Re: A Crushing Victory
- From: Eugene Holman <holman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 19:03:10 +0200
In article <474AD309.2080809@xxxxxxxx>,
"J. Anderson" <andersons6@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Eugene moved to Finland in the mid-60's and quickly picked up that
reflex. He hasn't realized that it's now possible to say 'Paska-Venäjä'
without getting an angry letter from Kekkonen.
I don't say 'paska-Venäjä' because I have no need to. I am happy to see
that Russia is getting its act together and has finally figured out a
way to have a functional economy. I also appreciate the cautious words
of Vello, that Russia in some ways looks like it has made the
transformation from Weimar Republic-like chaos to early Third Reich-like
renewal.
For a sobering assessment of what might lie ahead, try this:
Source:
http://www.economist.com/theworldin/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1009
2027&d=2008
<quote>
Putin's pyramid
Arkady Ostrovsky | MOSCOW
From The World in 2008 print edition
Russia's politics will be increasingly unstable
By March 2008 Russia will have a new president and parliament. But the
power will stay in the hands of the same man: Vladimir Putin. After much
speculation, Mr Putin has decided to hang on to power one way or another.
One way is for him to become prime minister, which he has said is
"entirely realistic". He could use the majority of his United Russia
party in parliament to turn Russia into a parliamentary republic where
the president plays a largely ceremonial role while real power is
wielded by the prime minister. Alternatively, Mr Putin could select a
loyal president who would keep the Kremlin seat warm for a while and
then quietly step down, clearing a way back for Mr Putin. Viktor Zubkov,
the Soviet-style apparatchik appointed as prime minister by Mr Putin in
2007, fits the role of a temporary president. He is loyal (he was Mr
Putin's deputy in St Petersburg's mayoral office), quite old (66 to Mr
Putin's 54) and has no visible ambitions of his own.
This neat, if brazen, plan allows Mr Putin to stay in power while not
formally breaking the constitution, which demands that he leaves office
after two terms. Whatever Mr Putin decides, people will support him. And
it is not just because he controls the media, the parliament, the
economy and just about every other sphere of life. It is also because
oil money is flowing in and people's lives are generally improving. And
if none of it looks democratic, it does not seem to bother the vast
majority of Russians.
Yet Mr Putin and the people around him seem twitchy. Why else would the
Kremlin be sending troops to squash opposition protests which pose no
threat? And why would state companies, which have only recently taken
over many private assets, be itching to sell some of their shares on
international markets? The answer is that the system which has emerged
in Russia under Mr Putin is profoundly unstable.
The eight years under Mr Putin have not legitimised the property
accumulated by his loyal friends who control Russia's largest companies.
Having undermined property rights as well as whatever might act as a
counter-balance to the Kremlin's power, Mr Putin has built a political
construction that resembles a pyramid which rests on its tip, rather
than on its base. A transfer of real power to even a hand-picked
successor could upset the balance and jeopardise the safety of Mr
Putin's friends. Which is why he decided (or was persuaded) to stay.
In the short term this might calm the nerves of Mr Putin's closest
allies as well as some investors. But it will not make Russia any more
stable and will only increase the pressures that already exist.
Enemies here, enemies there
First, there will be pressure on the Kremlin from outside its charmed
circle. Mr Putin draws his main support from a small group of former KGB
colleagues who rose with him and occupy powerful political posts as well
as the commanding heights of the economy. This stifles social mobility.
Ambitious regional politicians have almost no chance of getting lifted
into the higher echelons of power. The dominance of United Russia,
supported by the apparatus of the state, eliminates the hope for a
multi-party system developing any time soon. Nor is there much hope for
any kind of economic reform.
Within the Kremlin itself, rivalry between factions backed by different
financial interests is fierce. Until now, Mr Putin has masterfully
claimed all the credit for the oil-fired boom, while transferring the
blame for anything that goes wrong to the government. If he becomes
prime minister, he may have to bear some responsibility for the
inefficiency of the system he created.
To divert attention from such problems, the Kremlin will try to find
enemies both inside and outside the country. The number of "extremists"
persecuted by the security services will increase. To justify its hard
line, the Kremlin will call for national unity in the face of a growing
threat from the West. Nationalism, already strong, will become the
dominant force in Russia--indeed, the Kremlin will adopt it as its main
policy. In the process it risks creating a monster it will be unable to
control.
</quote>
Regards,
Eugene Holman
.
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