Election Backlash: Iraq, Palestine, and Israel

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Election Backlash: Iraq, Palestine, and Israel

Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit

Electronic Iraq - May 10, 2006
http://electroniciraq.net/news/2349.shtml

Election Backlash: Iraq, Palestine, and Israel

by Roni Ben Efrat, Challenge magazine

The phrase "democratic elections" can be misleading in its positive
connotation, especially when the countries where the elections take place
are embroiled in conflict. In the Middle East, during the past six months,
we have witnessed three sets of elections. Each has further entangled an
already complex situation. There were the Iraqi elections in December 2005,
then the January 2006 elections for the Palestinian Authority (PA), and, in
March, the Israeli elections. In the first two instances, the voting took
place during or just after a bloody war; the elections aspired to usher in a
new era of conflict resolution.

Iraq

Let's begin with Iraq. This country was chosen by the militant Bush
administration to serve as a guinea pig in its crusade to eliminate
(selectively) dictatorships in the Middle East. The larger purpose was to
make the opening shot in a new global policy - now that the Soviet Union was
gone - for "shaping the international security order in line with American
principles and interests."[1] The document from which we have quoted, called
Rebuilding America's Defenses (September 2000), became the basis for the
foreign and defense policy of US President George W. Bush.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 gave new urgency to America's drive for
global control, as reflected in a later document, "The National Security
Strategy of the United States", published by the Bush Administration on
September 20, 2002.[2] It contains what came to be known as the Bush
Doctrine: "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the
support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone,
if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting
preemptively..." The consequence was clear: Americans would not be safe
until Uncle Sam secured its position as the world's sole superpower. The
first step would be to seize control of the Middle East's oil reserves. This
could be packaged as a noble campaign to democratize the region.

The Bush Administration skipped over one little detail: the ethnic and
religious structure of Iraq. If it had replaced Saddam Hussein with some
other ruthless dictator, it might have gotten the control it wanted. But no,
the pretext was democracy, so democracy it had to be. In a society like
Iraq's, however, where ethnic affiliations and religious belief are prime
organizing factors, democracy inevitably becomes an alternative form of
tyranny. A religious majority will put God's law first. An ethnic majority
will seek to ensure its dominance. When Bush and his neo-cons talked about
democracy in Iraq, they were selling it to Americans within an American
context. Democracy can be a force for peace and justice, including
protection of minority rights, but only under certain conditions.
Scientific, industrial and urban revolutions must have done their work,
breaking the power of clans and promoting secularization (a prerequisite for
separating religion from the state). Even that doesn't bring economic
justice, but it's a step. However, you can't take a thing like "democratic
elections" out of your secular, industrial context and impose it on a
tribal, religious society without getting tyranny-of-the-majority.

The Iraqi elections gave the Shia movements almost half the seats in
parliament. The result is a level of tension that cannot be eradicated. For
there are other ethnic groups in Iraq, notably the Sunnis and the Kurds.
Each is big enough to make big problems.

As prime minister, the Shia at first proposed Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who had
headed the provisional government during the months before the elections.
Washington, the Sunnis and the Kurds did not like him. The Administration's
view was also the view of a New York Times editorial on February 14, 2006,
called "The Wrong Man in Iraq":

"Mr. Jaafari has been a spectacular failure?. He is unlikely to do a better
job if he gets the job a second time, particularly since he owes his
selection to a political deal with the followers of Moktada al-Sadr, a man
whose own armed gang, the Mahdi Army, is very much part of the problem."

On April 2, the Times editorial called Moktada al-Sadr "a radical
anti-American cleric who leads a powerful private militia that is behind
much of the sectarian terror."

Ethnic militias are everywhere in Iraq, indeed, because ethnic mistrust
there has deep historical foundations, reaching deep down into the period of
Saddam Hussein. This mistrust was part of the "given," before the Great
White Bush arrived with shock, awe and democracy. What else was to be
expected?

The Times editorial of February 14 declared that "democracy does not require
confirming him (Jaafari) as prime minister," and so it happened: under
pressure from Washington, the man exalted by the democratic process was
forced to step aside. Instead, his spokesperson, Jawad al-Maliki, has been
put forward. Malaki is "a stalwart of Iraq's Dawa party - the Shia political
group that for years led an armed underground resistance to the secular
Baathist leadership of Saddam Hussein."3 Given the religious and ethnic
context, is there any reason to think that Maliki will succeed where Jaafari
did not? The imposition of American interests, we shall see, will only
complicate the existing strife, pushing the country deeper into civil war.

There is another side to the coin. While Iraq has become a pile of rubble,
the Americans too have paid heavily for their exported "adventure in
democracy." First, the Bush Administration has increased the importance of
Iran as a geopolitical power, because of the Shia connection. America will
need Iranian cooperation if it is ever to extricate itself from its Iraq
nightmare (a point that should be reckoned with in speculations about a US
attack on Iran). Second, since the start of the war the price of oil has
more than doubled, from $30 per barrel to $70. Third, more than 2300
American soldiers have been killed and more than 17,000 wounded,
contributing to a plunge in Bush's popularity and the likelihood of a
lame-duck presidency after the Congressional elections in November.
Washington's endorsement of Maliki, it appears, derives from its desire to
make a quick escape from the cauldron of its own creation, rather than from
any new formula for resolving sectarian conflicts.

The Palestinian Arena

In the Palestinian Authority (PA), the divisions do not run along religious
or ethnic lines. Here too, however, democratic elections did not help
anyone.

Elections took place as the result of a deal between PA President Abu Mazen
and Hamas: the latter would pause in its armed struggle, and in exchange Abu
Mazen would hold elections. Hamas moved eagerly toward the polls on both the
municipal and national levels.

First it won landslide victories in the municipalities. Aghast, Abu Mazen
wanted to postpone the national elections. Bush, though, insisted he go
through with them. Severely criticized over Iraq, the American president
wanted to show momentum toward democracy in the Middle East. So elections
there were, in January, and the Hamas victory took everyone including Hamas
by surprise.

Most pundits had expected that the voting pattern would differ from that in
the municipal polls. But the people contradicted this, again choosing Hamas.
They did so not because of the movement's extremism or its refusal to
recognize Israel, and not because it rejects a negotiated solution. The
people simply demonstrated the depth of its disgust with the corrupt PA and
Fatah. The vote was also a way of punishing Israel and America. "You want
democracy? Here's some in your face!"

While on the subject of punishment, we should note that the Americans and
Israelis are past masters. At least in the short term. The hazing through
which they're putting Hamas, with no scruples about starving Palestinians,
is aimed at transforming it into Fatah. It's as if they were saying: "Either
change your stripes and adopt the Fatah policy or get out of the game. We
don't just determine the rules, we decide the final score."

It has often been said in these pages that Hamas never intended to hit the
jackpot. Because its ideology prevents it from recognizing or negotiating
with Israel, it would have preferred to join a government under Fatah. Today
the movement is caught in a peculiar situation: the people wants Hamas
purity without Hamas politics. Will Hamas sacrifice its agenda for the sake
of the people's? The latest developments do not indicate this. The
democratic process entails the risk of winning, and one does well to
calculate it beforehand. Too big a victory can spell defeat when the victors
are not prepared ideologically for the leadership role.

But the main miscalculation here was Israel's and America's. Purity became
the chief issue in the Palestinian campaign not just because Fatah
corruption was execrable, but because there were no political prospects.
What point was there in voting for a group that recognizes and is willing to
talk with Israel, when it is clear by now that recognition and talks lead
nowhere: they won't stop the separation barrier, won't stop cantonization,
won't open Jerusalem, won't get rid of the settlement blocs, won't free the
prisoners, won't bring back the refugees, and won't lead to a real
Palestinian state.

And yet all Palestinians stand to lose. Hamas stoops today under
international and financial pressures that are likely to end either in civil
war or in its withdrawal from politics and a return to arms. Either option
spells catastrophe for the Palestinian people.

Israel

In Israel, the cradle of Middle Eastern democracy, elections enabled the
nation to keep its head in the sand. The founding of Kadima in November
2005, after PM Ariel Sharon's secession from the Likud, was intended to be
the basis for a new Israeli political center. The scenario, known as the
"big bang," had all centrist forces hitching their wagons to Sharon,
overwhelming extremists on the left and the right. Smaller parties too would
join in. At last, it was hoped, Israel would be able to bulldoze a path
toward what Sharon conceived as the nation's two main tasks: (1) to resolve
social problems while preserving a credible economic position in the eyes of
foreign investors and financial institutions; and (2) to lessen the scope of
the Occupation and unilaterally establish permanent borders. Neither of
these projects can withstand the test of reality. As long as it remains
within the context of global capitalism, Israel cannot create the jobs it
would need in order to narrow social gaps. As for the second task, the
Palestinians will not simply surrender. This fabric of self-delusory
expectations depended on one man, an old man of colossal proportions who
emerged from his ascent of the Knesset stairs each day with a smile on
camera as if to say, "Surprise, still here!" Then one day he wasn't.

At first it seemed that Sharon's incapacity would not affect the chances of
his successor, Ehud Olmert, to continue the project. Olmert even thought to
use the expected majority as a sort of national referendum for the
unilateral withdrawal he intended to carry through in parts of the West
Bank. As Election Day approached, however, worrisome signs appeared. The day
after, Israel awoke to a strange, diffuse political map. Kadima led - but
with only 29 mandates of the 120. Labor declined from 22 to 19. Shinui,
which had been third in size with 15 mandates, disappeared entirely. The
public punished the Likud, which fell from 40 to 12. It raised up a new
right-wing party under Avigdor Lieberman (11 mandates). The lack of trust in
Olmert or Amir Peretz, the new head of the Labor Party, expressed itself in
a protest vote for the Pensioners' Party (7 mandates).

Democratic elections, in sum, can be harmful, especially when conditions are
such that they can only lead to sectarian strife, as in Iraq; or when they
offer no meaningful political prospect, as in the Palestinian territories;
or when they distract a nation from facing reality, as in Israel.

Footnotes

[1]http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
[2]http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat.htm

CHALLENGE is a bi-monthly leftist magazine focusing on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict within a global context. Published in Jaffa by
Arabs and Jews, it features political analysis, investigative reporting,
interviews, eye-witness reports, gender studies, arts, and more. This
article was published first in CHALLENGE #97 and is reprinted with
permission.

© 2003-2005 Electronic Iraq/electronicIraq.net, a joint project from Voices
in the Wilderness and The Electronic Intifada.

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