Sino-Canadian Relations Enter Uncharted Waters
- From: Mike <yard22192@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2007 05:27:12 -0700
http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373468
China Brief
Volume 7, Issue 12 (June 13, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Sino-Canadian Relations Enter Uncharted Waters
By Wenran Jiang
Only eighteen months ago, China's relations with Canada seemed to be
at their best in history. President Hu Jintao had visited Prime
Minister Paul Martin in Ottawa, declaring that a bilateral strategic
partnership was established and the two countries would cooperate in a
range of areas from energy security to environment to trade and
investment. Since the Conservatives ousted the Liberals and formed a
minority government in early 2006, however, Sino-Canadian relations
have entered a period of uncertainty. While the new government in
Ottawa underwent a learning curve in formulating its policy toward
China, Beijing has displayed no urgency to adopt any fresh
initiatives.
A Withering "Strategic Partnership"
Under the Liberals, from 1993 to 2006, the Canadian government took
active measures to promote engagement with China. Both Prime Ministers
Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin pursued closer economic relations with
Beijing. The "Team Canada" approach, developed by the Chrétien cabinet
with much hope and hype, was first applied to furthering economic and
trade relations with China. The idea of provincial premiers and
hundreds of Canadian business executives following the prime minister
on a mission to Canada's major trade partners was to demonstrate a new
commitment by the federal government to make Canada more competitive
in a globalizing world.
The Liberal government managed to further upgrade Canada's political
relations with China through a number of important phases. In 1997,
Beijing optimistically labeled its relationship with Ottawa as a
"Trans-century Comprehensive Partnership." In response to the Chinese
initiative, a Canadian Strategic Working Group, centered on the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, but with the
participation of other federal and provincial government agencies and
China experts across Canada, was created in early 2004. When Chinese
President Hu Jintao visited Ottawa in the fall of 2005, the two sides
officially elevated the bilateral relationship from "cooperative
partnership" to "strategic partnership"-a status reserved for
Beijing's most important and trustworthy international partners.
Both the Chrétien and Martin cabinets also made achieving closer
energy ties with Beijing one of their top China policy objectives.
Major Canadian missions to China have focused on energy. When Atomic
Energy of Canada Ltd. completed two CANDU 6 nuclear reactors at
Qinshan, outside of Shanghai, on time and within budget, Chrétien went
to China to celebrate. A major highlight of Martin's official visit in
January 2005 was the signing of the Canada-China Statement on Energy:
Cooperation in the 21st Century, which identified three priorities of
cooperation in energy and related areas.
The new Conservative government under the leadership of Prime Minister
Stephen Harper, however, did not display a high level interest in any
of these China policy initiatives implemented by the Liberals in most
of 2006. For months, Foreign Minister Peter Mackay did not respond to
the Chinese Ambassador's request for a meeting; the Conservatives
criticized China's human rights record; the annual bilateral
governmental human rights dialogue was assessed with little value and
suspended, and a senior China policy consultation session did not take
place until last October. While Beijing was waiting for Ottawa to
adopt a more favorable foreign policy, the Canadian government stopped
using the term "strategic partnership" to characterize bilateral
relations. In his recent and first visit to China, Foreign Minister
Mackay stated that he was seeking a "constructive and comprehensive
relationship" with China (Toronto Star, April 30).
The "Rights versus Trade" Debate
China's human rights violations, which preoccupied the Canadian
public's perception of China and then-conservative Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney's China policy in 1989, gradually diminished from being
an important factor in Sino-Canadian relations under the leadership of
the Liberals. Even under the administration of Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy, who emphasized the promotion of human rights, Canada took a
subdued approach toward China on its human rights record. The Liberal
idea of an engagement strategy with China on human rights was to avoid
open confrontation and, instead, to adopt more subtle and indirect
means to hopefully influence Chinese behavior.
The Conservatives, during their tenure as the opposition, often
clashed with the Liberals and criticized the government's policy of
prioritizing trade over human rights. In fact, Canada's China policy
has often been a subject of heated debates in the Canadian political
discourse. Canadians tend to repeat a familiar "trade versus human
rights" debate during the period surrounding a Canada-China bilateral
summit. Opposition politicians, editorial pundits and certain NGO
groups criticize the government for blindly pursuing economic
interests while not substantially condemning human rights violations
in China; the government counters such criticism by raising human
rights concerns in the summit agenda, and the Chinese accommodate what
they see as a formality. Once the high-level meeting is over, most of
the contentious issues disappear from the news coverage and little
follows in terms of government policies.
When the Conservatives returned to power, however, they signaled a
change of course by emphasizing human rights issues. The annual
bilateral governmental human rights dialogue, which was celebrated by
the Liberals as a major instrument of encouragement, received a
critical review as having little impact [1]. While the Conservatives
held a series of hearings on China's human rights record in
Parliament, the 2006 dialogue did not take place.
What dominated both the media and government agenda on China's human
rights for much of the past year was the case of Huseyin Celil (Yu
Shanjiang in Chinese), a Canadian citizen of Xinjiang Uyghur origin.
Celil had escaped from a Chinese prison in 2000 and later acquired
refugee status and Canadian citizenship. He was wanted in China,
however, for terrorist and separatist activities. When Celil was
arrested by Uzbek authorities and extradited to China in June last
year, Beijing refused to recognize his Canadian citizenship on the
grounds that Celil was a wanted fugitive who belonged to the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement, which is considered by both China and the
UN to be a terrorist organization [2]. Denying Canada consular access
to Celil, a Chinese court tried Celil in April and sentenced him to
life in prison for "terrorist activities and plotting to split the
country."
Ottawa seemed to have little influence over Beijing on the Celil case,
despite the fact that both Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign
Minister Mackay raised the issue with their Chinese counterparts.
Beijing's position clearly reflects its deep concern that it does not
offer any compromises that could potentially weaken its control over
Xinjiang.
The Canadian approach has also sent mixed signals. While the official
stance was to obtain consular access, Prime Minister Harper also
referred to the Celil case in the context of promoting human rights.
On his way to Hanoi last November for the APEC summit, Harper
indicated to reporters that he would raise the Celil case with Chinese
President Hu Jintao, with whom Canada had requested a meeting on the
sidelines. "I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations
worldwide, and we do that, but I don't think Canadians want us to sell
out important Canadian values," Harper claimed. "They don't want us to
sell that out to the almighty dollar" (CTV, November 16, 2006). Such
statements, when expressed in media reports or op-ed pages, may have
little effect on China. When it was articulated by the Canadian prime
minister, however, Beijing likely interpreted the Conservative
government's China policy as supporting the separatist movement in
Xinjiang. That perception may have influenced the Chinese decision for
Hu Jintao to refuse to meet Harper in a more "formal" setting in Hanoi
as it had arranged with other major heads of state. Instead, the Hu-
Harper meeting lasted a mere 15 minutes-enough time for only the
diplomatic formalities and customary greetings.
In the recent G8 summit in Germany, Hu and Harper again met at the
sidelines. This time, there was no media storm or controversy like the
one surrounding the last meeting. Yet, the pattern of communication
remained more or less the same. Harper, while acknowledging the
positive progress China made in the past 25 years, again emphasized
the issue of human rights, pressing China to improve its image prior
to the 2008 Olympics. He also raised the Celil case again with Hu
(Globe and Mail, June 9). Hu politely listened to Harper's concerns
regarding the human rights issues, did not offer any concrete promises
of action on the Celil case.
Some "Irritations" That Won't Go Away
The Harper government, however, has not abandoned trade and economic
considerations in its China policy. While most Canadians seem to
support the idea that Canada places more emphasis on human rights in
its relations with China, there are also growing criticism and
pressure for the Conservatives to formulate a more effective China
policy that balances both human rights and economic ties. After
struggling through a precipitous learning curve, Canada has, since
last fall, begun to send a delegation of its ministers to China to
represent the following areas of concern: agriculture, natural
resources, international trade, finance and, most recently, foreign
affairs. In return, China has sent a number of its deputy ministers to
visit Canada, the most recent of which was Minister of Commerce Bo
Xilai who visited Ottawa after attending the second U.S.-China
strategic economic dialogue. China's powerful National Development and
Reform Commission, which is in charge of the country's energy policy,
will lead a delegation of top Chinese energy companies to participate
in a major Canada-China economic cooperation conference in Edmonton,
Alberta next month [3].
Yet, the issues of human rights and trade are only two of the numerous
problems that exist between China and Canada. There are, as one
Chinese diplomat characterized to this author, other persistent
"irritations" in bilateral relations. For instance, Beijing has
expressed frustration regarding the fact that China's most wanted
fugitive, Lai Changxing, who was accused of embezzling billions of
dollars through an elaborate smuggling ring, has been residing in
Canada since 1999 and fighting extradition proceedings in the Canadian
legal system for the past seven years. There are other suspects of
financial crimes who have also taken refuge in Canada and whose
lawyers are using China's human rights record and its incomplete legal
protection as the first line of defense. There is a widespread
perception that China has not carried out its promise to grant Canada
the status of "designated tourist country" primarily because Lai has
not been sent back to China. At the same time, there is also a growing
Chinese perception that Canada is becoming a safe haven for Chinese
fugitives.
Another issue, which has been prominently featured in the media and
resulted in a major diplomatic row between the Conservative government
and Beijing, pertains to national security concerns. Foreign Minister
Peter Mackay first mentioned the matter not long after the change of
government last year, claiming that the Canadian government was "very
concerned about economic espionage" from China. "It is something we
want to signal, that we want to address, and to continue to raise with
the Chinese at the appropriate time," said MacKay (CTV, April 20). It
appears that his concerns were not based on new evidence. Rather, the
Chinese spy charges originated in a 2003-2004 report from the Canadian
Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS). While not explicitly
mentioning China, the report suggested that there could be up to 1,000
Chinese agents and informants operating in Canada for the purposes of
collecting economic, scientific and military information, among other
secrets.
The Chinese responded strongly, with Chinese foreign ministry
spokesman Qin Gang asserting that China had not engaged "in any so-
called economic espionage activities in Canada." In addition, Chinese
Ambassador to Canada Lu Shumin appeared on CTV, declaring, "There is
no Chinese espionage in Canada," and warned, "These kinds of
accusations do not help the relationship and are not conducive to the
development of this strategic partnership between the two countries."
Harper, firmly backing his foreign minister, insisted that Mackay's
comments were well-founded. He stated, "We have some concerns with
certain activities of the Chinese government in this country and we do
intend to raise them at the appropriate time" (CTV, April 20).
Still, in a recent appearance before a Senate committee hearing, the
head of CSIS Jim Judd claimed that China is on the top of Canada's
anti-espionage operation, with about half of its agency's total
resources devoted to China. The charges seem to be wide-ranging, with
Harper claiming that Chinese spies stole $1 billion worth of
technological secrets from Canada every month (CP, April 30). Even the
Chinese efforts to set up Confucius Institutes around the world are
viewed by Canada's spy agency as a national security concern (CP, May
29).
It is obvious that in the span of the past year and a half, Sino-
Canada relations have entered a period of uncertainty. While economic
ties continue to grow and many fundamental aspects of the bilateral
relationship remain sound, policy adjustments on a range of issues are
taking place in both capitals. Ottawa is now faced with the challenge
of developing a coherent strategy toward China that would allow it to
reassert its lost influence and effectively achieve its China policy
objectives.
Notes:
1. See Charles Burton, Assessment of the Canada-China Bilateral Human
Rights Dialogue. Report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade, available online at
http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~cburton/Assessment%20of%20the%20Canada-China%20Bilateral%20Human%20Rights%20Dialogue%2019APR06.pdf.
2. See Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu's Regular Press
Conference on 8 February 2007, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t296526.htm.
3. For the details of the visit, see http://www.china.ualberta.ca/
.
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