Re: 'US to cap our N-program' Satish Chandra
- From: "Morar" <mortayee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 18 Aug 2005 15:58:05 -0700
Indians under Congress led by Italiano, with non-functional opposition
of geriatric monkey brigade in disarray, are being taken for a ride!
Morar wrote:
> He is an 'ambitious and scheming individual.' A hardliner on India, his
> elevation as Chief of the Army Staff does not bode well for Indo-Pak
> relations. And he will not toe (Nawaz) Sharif's line over a longer
> period.'
>
> That was the prophetic gist of a secret telegram sent to Delhi by then
> Indian high commissioner to Pakistan Satish Chandra when Prime Minister
> Nawaz Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf as Pakistan's army
> chief in October 1998.
>
> Chandra, now 63, was high commissioner to Islamabad from 1995 to 1998.
> Appointed Deputy National Security Advisor from January 1999 to
> February 2005, he participated in the Indo-US Security and
> Non-Proliferation Dialogue. An expert on disarmament, he was also
> permanent representative to the UN in Geneva from 1992 to 1995.
>
>
> 'US wants to cap our nuclear programme'
>
> August 18, 2005
>
>
> Former Deputy National Security Adviser Satish Chandra believes the
> recently concluded nuclear deal between India and the US is dangerous
> for India's national security, because it exposes India's nuclear
> weapons programme to external interference.
> In the second part of the interview to Senior Editor Sheela Bhatt,
> Chandra explains why separating India's civilian and military nuclear
> facilities will adversely impact its weapons programme, which needs to
> be flexible to adapt to changing circumstances.
> Part I of the interview: 'The US has not fully delivered'
> Part II of the interview: ''World doesn't know how many bombs India
> has'
> But there is also a counter-claim regarding the separation of civilian
> and military facilities.
> Yes, I know. I am just saying we have an excellent atomic energy
> establishment. It is of high repute and has an excellent ethos. It has
> delivered both on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and on the weapons
> side.
> We have a large manpower pool and interchange always take place,
> creating synergy. We are doing lots of research on both sides. If you
> are going to segregate people it will affect research.
> Say if I am engaged in the Bhabha Atomic Energy Centre. Now, if you
> shift me (after the segregation of civilian and military facilities as
> India has agreed with the US) to the civilian side, you are limiting my
> options. The country will have a limited pool of talent for the weapons
> programme.
> The segregation of civilian and military facilities is not wise and not
> practical.
> Also, we don't know who will head the military structure. Will it be
> under the Department of Atomic Energy? Maybe we will have to create a
> huge structure. Will civil servants head a military structure?
> Indo-US nuclear treaty: A good deal
> Many countries do have separate civil and military nuclear
> establishments.
> Frankly, you can't compare yourself to others, not even to Pakistan.
> The US is a massive power and they have laboratories doing both
> military and civilian work. The US can get away with anything. If they
> ask others to stay away no one will go further.
> Pakistan's nuclear programme is almost exclusively military. India has
> agreed to additional protocol, which are so strict and intrusive. India
> has agreed to dangerous ground rules.
> During the NDA rule, I was involved somewhat in NSSP (Next Steps in
> Strategic Partnership)talks. Then, there was no question of agreeing to
> segregation (of civil and military nuclear facilities). Because that
> would not have been accepted at all. We were arguing with the Americans
> that we already had stringent protocols and that we are not
> proliferators. We have stringent controls because it is in India's
> interest.
> But now we have agreed to obligations which were entirely avoidable. We
> are accepting controls in return for what?
> Charter of Dependence?
> It is a question of future vision. What about new plants? Also, once
> the US changes it laws India will able to talk to France and Russia for
> nuclear fuel.
> India's route is not the light breeder reactor. We have fast breeder
> reactors. And we have ample thorium reserves. I know it will take time
> to make use of it. But we should have explored the ways to get uranium
> from other sources, from other countries that are not bound by
> international laws.
> India-US: Unequal partners
> Since the days of Nehru India has said it needs weapons only for
> minimum deterrent. You can't keep saying that you are a Gandhian
> country and a believer of peace and also ask for thousands of bombs.
> We have always been a peaceful country. We are for the complete
> elimination of nuclear weapons. I was posted in Geneva, as permanent
> representative and I know well that this is the issue we still hold
> dear to us.
> If the world agrees to complete elimination of nuclear weapons, India
> has offered a time bound programme (to do so).
> My colleagues from the West then at the UN told me that it is a pipe
> dream. Nuclear weapons are here to stay. That is the reason India went
> for nuclear testing.
> It is not minimum deterrent India is talking about. India's doctrine is
> one of credible minimum deterrence. What is the assessment of minimum
> deterrent today? It could be X. After ten years it could be two X.
> India's minimum deterrent will change if assessment of threats to the
> country changes.
> What is safe today may not be safe enough tomorrow. You can't finalise
> your stockpile of weapons today because we don't know what the future
> holds.
> Countries who think that they are threatened by India would like to
> know the numbers. Do you want to reveal those numbers? The moment you
> separate your facilities you reveal your numbers.
> Countries like America don't have to bother about it because fissile
> material is coming out of their ears, but a country like India should
> be very, very cautious.
> It is the US game plan to cap India's nuclear weapon programme. What
> the US Congress is ready to do is not as important for me. What we are
> committing is important for me. We are committing to a complete
> inspection regime for our civilian nuclear sector. It will not be
> possible to produce fissile material for our military establishment.
> You are agreeing to close that option.
> They have not even de-hyphenated our relation vis-à-vis Pakistan. Soon
> after talking to us Ms Rice called Pakistan and briefed them. In short,
> I am saying that to get fuel the price we are paying is too high. I
> have a problem with what we are giving in. Give and take is fine but
> when you give in national security, it is not fine with me.
> US lawmakers say N-deal will be a tough-sell
> Critics could ask you to rethink your definition of national security.
> For me definition of national security is to have a credible minimum
> deterrent. We are sacrificing a credible minimum deterrent. I am very
> conservative on matters of national security. I think it is dangerous.
> But India is so poor. More than 230 million people live below the
> poverty line.
> Right. We are a developing country, and that is why we have a 'credible
> minimum deterrent.' The US is so rich they have a 'massive deterrent.'
.
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