Re: Hitchens on religion
- From: "Steve Goldfarb" <slg@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 29 May 2007 13:04:54 +0000 (UTC)
In <f3athv$jdu$1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> micha@xxxxxxxxxxx (Micha Berger) writes:
Do you deny that illusions exist? Given that illusions exist, must you
conclude, then, that there is nothing about which you can reason? You're
making a huge logical error here. Whether or not we are deluded is
irrelevant. If there's no *consistency* to the universe, then we can't
reason - but as long as our experiences are consistent, deluded or not,
then we can reason about them.
1- The requirement would be that our delusions are consistent.
Agreed
2- The result would be a theory about our delusions, not reality.
Agreed
3- How do you know the domain of delusion is only in the first
principles? Perhaps one's notion of "valid logic" is also delusional?
You never even know if you're really reasoning about them.
Agreed
Which is my point exactly -- we never demand the level of proof which
eliminates the consideration of delusion. The words "knowledge" vs
"faith" aren't used that way. If we did, you don't even know for sure
that you have eyes. You would have to call that "faith".
We never demand that level of proof where? The degree of proof necessary
depends upon the ramifications of the choice. Further, we generally
express our degree of certainty in how we respond -- you are specifically
asserting certainty here, and in my book certainty requires proof. It is
rare, in life, that absolute certainty is necessary - usually a reasonably
high confidence is sufficient, and in normal conversation I think people
generally understand this.
I am interested in certainty. I'm arguing that we are certain of many
things on the basis of things like inductive reasoning. That people
rightly accept proofs that are only nearly perfect with complete
trust.
First, inductive reasoning doesn't mean what you seem to think it means.
It's not just a random series of trials, after some number of which you
form a conclusion. The structure of an inductive proof is: if from any
rung in a ladder I can reach the next rung, and if I can reach the first
rung, therefore I have proven that I can reach the top of the ladder.
Umm... You're talking Mathematical Induction, I'm talking
Inductive Reasoning. Different things. Inductive
Reasoning really is drawing conclusions about a set from a
sampling of its members. As opposed to Deductive Reasoning. See
<http://www.sparknotes.com/math/geometry3/inductiveanddeductivereasoning/section1.html>
which begins, "Inductive reasoning is the process of arriving at a
conclusion based on a set of observations."
Did you read the next line? "In itself, it is not a valid method of
proof." Inductive reasoning is a tool for forming testable hypothesis, you
cannot assume the validity of your conclusion based on inductive
reasoning. You most definitely cannot declare certainty based on inductive
reasoning.
You still haven't shown how accepting "proofs that are only nearly perfect
with complete trust" is any different from "having faith." That's what
faith means, Micha, it means having complete trust based on an incomplete
proof.
My point is that if this is what faith means, and you really want to
speak consistently, then you have faith that you have a body, you have
faith that the sun came out today, you have faith that there is a law
of gravity, and you have faith that "2+2=4". In all of these cases, one
can never be sure one isn't deluded about the validity of the evidence
or the argument.
No! Because I won't assert absolute certainty that I have a body, that the
sun came out today, etc. For exactly the reason you cite -- I am aware
that I cannot be absolutely sure that I'm not deluded somehow. All I'm
willing to assert is that these data points are -- so far -- consistent
with everything else I know. I'm asserting consistency, not certainty.
Hence, it's not faith.
The game you're trying to play, distinguishing between the skepticism
of a scientist and the faith of a religious person, can simply be
reduced to being the product of inconsistently using the word faith.
Incorrect, and I'm not the one playing the game, Micha.
I have no idea of what you're trying to say here. Unless you're saying if
the first part is faith, then the belief that the ball wil drop must also
be faith? But it's NOT faith, Micha. I am reasonably sure to the point of
*near* certainty that the ball will fall...
You only have faith that the ball exists. After all, you can't prove
with full certainty that your sense aren't being fooled. And even if
you tried, you couldn't prove with full certainty we aren't be fooled
about the quality of the proof.
But Micha, I'm *not asserting with certainty that the ball exists*. You're
definitely playing games here. I'm saying there's no certainty, you are
insisting that their is. The onus is on you to defend that assertion. So
far you haven't done very well.
...
Further, you're arguing apples and oranges. One is an experience, the
other is a conclusion. You have faith in the SYSTEM, that is, your
UNDERSTANDING of God and halacha. I most certainly do NOT have anything
approaching faith in my understanding of gravity.
Gravity is not an experience. It's a generalization from past experience
that people hold as a cherished presumption will apply to future
experiences.
Gravity is a theory. The ball dropping is an experience. Asserting that a
prior experience is likely to happen again, given the same circumstance,
is quite different from generalizing based on that experience and
"reasoning" an overall theory. Aristotle erred this way often.
Yeah, and? The current physical evidence and logic clearly indicate that
there was no Exodus. Do you believe that it happened anyway, despite the
lack of evidence, some contrary evidence, and illogic of that belief?
Actually, there is no physical evidence and logical possible for the
miraculous. That's why the realm of religious argument should not be
confused with empirical arguments.
Foul! You asserted "Faith, as promoted by many forms of Christianity,
would be to hold a level of belief that it is so unrelated to evidence or
reason that it could be held on to *despite* evidence or logic to the
contrary." Well, I have you an example of exactly that, and now you're
saying, what, that evidence or logic don't apply to religious arguments?
You just flat-out contradicted yourself, Micha. By your own definition,
belief in the Exodus requires faith.
Of course not. It's only a summary of my thesis.
The concept of faith, as shaped by Christianity (the dominant religion
among English speakers) connotes something far different than "We have
very strong evidence but we might be delusional, so we can only say that
we are as sure of this as we can be of anything."
Right... I don't disagree with that. Faith is stronger than "we are as
sure of this as we can be of anything." But you've never -- ever --
asserted that your claim was "I am as confident in Judaism as I can be in
anything," you've asserted that it's flat-out absolute truth. If you're
introducing a whole new thought here, well that's something else.
--s
--
.
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