Update: The FBI and Chinese in the U.S.

On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 15:50:13 -0700, rst0wxyz <rst0wxyz@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

learn the latest secret project in the US. Once one is trained in the
methodology its not terribly difficult to deconstruct the probable
technology solutions needed to design and build a particular machine
to duplicate the functions. All machines obey the same physics,
chemistry and engineering rules. The Americans may have the more
advanced machine but a close enough copycat is good enough in most
applications.

Some of the precision machines are very fine and precise. A copycat
is NOT good enough and in a lot of cases, it's a waste of time and
money without the very fine and precise machines to do the job. It
would take a lot of time and money to refine a copycat machine to be
good enough and precise enough to pass test and inspection. That is
what "industrial spying and stealing" give you, to save time and money
to refine the equipment.

========================================

PPP: The article below show that China, and any technologically
competent country, can develop equivalent complex systems
independently. Once an objective is established whose solution is
based on technology there are always alternative solutions to arrive
at the same end result. In this case it is satellite based
navigational positioning.

In other areas China has its own computer CPU chip designs and its own
OS. They have not been released to the general public as current
market leaders (Intel, MS, etc.) have an overwhelming lead. They are
used in governmnet installations where security is paramount. Even
France has the same philosophy and has banned government business from
using Blackberries and iPods for example. But any competent country
can design and build equivalent technology systems. The use of the
word "copycat" was unfortunate as it misdirects the discussion.
========================================

Galileo: Europe's great leap outward
Despite its partnership with China, the European Galileo Satellite
System may need substantial infusion of public money if it is to
survive. The US, protective of its own Global Positioning System, has
been opposed from the beginning, fearing China will use the technology
to upgrade its military. Meanwhile, Galileo is facing competition from
Russia and an indigenous Chinese system.

Galileo: Europe's great leap outward
By Jose Carlos Matias
July 19, 2007 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IG19Ad01.html

When the European Union and China agreed to cooperate to develop the
Galileo Satellite System in 2003, the US reacted with strong
skepticism, since Washington was against the sharing of sensitive
dual-use technology (with civilian and military applications) with
China.

In the past, the United States had tried unsuccessfully to impede the
EU's ability to set up Galileo, which is an alternative to the
US-established Global Positioning System (GPS). At the time, US
analysts questioned why Brussels was spending money (3.6 billion
euros, now the equivalent of nearly US$5 billion) to duplicate an
existing system that was available "for free", and why it was eager to
accept Chinese participation in the program.

Four years later, the EU-China "maturing partnership" has evolved
toward a more complex network of common and contradictory interests,
as the trans-Atlantic links have slowly recovered since the US-led
intervention in Iraq.

Moreover, China has begun to develop its own global navigation
satellite system (GNSS) - the Beidou-2. At the same time, the Galileo
deployment has suffered a crisis due to disagreements among the
industries that were awarded the concession to build and deploy the
first four satellites of the Galileo system.

Public funding may save Galileo, but the best-case scenario for a
successful program is for the actors involved to pursue a more
realistic approach. In addition to China's announcement of upgrading
Beidou to mass-market applications, Russia has also decided to
complete its own GNSS, called Glonass.

In the face of these developments, what will be the impact of
developing the Chinese GNSS for EU-China cooperation and to the
commercial feasibility of Galileo?

The EU and the European Space Agency (ESA) made the decision to create
their own GNSS because of a combination of factors that imply
political, economic, technological, social and military gains.
Politically, Galileo has been portrayed as a guarantee of independence
and autonomy from the US-established GPS.

This perspective became more evident in the aftermath of the Kosovo
war when European forces were fully dependent on the US system, a
limitation that has worried the actors involved in the development of
a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), especially the member
states that stand for the modernization of autonomous EU military
capabilities.

Since the beginning of the definition phase of Galileo, European
Community (EC) papers have noted the importance of Galileo for
Europe's Rapid Reaction Force, EU peacekeeping missions and,
separately, the realm of activities related to the "Petersburg Tasks",
a set of security and military tasks in the field of peacekeeping and
stability operations agreed in 1992 among the EU members.

It is noteworthy to underscore the fact that the defense-related
justifications for Galileo have been played down by the EU
institutions, which instead have highlighted the economic benefits of
a GNSS. On behalf of the EC, the consultancy company
PricewaterhouseCoopers drew up a business plan for the Galileo
project, which was submitted to the European Council of Ministers.

By involving private-sector actors, Galileo "should generate revenues
for the operator rising from some 66 [million euros] in 2010 to over
500 [million euros] in 2020", the report said. Definitively, Galileo
would create a "virtuous cycle" through a spin-off effect in several
sectors of the European economy. Moreover, Galileo has been portrayed
as an instrument to create thousands of jobs and as a way to avoid the
brain drain in the realm of aerospace, aeronautics and satellite
industries.

Undoubtedly, Galileo signifies independence and autonomy from the US
and the ownership of cutting-edge technology. Galileo has been
regarded as a key instrument not only in the process of modernizing
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and ESDP, but also part of the
ongoing integration of the EU's defense industries.

The US response
US opposition to the European GNSS can be understood in two different,
but complementary, perspectives: economic reasons (in terms of market
share of GNSS services) and security and military concerns.

In 2001, then-US deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz addressed
the central problem from Washington's perspective by expressing, in a
letter to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
concern that Galileo could interfere with US military operations
guided by GPS. Wolfowitz also expressed the willingness of the
Pentagon to take part in the development of Galileo, justifying this
position with the fact that NATO enjoyed the benefits of GPS.

After Washington's "diplomatic offensive", analysts thought the birth
of Galileo was in danger. Yet in March 2002, there was a breakthrough,
and Galileo saw the green light during the Barcelona Summit of Heads
of State and Government. After failing to put Galileo on the back
burner, Washington started to emphasize concerns over the interference
of signals between the two GNSSs.

This problem was solved in June 2004 with an interoperability
agreement between the US and the EU. Yet even before, in October 2003,
another problem came into sight when Brussels and Beijing signed the
cooperation agreement on the development of Galileo.

The China dimension
On September 18, 2003, the EC announced that China was to join the
Galileo undertaking and finance it as a preferential external partner.
According to the agreement, China would contribute at least 230
million euros. From Washington's point of view, this partnership posed
several dangers to the trans-Atlantic relationship and especially to
the security and economic interests of the United States.

Basically, by involving China in the development of Galileo, the EU
was indirectly helping the modernization of the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), an act regarded as unacceptable by many analysts and
politicians in Washington.

Indeed, it would be almost impossible to prevent the transfer of
technology to the Chinese. This has been a very sensitive issue at a
time when the US is increasingly preoccupied with the military
capabilities of China. In addition, the Europeans could be, in
practice, contradicting the arms embargo imposed on Beijing in the
aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre of 1989.

In the worst-case scenario - a war between mainland China and Taiwan -
the PLA would be using the European GNSS in a war against Taiwanese
military forces. The possibility of the PLA using the Galileo system
was ruled out by EU authorities, since the most accurate signal, the
Public Regulated Service (PRS), is encrypted and can only be used by
specific entities: the European Police Office (Europol), the European
Anti-Fraud Office (Office Europeen de Lutte Anti-Fraude, or OLAF),
civil protection services, safety services (Maritime Safety Agency),
emergency response services, humanitarian response teams, and the EU
peacekeeping forces involved in the Petersburg Tasks missions.

In any case, the US was not convinced by this guarantee and spurred
the development of a new generation of GPS satellites. In 2004, a
British media report revealed that the United States was developing
anti-satellite systems capable of wiping out EU Galileo satellites if
they were being used against US troops.

For the EU, the partnership with China represents an attractive
opportunity to have access to a promising transport and
telecommunication market. Right after the signing of the EU-China
agreement, Loyola de Palacio, then European commissioner for transport
and energy, made Europe's stand very clear, stating, "China will help
Galileo become the major world infrastructure for the growing market
for location services."

This level of cooperation can only be understood in light of a
Sino-European "maturing and comprehensive partnership" based on
intense economic and political linkages. Simultaneously, the EU has
been projecting itself as a global player - for some analysts, a
rather civilian power - with ambition to develop its autonomy and
independence from the US in terms of military capabilities.

Growing competition from China, Russia
In Beijing's eyes, cooperation in the Galileo project is seen as part
of a strategy of strengthening China's position in the international
arena, by cooperating in a sensitive technology that disrupts US
hegemony in GNSS. In addition, this cooperation appears to be a golden
opportunity to benefit from the transfer of expertise and technology
in such a sensitive asset. This would be extremely useful in tandem
with the Chinese Space Strategy.

In 2000, China published the White Paper on Space Activities,
declaring that the creation of an independent satellite navigation and
positioning system was a priority. The embryo of this system was
already in orbit when China and the EU agreed on the partnership. The
Beidou system consisted, at the time, of three geostationary
satellites, whose positioning and navigation coverage and accuracy
were far behind what Galileo aimed for.

Analysts believed that the future Beidou-2 (also called Compass
System), a 35-satellite constellation, would only be used by the
military - this would justify the decision of investing 230 million
euros in the Galileo system. Last November, however, China's official
news agency, Xinhua, unveiled that the Beidou system would provide,
from 2008 onward, commercial open services with a 10-meter accuracy.
It was noted that this service could be "free of charge" for the
Chinese people and to other countries that would sign agreements with
China.

In addition to Chinese pressure, Russia announced this May that its
own GNSS, the Glonass system, which had been only partially operable,
would be fully operable and available "for free" to customers in 2009
after the deployment of the remaining satellites of a constellation of
24. Meanwhile, the process of deployment of the first four Galileo
satellites went into crisis because of strong disagreements among the
national industries of consortia responsible to build and deploy those
satellites.

So far, only one satellite - Giove A - has been deployed (in December
2005). The whole process is delayed, and what was supposed to be in
orbit and operable in 2008 was postponed to 2011-12. In face of these
hurdles, the EU transport ministers asked the EC to draw a plan to
"bail out" Galileo through public funding.

Currently, the EU faces growing pressure from the other major space
powers in the realm of satellite positioning and navigation. With the
new developments of the Beidou system, the promise of profitable
access to the Chinese transport and telecommunication market may be in
danger. What was deemed to be strategic cooperation may become
strategic competition.

The progress in the Beidou system implies that Chinese authorities
were aware of its probable limitations in seizing the military
benefits of the transfer of technology. At this moment, it is not
clear how the EU-China partnership will evolve, given that it faces a
complex network of common and contradictory interests.

It is plausible that both parties will reach a solution to share the
market through consultation. It is important, however, to bear in mind
that the EU-China relationship is still, to some extent, a consequence
of the other parts of the triangular equation: the US-China
relationship and the US-EU trans-Atlantic alliance.

The rapidly announced development of the Chinese Beidou system and the
Russian Glonass has put pressure on EU authorities to solve the
imbroglio and spur the deployment of the remaining satellites. As a
reaction to the foreseeable competition, Brussels has been eager to
set up agreements with other countries.

Last month, the ESA paved the way to satellite cooperation with Africa
through a cooperation agreement with the Agency for Security of Air
Navigation in Africa and Madagascar. Previously, Israel, Ukraine,
India, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and South Korea had signed agreements to
become partners and join the Galileo project.

In the meantime, even if there are some doubts on the commercial
feasibility, it is becoming clear that the defense and military
applications are, per se, a strong reason to use European taxpayer
money to save Galileo.

Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an
analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All
comments should be directed to content@xxxxxxxxx

.