Re: Universality as warrant for relative truth value

Haines Brown <brownh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
Neil W Rickert <rickert+nn@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:

yes, f=ma does not explain anything; it is a prediction based on a
generalization of experience.

Oh, no, it isn't any kind of generalization. It is a *definition* of
mass,

We are not disagreeing, at least not on the surface. It is, of course, a
definition, but it is also an abstract description of past experiments
that verified the truth of the relation of these variables.

Which past experiments?

You could not even talk about mass until it was defined. Of course,
Newton was doing experiments before he announced his laws of motion.
But it is likely that he was privately using his definition.

This
simple-minded conventional reply does not address the possibility that
you may be making a postmodernist point.

It was already obvious to me as a high school student, that f=ma
was the definition of mass. And that was decades before I had even
heard of postmodernism.

However, if you intend one, I
can't respond unless you make it explicit. All you do is to deny my
statement, which in itself carries no weight.

I explain my position. I cannot command you to accept it.

Apparently you use the word otherwise. What is your definition?

Theories come in different forms, so perhaps there isn't one
definition that fits all. But, generally speaking, what constitutes a
scientific theory is a set of empirical principles that serve as a
guide to scientists in that field (or subfield).

I find the word "empirical" here odd, for it would preclude the
unobservables that scientists regularly handle, such as gluons.

I don't follow. Are you unaware that physicists carry out empirical
experiments to detect the various particles that they hypothesize?

While I'd not necessary object to your definition, it is significant
that you disregard the three standard definitions of theory that I more
or less copied here from a standard authority that defined what the
term means to people and that might have the odor of truth value.

I largely ignore philosophy of science, which I think of as little more
than a quaint collection of "Just So" stories.

This I would do only if you offer a convincing warrant for your
alternative, but for some reason you omit it.

I am presenting my viewpoint. It is not up to me to convince you.
The only thing that could convince you, would be for you to spend
some time studying the practices of scientists - not what they say
they are doing, but what they actually are doing.

Outside religious witnessing, to
agree or disagree is only a precondition for constructive discourse, not
a substitute for it.

I cannot point to evidence that you are unwilling to see.

There's a postmodern view that the authoritative weight behind an
established theory represents an imposition on the thinking of other
scientists in that it brings pressure upon them to conform.

To an extent, I agree with that. However, postmodernism takes that
too far.

What do you mean, "to some extent"? Do you agree with this bit of petit
bourgeois ideology (sorry for the provocative terminology, but it is
easy to argue that what I described as a postmodern view is simply
instance of that).

I'm not completely clear on what you are arguing here.

If you look at the conflict between Galileo and the church, it
is difficult to see it as other than attempts at imposing ideas.
If Galileo had been pointing to simple obvious facts, it is hard
to believe that the church would have reacted as it did. And if
the church were not imposing ideas, then Galileo's statements would
not have been seen as a problem for the church.

So it becomes important just what your position is,
rather than merely say you agree and disagree simultaneously. To what
extent do you agree, and wherein do you disagree? You have not said
anything.

We are both using words found in the English dictionaries, but we
seem to be talking in different languages. I really do not know
what it is with which I am expected to agree or disagree.

There's also a postmodern view that suggests that mind (logic,
language) is the sole foundation of knowledge, and I consider this
just as problematic as the old empiricist view that the world has that
function.

"Sole foundation" does not have a clear meaning to me.

My understanding of the postmodern position is that it holds the
operations of mind to represent the foundation of meaning (words or
logic the independent variable, if you will, while the world is a
dependent variable), and not the world outside the mind (as in
positivism) or the relation of mind and world (as in critical empiricism
or Marxism). Do you hold to one of these three positions, or, if yet
another, would you specify what it is?

I'm not quite sure you are asking. However, I do see meaning as
inherently subjective.

Defining words as they are commonly used is indeed circular, but
instrumental. That's the purpose of a dictionary, to support effective
communications, not to convey conventional truth. Encyclopedias do
that.

I don't know about that "instrumental" part. I would be more inclined
to use the word "simplistic".

How can you suggest that when dictionaries facilitate communications by
offering conventional meanings for words, it is unrealistic
("simplistic")?

Dictionaries don't actually give meanings. They cannot, for meanings
are subjective. Typically they describe usage, and it is up to us to
attempt to glean the meanings from that.

To ascertain the generally held meaning of words we turn to
dictionaries.

That would be a mistake, IMO. For one thing, words do not have
meanings. People mean things, and use words to convey that. But the
meaning is not a property of words.

Well _finally_ you offer an unconventional point with some justification
for it, but I'm not sure the justification makes any sense, at least not
in conventional terms. When we say a word has a meaning we only

When we say a word has a meaning we only
associate a meaning with a word and do not imply that the meaning is a
property of a reified word.

We cannot associate a meaning with a word, because "meaning" is not
a thing that can be associated.

The word is only a sign that points to
meaning.

I had thought it clear that I was explicitly disagreeing with that.
A word is an objective entity. Meaning is subjective. An objective
entity cannot point to something subjective.

For example, when I say f=ma, the letter "f" is only a symbol,
and it is the force to which the "f" refers that has the properties.

Which properties?

Incidently, I see Newton's science as redefining "force" -- that is,
changing what we mean by "force" (when used in scientific contexts).

For example, I have a scientific dictionary that suggests that fact is
an event, phenomenon or fragment of reality that is an object of man's
practical activity or knowledge.

That sounds like a useless definition.

It is very useful, for when someone uses the word "fact," I've got some
idea of what they mean by it.

But surely you already had a pretty good idea of what people mean
by "fact" before you ever learned to read.

Your point seems contrary to common sense
and is not accompanied by any justification, which means in principle
that it should be ignored. That is, if I said the moon consisted of
cheese, that would be an unconventional view, but if I don't offer any
justification for it, my statement means nothing except an indication of
my lunacy (if you excuse the pun).

Your example is poor.

If we were walking around on the moon, and picking up bits of
the moon to savor the cheesy flavor, nobody would be asking for
justification. Or if we found it gritty and tasteless in the
mouth, nobody would be asking for justification. We don't normally
demand justification for what should be obvious from common sense
observations of every day life. My comment was about concepts
and meanings. The use of these are part of our common sense
observations of every day life. I don't think I said anything that
was outside of common sense experience.

Now it is true that philosophers have have developed some tenuous
theories about meaning and reference. And it does seem to be true
that philosophers use these tenous ideas so much, that they have
become part of the philosopher's common experience. It seems that
philosophers have lost track of how tenuous those ideas are.

That does not make sense to me. The "object of knowledge" would seem
to be the world. And facts are not the world. I see a fact as simply
being a true statement.

We are not disagreeing. An object of knowledge is an aspect of the world
or that portion of the world to which a knowledge refers.

As I see it, knowledge does not refer. Due to our knowledge, we are
able to make statements that do refer. But it isn't the knowledge
that refers, it is the statements we make using that knowledge.

Yes, facts are
true statements about an object of knowledge. I did not say that a fact
_is_ the world, but rather an object of (true) knowledge. A hypothetical
rock on the other side of the moon never seen by man is real, but not a
fact until it is seen.

A rock is not a statement, and therefore could not be a fact whether or
not seen.

Our discovering the rock does not create it, but
establishes it as a known fact.

It does not make the rock a known fact, except in metaphorical use
(such as "facts on the ground"). It is statements about the rock
that could become known facts.

I take "fact" to be just a true statement about the world. Currently
I am taking knowledge to be the ability to generate true statements
about the world, and to interpret statements about the world that are
received from others.

So where do we disagree?

Apparently, we have substantial disagreements. For you make statements
about knowledge that make no sense with how I defined it above.

..; truthful knowledge is an emergent
property of the mind that arises because of this interaction ...

If knowledge is an ability, as I defined it, then "truthful
knowledge" makes no sense. Abilities are neither truthful nor
untruthful. Truthfulness is an attribute of representations,
not of abilities.

Incidentally I was careful to say "engage" the world rather than observe
the world. To posit a person as gaining knowledge from passive
observation seems an artifact of Cartesian ontology. Our aim is not just
to understand, but to change it (Marx, roughly).

I don't have a problem with "engage". I'm not sure that the idea of
knowledge from passive observation is just an artifact of Cartesian
ontology. It also seems to be widely assumed in empiricist writings,
and in the AI literature.

What I was getting at was that action is the mechanism from which
knowledge emerges. We act first, and as a result acquire truthful
knowledge.

I would change that.

We act first, and aquire useful abilities. Then we invent ways of
talking about the effects of using those abilities that we can use
to help us discuss those abilities with others. We apply "truth" to
some of the statements in our talk about the use of those abilities.

My objection to pragmatism is that the truth-status of knowledge
acquired from experience remains uncertain or hypothetical until we
perform a future test or observe a future outcome.

By contrast, since I see knowledge as abilities, it has no truth
status. Pragmatism provides the only test of those abilities.
"Truth" applies to the statements we make using that knowledge,
but it does not apply to the knowledge itself.

I am not a dualist. However, there may be more problems with
materialistic monism than with Cartesian dualism.

I did not mean to imply you were. On the contrary, I suspect you respond
to the Cartesian contradiction by a reduction of world to mind. But
since you don't state your position, that's only a guess.

Actually, that's a bad guess.

Most of the atoms that today constitute your body, will be gone within
a few months, replaced by other atoms. Thus you cannot be identified
with a set of atoms. Unless I misunderstand what you mean by
"materialistic monism", I think that's a problem for the view you
embrace.

Your point about the persistence of identity does not seem relevant to
the issue of materialistic monism.

Let me state it differently. We are not made of atoms. We are
not made of matter. Rather, we are made of processes. These are
material processes (matter is what is processed).

Maybe I should point out that matter is itself a rather tenuous
concept, as quantum physics makes clear.

Monism is the metaphysical view that all reality is subsumed under one
fundamental category of being or existence.

I am a skeptic of metaphysics.

A materialist monism is the basis of science

I am not convinced of that.

A few
(Penrose, for example), are dualists, but even then they seem to put

I'm not convinced that Penrose is a dualist, either, though I
disagree with his views. I suspect that Penrose would deny that
he is a dualist.

As for your example, I suppose that what the Martian misses is a
meaningful context in which to understand the import of dots on paper.

Doesn't that amount to saying that you can only define "truth" for
those who already know what it means?

Yes, but not quite. There's a difference between the meaning of the word
"truth" and the possession of truthful knowledge. The Martian would not
"truth" and the possession of truthful knowledge. The Martian would not

Again, I'll mention my objection to the expression "truthful
knowledge."

The Martian would not
know the word truth, of course, but presumably has truthful knowledge,
for otherwise it would not have successfully made the trip to earth.

Are you implying that a lion has truthful knowledge, for otherwise
it could not have successfully made a trip to the watering hole?

I present that as an example of why I think it better to consider the
correspondence theory to be a theory of reality, rather than a theory
of truth.

But the instruments are not just "conventions" but also exist as the
result of our interactions with the world.

I don't see that as making them "not just conventions". Surely,
it only means that we justify our conventions with pragmatic tests.

We test the equipment for its
ability to yield truthful information, yes,

No. We test the equipment for its ability to yield *useful*
information, and then we declare the information produced by the
equipment to be truthful (unless the equipment is malfunctioning).

You have a certain confidence in the fact that your typing your message
will have a certain effect in your computer and eventually your words
reach the newsgroup.

That has been known to fail, on occasion.

Now I could play the schoolboy and say that your
typing is an illusion in the mind of a god on Mt. Olympus, just as is
your computer, the newsgroup and the rest of the world.

As long as it all works for me, that's good enough. As I said above,
I am a skeptic of metaphysics.

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: X = Z
    ... travel a path and return to its beginning, a goal of mathematics is ... that have otherwise generally canonical meaning. ... Fashion has nothing to do with truth. ... appear on the subject of 'primes' above and below mine, ...
    (sci.math)
  • Re: Universality as warrant for relative truth value
    ... 99% of all scientists would agree. ... not to convey conventional truth. ... To ascertain the generally held meaning of words we turn to ... As I've indicated, I don't believe correspondence ...
    (sci.philosophy.meta)
  • Re: Definition of truth
    ... and that's only of the "true" truth. ... behaviors are well established and documented in Physics. ... if you wish to put specific meaning on certains ... Yeah, probably I should have, but didn't know at the time that English ...
    (rec.skiing.alpine)
  • Re: The Liars Sentence and Nontermination
    ... meaning is not the same thing as agreeing on a computational ... somehow detached or outside of their evaluation semantics. ... evaluate the truth of a sentence of the form "Program ... P never halts on input I". ...
    (sci.logic)
  • Re: Godels theorem is invalid?
    ... > Then his definition of truth simply does not match the classical one. ... I am not saying that I agree with Tennant's arguments (which are based ... What exactly do you mean by the assertion ... > NOT ONE IOTA OF IMPACT on the TRUTH or the MEANING ...
    (sci.logic)
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