for your consideration
- From: "«Pas de deux»" <kamouraska3@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 31 May 2006 06:47:46 -0400
Strategic Victimhood in Sudan
a.. New York Times
{I don't fully agree with this artcile but it raises some interesting
points.]
By Alan J. Kuperman
Published: May 31, 2006
Austin, Tex.
THOUSANDS of Americans who wear green wristbands and demand military
intervention to stop Sudan's Arab government from perpetrating genocide
against black tribes in Darfur must be perplexed by recent developments.
Without such intervention, Sudan's government last month agreed to a
peace accord pledging to disarm Arab janjaweed militias and resettle
displaced civilians. By contrast, Darfur's black rebels, who are touted
by the wristband crowd as freedom fighters, rejected the deal because it
did not give them full regional control. Put simply, the rebels were
willing to let genocide continue against their own people rather than
compromise their demand for power.
International mediators were shamefaced. They had presented the plan as
take it or leave it, to compel Khartoum's acceptance. But now the
ostensible representatives of the victims were balking. Embarrassed
American officials were forced to ask Sudan for further concessions
beyond the ultimatum that it had already accepted.
Fortunately, Khartoum again acquiesced. But two of Darfur's three main
rebel groups still rejected peace. Frustrated American negotiators
accentuated the positive ? the strongest rebel group did sign ? and
expressed hope that the dissenters would soon join.
But that hope was crushed last week when the rebels viciously turned on
each other. As this newspaper reported, "The rebels have unleashed a
tide of violence against the very civilians they once joined forces to
protect."
Seemingly bizarre, this rejection of peace by factions claiming to seek
it is actually revelatory. It helps explain why violence originally
broke out in Darfur, how the Save Darfur movement unintentionally poured
fuel on the fire, and what can be done to stanch genocidal violence in
Sudan and elsewhere.
Darfur was never the simplistic morality tale purveyed by the news media
and humanitarian organizations. The region's blacks, painted as
long-suffering victims, actually were the oppressors less than two
decades ago ? denying Arab nomads access to grazing areas essential to
their survival. Violence was initiated not by Arab militias but by the
black rebels who in 2003 attacked police and military installations. The
most extreme Islamists are not in the government but in a faction of the
rebels sponsored by former Deputy Prime Minister Hassan al-Turabi, after
he was expelled from the regime. Cease-fires often have been violated
first by the rebels, not the government, which has pledged repeatedly to
admit international peacekeepers if the rebels halt their attacks.
This reality has been obscured by Sudan's criminally irresponsible
reaction to the rebellion: arming militias to carry out a scorched-earth
counterinsurgency. These Arab forces, who already resented the black
tribes over past land disputes and recent attacks, were only too happy
to rape and pillage any village suspected of supporting the rebels.
In light of janjaweed atrocities, it is natural to romanticize the other
side as freedom fighters. But Darfur's rebels do not deserve that title.
They took up arms not to stop genocide ? which erupted only after they
rebelled ? but to gain tribal domination.
The strongest faction, representing the minority Zaghawa tribe, signed
the sweetened peace deal in hopes of legitimizing its claim to control
Darfur. But that claim is vehemently opposed by rebels representing the
larger Fur tribe. Such internecine disputes only recently hit the
headlines, but the rebels have long wasted resources fighting each other
rather than protecting their people.
Advocates of intervention play down rebel responsibility because it is
easier to build support for stopping genocide than for becoming
entangled in yet another messy civil war. But their persistent calls for
intervention have actually worsened the violence.
The rebels, much weaker than the government, would logically have sued
for peace long ago. Because of the Save Darfur movement, however, the
rebels believe that the longer they provoke genocidal retaliation, the
more the West will pressure Sudan to hand them control of the region.
Sadly, this message was reinforced when the rebels' initial rejection of
peace last month was rewarded by American officials' extracting further
concessions from Khartoum.
The key to rescuing Darfur is to reverse these perverse incentives.
Spoiler rebels should be told that the game is over, and that further
resistance will no longer be rewarded but punished by the loss of posts
reserved for them in the peace agreement.
Ultimately, if the rebels refuse, military force will be required to
defeat them. But this is no job for United Nations peacekeepers. Iraq,
Afghanistan and Somalia show that even the United States military cannot
stamp out Islamic rebels on their home turf; second-rate international
troops would stand even less chance.
Rather, we should let Sudan's army handle any recalcitrant rebels, on
condition that it eschew war crimes. This option will be distasteful to
many, but Sudan has signed a peace treaty, so it deserves the right to
defend its sovereignty against rebels who refuse to, so long as it
observes the treaty and the laws of war.
Indeed, to avoid further catastrophes like Darfur, the United States
should announce a policy of never intervening to help provocative
rebels, diplomatically or militarily, so long as opposing armies avoid
excessive retaliation. This would encourage restraint on both sides.
Instead we should redirect intervention resources to support "people
power" movements that pursue change peacefully, as they have done
successfully over the past two decades in the Philippines, Indonesia,
Serbia and elsewhere.
America, born in revolution, has a soft spot for rebels who claim to be
freedom fighters, including those in Darfur. But to reduce genocidal
violence, we must withhold support for the cynical provocations of
militants who bear little resemblance to our founders.
Alan J. Kuperman, an assistant professor of public affairs at the
University of Texas, is an editor of "Gambling on Humanitarian
Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion and Civil War."
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