"China is the elder brother in Asia and India is the younger brother"
- From: ano457@xxxxxxxxx
- Date: 29 Aug 2005 20:43:56 -0700
Book Review
Protracted Conflict: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century
John W. Garver.
Protracted Conflict: Sino-Indian Rivalry
in the Twentieth Century.
John W. Garver, in this well-crafted and incisive study of Sino-Indian
relations in the past half-century and more, refers to the impressive
contributions of Chinese and Indian civilizations, but hints at the
difference in their prime characteristics. There was a political
content to China's, which reflects its longer life-span as a state.
India's was essentially a complex cultural enterprise reflecting the
country's unique genius to explore and absorb.
India's China policy was in turn idealistic, naïve, muddled and
sensible. Nehru understood from the beginning that Mao's China would
never consent to play the role of a Soviet East European satellite,
when US Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had confidently
pronounced the new China to be a "slavic Manchukuo". Nevertheless, the
Indian Prime Minister seriously underestimated the primordial texture
to China's communist nationalism and its ruthless leadership. In the
after-shock of India's humiliating defeat by China in the 1962 border
war, Nehru confessed to his parliament that "we have been living in an
artificial world of our own creation".
The agenda of Mao's China was never in doubt from the day the regime
proclaimed its existence from the ramparts of Beijing's Gate of
Heavenly Peace. "China has stood up", the Chairman said. "Never again
would she be humiliated." Loss of imperial territory to Western
colonial powers and to Tsarist Russia was one reason why the Qing
(Ch'ing Dynasty) rulers had lost face and moral authority with their
subjects. Committed to the restoration of China's former limits, the
Communists were resolute in defence of the far expanses of the Qing
Empire. Communist governance has cheerfully borne the burdens of the
imperial past.
When Ambassador K. M. Panikkar, in 1948, presented his credentials at
the Chinese Foreign Ministry, he was received with friendliness by
Kuomintang officials, but it was made clear to him that China was the
elder brother in Asia, and that India, as the younger brother, was
expected to know its place. The entry of the People's Liberation Army
into Tibet and India's mild protest brought a searing response: it was
none of India's business, and it showed that New Delhi was acting under
foreign influence: read the USA and Britain.
The author quotes Chairman Mao as saying that it was Tibet and not the
MacMahon Line that lay at the heart of the Sino-Indian dispute. He was
having none of the casuistic legal distinctions between suzerainty and
sovereignty. Tibet was an inalienable part of China and his government
would brook no argument over China's right to full autocratic
possession. Tibet, as a buffer on India's northern frontier, was a
Curzonian imperative; it was surrendered by the Indian government
without the precautionary quid pro quo of a settled border. Peaceful
co-existence would work well with Nepal, for example, because its
feudal oligarchs have been happy to hand back fleeing Tibetan refugees
to the Chinese authorities. No Indian government could survive were it
to do likewise.
Garver refers to India's rejection of a possible alignment with the USA
because of Nehru's insistence on non-alignment, but this explanation
may be a trifle simplistic. He had been deeply affected by
Anglo-American politicking over Kashmir at the United Nations. It was
the invasion of the territory by Pakistan-sponsored Pathan tribesmen,
and the killing and rape of mainly Hindus and the looting of their
property, rather than territorial rights, that affected Indian opinion.
This was also the case in 1971, with the Pakistan genocidal massacres
in the former East Pakistan (Bangladesh today).
Nehru's visit to the USA in 1949 had disappointed both hosts and guest.
A US State Department desk officer in 1949, castigating the Indian
premier for his "inflexible attitude on Kashmir", suggested "national
traits which in time, if not controlled, could make India Japan's
successor in Asiatic imperialism. In such circumstances, a strong
Muslim bloc under the leadership of Pakistan and friendly to the US
might afford a desirable balance of power in South Asia".
This is not greatly different from Chinese policy in the past few
decades. Garver threads his way through the diplomatic and moral maze
of the Sino-Indian relationship as it waxed and waned. Pakistan has
been Beijing's strategic anchor in South Asia. Chairman Mao protected
it from the storms of the Cultural Revolution, such was its perceived
value. Yet, curiously, he held India in uncomprehending contempt.
India was to be kept off-balance in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, which
Beijing has refused to recognize as a constituent of the Indian Union.
Sikkim was listed as an Indian princely state by the British, contrary
to Garver's assertion of its protectorate status. China's close
relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, coupled with the
Pakistan connection, had India encircled. Through the 1990s the Clinton
administration's pour parlers with Beijing appeared to recognize a
Chinese 'sphere of influence' in the subcontinent. China's
nuclear-weapons help to Pakistan, which Garver outlines, appeared to
have little effect on Washington. Nuclear technology and missile
proliferation were tolerated for reasons of diplomatic convenience.
And then India went nuclear. Pakistan followed suit and the 'ball-game'
changed dramatically. Garver's title was published before September 11,
2001. Afghanistan, North Korea, Iraq and global terrorism have
contributed to a seminal change of scene. Putin's arrival brought India
and Russia into a 'strategic partnership', closer than at any time
during the Soviet era. The USA and India are establishing a
relationship that would have been unthinkable a few years ago; India
and Israel are engaged in a bonding of far-reaching consequences, while
Japan and India are conducting strategic talks for the first time since
Indian Independence in August 1947.
Notwithstanding the mystique attached to China's age-old strategist --
Sun Tzu and his Art of War -- Beijing may yet rue the day it helped
Pakistan with nuclear weapons. Clearly, the last word on China's
protracted contest with India has not been said.
Premen Addy
.
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