ICG:IRAQ/INSURGENCY CONSOLIDATING(15/2/06)
- From: uneoo_AT_netipr.org@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2006 08:25:53 GMT
IRAQ: INSURGENCY IS CONSOLIDATING
[The International Crisis Group is a think-tank group, in cloaked form
of NGOs. It is an unlikely place though -- so far as I'm aware -- any
praise for Iraqi resistance would comes out. Then again, here, this
report alarmed the US government about the Iraqi insurgency's
popularity and their increasing sophistications in political & military
tactics. --U Ne Oo]
--------------
In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency
www.crisisgroup.org
Middle East Report
15 February 2006
This report was featured on ABC's Nightline (U.S.). Click here to
watch the footage.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In Iraq, the U.S. fights an enemy it hardly knows. Its descriptions
have relied on gross approximations and crude categories (Saddamists,
Islamo-fascists and the like) that bear only passing resemblance to
reality. This report, based on close analysis of the insurgents own
discourse, reveals relatively few groups, less divided between
nationalists and foreign jihadis than assumed, whose strategy and
tactics have evolved (in response to U.S. actions and to maximise
acceptance by Sunni Arabs), and whose confidence in defeating the
occupation is rising. An anti-insurgency approach primarily focused on
reducing the insurgents perceived legitimacy -- rather than achieving
their military destruction, decapitation and dislocation -- is far
more likely to succeed.
Failure to sufficiently take into account what the insurgents are
saying is puzzling and, from Washington's perspective,
counter-productive. Abundant material -- both undervalued and
underutilised -- is available from insurgent websites, internet chat,
videos, tapes and leaflets. Over the past two years such communication
has assumed more importance, both among insurgent groups and between
groups and their networks of supporters or sympathisers. This report,
the first exhaustive analysis of the organised armed opposition's
discourse, seeks to fill the gap, and the lessons are sobering.
Textual analysis has its limitations. The information by definition
sheds light only on those who choose to speak, and only about that
which they discuss in public. Wartime communication is part
information, part propaganda; insurgents highlight their nobleness,
tactical exploits and ingenuity while downplaying brutality and
setbacks. Without knowing more of the groups inner workings, it is
hazardous to speculate on the reasons behind specific communications.
Still, the discourse offers a window into the insurgency. It tells us
about themes insurgents consider best to mobilise activists or
legitimise actions, and gives us information on internal debates and
levels of coordination, and about shifts in tactics and strategy. This
war, U.S. officials concede, will be won as much in the court of
public opinion as on any battlefield. The U.S administration faces an
increasingly sceptical domestic audience; Iraq's authorities suffer
from a serious credibility deficit at home; and insurgents must
contend with accusations of sectarianism and barbaric violence. For
the U.S. to ignore, or fail to fully take into account, the insurgents
discourse -- at a time when they are paying close attention to what
Washington is saying -- is to wage the struggle with one hand tied
behind its back.
Several important conclusions emerge:
* The insurgency increasingly is dominated by a few large groups with
sophisticated communications. It no longer is a scattered,
erratic, chaotic phenomenon. Groups are well organised, produce
regular publications, react rapidly to political developments
and appear surprisingly centralised.
* There has been gradual convergence around more unified practices
and discourse, and predominantly Sunni Arab identity. A year ago
groups appeared divided over practices and ideology but most
debates have been settled through convergence around Sunni
Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni Arab grievances. For now
virtually all adhere publicly to a blend of Salafism and
patriotism, diluting distinctions between foreign jihadis and
Iraqi combatants -- though that unity is unlikely to outlast the
occupation.
* Despite recurring contrary reports, there is little sign of
willingness by any significant insurgent element to join the
political process or negotiate with the U.S. While covert talks
cannot be excluded, the publicly accessible discourse remains
uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its
collaborators.
* The groups appear acutely aware of public opinion and increasingly
mindful of their image. Fearful of a backlash, they
systematically and promptly respond to accusations of moral
corruption or blind violence, reject accusations of a sectarian
campaign and publicise efforts to protect civilians or
compensate their losses. Some gruesome and locally controversial
practices -- beheading hostages, attacking people going to the
polls -- have been abandoned. The groups underscore the enemy's
brutality and paint the U.S. and its Iraqi allies in the worst
possible light: waging dirty war in coordination with sectarian
militias, engaging in torture, fostering the country's division
and being impervious to civilian losses.
* The insurgents have yet to put forward a clear political program or
long-term vision for Iraq. Focused on operations, they
acknowledge this would be premature and potentially
divisive. That said, developments have compelled the largest
groups to articulate a more coherent position on elections, and
the prospect of an earlier U.S. withdrawal than anticipated is
gradually leading them to address other political issues.
* The insurgency is increasingly optimistic about victory. Such
self-confidence was not there when the war was conceived as an
open-ended jihad against an occupier they believed was
determined to stay. Optimism stems from a conviction the
legitimacy of jihad is now beyond doubt, institutions
established under the occupation are fragile and irreparably
illegitimate, and the war of attrition against U.S. forces is
succeeding.
The emergence of a more confident, better organised, coordinated,
information-savvy insurgency, increasingly susceptible to Sunni Arab
opinion, carries profound implications for policy-makers. That it has
survived, even thrived, despite being vastly outnumbered and
outgunned, suggests the limitations of the current counter-insurgency
campaign. Its discourse may be dismissed as rhetoric, but,
notwithstanding credible reports of internal tensions, it appears to
have been effective at maintaining agreement on core operational
matters, generating new recruits, and mobilising a measure of popular
sympathy among its target audience.
Countering the insurgency requires taking its discourse seriously,
reducing its legitimacy and increasing that of the Iraqi
government. The harm from excessive use of force, torture, tactics
that inflict widespread civilian injury and reliance on sectarian
militias outweighs any military gain. It is essential for the U.S. to
hold the new government accountable and make clear that long-term
relations, economic aid and military cooperation depend on disbanding
militias, halting political killings and respecting human
rights. U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad has recently struck a candid tone,
which should be followed with proactive measures. The U.S. and its
allies are unable to establish a monopoly over the use of force but
they can and should do so over the legitimate use of force, which
means establishing the legitimacy both of the means being deployed and
of the state on whose behalf force is being exercised.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the United States and its Coalition and Iraqi Allies:
1. Closely monitor, control and, if necessary, punish the behaviour
of security forces.
2. Halt recourse to the most questionable types of practices,
including torture and extraordinary methods of interrogation and
confinement, collective punishment and extrajudicial killings.
3. End the use of sectarian militias as a complement to, or
substitute for, regular armed forces and begin a serious process
of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of militia
fighters.
To the United States:
4. Hold the new government accountable and make clear that
longer-term relations, economic assistance and future military
cooperation will depend on the steps it takes to rein in and
ultimately disband militias, halt politically motivated killings,
and respect human rights and the rule of law.
5. Make clear its willingness, while it remains in Iraq, to negotiate
openly the terms of its presence and its rules of engagement.
6. Make clear repeatedly and at the highest level that it accepts
that the oil resources of the country belong to the Iraqi people
and no one else, and will withdraw from Iraq as soon as the newly
elected government so requests.
Amman/Brussels, 15 February 2006
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