Re: Universality as warrant for relative truth value

Haines Brown <brownh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
Neil W Rickert <rickert+nn@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:

And,
yes, f=ma does not explain anything; it is a prediction based on a
generalization of experience.

Oh, no, it isn't any kind of generalization. It is a *definition*
of mass, including the rule on how you measure mass. The concept
"mass" did not even exist at Aristotle's time. Its importance was
implicitly demonstrated by Galileo, and Newton gave us a useful
definition.

Perhaps. In a scientific context, by theory I meant an exposition of the
general principles of a science or description of the organization of a
domain of our world that represents a broad consensus of experts in the
field, or an explanation of a situation for which there is a consensus
that it is as close an approximation of truth that we today are able to
achieve.

Apparently you use the word otherwise. What is your definition?

Theories come in different forms, so perhaps there isn't one
definition that fits all. But, generally speaking, what constitutes
a scientific theory is a set of empirical principles that serve as
a guide to scientists in that field (or subfield).

There's a postmodern view that the authoritative weight behind an
established theory represents an imposition on the thinking of other
scientists in that it brings pressure upon them to conform.

To an extent, I agree with that. However, postmodernism takes that
too far.

There's also a postmodern view that suggests that mind (logic, language)
is the sole foundation of knowledge, and I consider this just as
problematic as the old empiricist view that the world has that
function.

"Sole foundation" does not have a clear meaning to me.

Defining words as they are commonly used is indeed circular, but
instrumental. That's the purpose of a dictionary, to support effective
communications, not to convey conventional truth. Encyclopedias do that.

I don't know about that "instrumental" part. I would be more inclined
to use the word "simplistic".

To ascertain the generally held meaning of words we turn to
dictionaries.

That would be a mistake, IMO. For one thing, words do not have
meanings. People mean things, and use words to convey that.
But the meaning is not a property of words.

I might use a dictionary to get a preliminary idea as to what is
meant by the use of a particular word. But all I could get that way
would be a preliminary idea. I would need to study the scientific
literature, where that word is actually used, to get a better idea
of what is meant.

For example, I have a scientific dictionary that suggests
that fact is an event, phenomenon or fragment of reality that is an
object of man's practical activity or knowledge.

That sounds like a useless definition.

Well, there is a difference here between the words fact and knowledge.

I certainly hope so.

A
fact refers to the object of knowledge, while knowledge is our
understanding of these facts.

That does not make sense to me. The "object of knowledge" would
seem to be the world. And facts are not the world. I see a fact
as simply being a true statement.

This seems to assume there's a relation
between what's in the mind and the world about which we are thinking,
and fact refers to one pole of that relation, while knowledge the other.

Is it not the consensus today that "fact" is both subjective
and objective at the same time? Or so I thought.

I don't know what is the consensus. Typically, people take facts
to be objective. However, since facts depend on meaning, and since
meaning is subjective, facts cannot be entirely objective.

If you are willing to offer cogent and better definitions of fact and/or
knowledge, I'd be interested in knowing what they are. Since we are
speaking of the conventional meaning of words, I have every reason to
adopt them for myself unless an attractive alternative shows up.

I take "fact" to be just a true statement about the world.
Currently I am taking knowledge to be the ability to generate true
statements about the world, and to interpret statements about the
world that are received from others.

A problem here seems to arise from a confusion of three things: a) How
do we arrive at truth; what is its foundation? b) What defines truth as
the word is conventionally understood? c) How do we know that a
statement is true?

Those three things cannot be separated like that. They are closely
connected.

I personally see action
as the foundation of truthful knowledge, not in the sense of a pragmatic
test of the truth value of a hypothetical, but as the beginning point
and necessary condition for the construction of truthful statements.

I can't work out what that means.

I must admit that there are ambiguities in my position, and so I would
appreciate criticism of them. There is ambiguity concerning the word
fact. I have suggested that facts are constructed and so would appear to
reside in the mind, but at the same time I suggested that facts refer to
the object of knowledge that resides in the world. If we mistakenly
follow Descartes and assume that mind and body are ontological
categories, then perhaps one can't say there is a determinant relation
between them. But if we instead embrace a materialistic monism, then
that problem disappears, and facts are those aspects of the world that
are represented in the mind and that we (a community) can agree are
truthful because the sentence corresponds to its referent.

I am not a dualist. However, there may be more problems with
materialistic monism than with Cartesian dualism.

Most of the atoms that today constitute your body, will be gone
within a few months, replaced by other atoms. Thus you cannot be
identified with a set of atoms. Unless I misunderstand what you
mean by "materialistic monism", I think that's a problem for the
view you embrace.

Incidentally, when it comes to causal mechanisms, I unfortunately
complicate things:

"Cause" is a tricky concept. I'm not sure I want to muddy the waters
by getting into that know.

As that Martian anthropologist, you see ink marks on paper. What
corresponds to what, and how could you tell.

I had suggested the word correspondence might be ambivalent, and your
question seems to imply the use of the word as a test of truth, not as a
definition for it. Keep in mind that I've not been defending a
correspondence theory of truth.

As for your example, I suppose that what the Martian misses is a
meaningful context in which to understand the import of dots on
paper.

Doesn't that amount to saying that you can only define "truth"
for those who already know what it means?

You are really saying "we all know what 'truth' means.

I'm suggesting that truth is a correspondence between a sentence and the
world. I suggested that the man on the street understands truth in this
way, that it is the dictionary definition, and generally speaking this
is what the scientist means. Since your question is about the _meaning_
of the a word, I can in principle I go out to ask people what they mean
by it, and if there is a consensus we have the word's shared meaning.

Scientists send spaceships to satellites of Saturn. These space
probes send back information. We take that information to be true
because we have tested the equipment that gathers the information
for the accuracy of its processes. Once we receive the information,
we reach conclusions about the way things are on that satellite
of Saturn.

I take that as an example of where we assess truth based on our
conventions (as embodied in the instruments). And then we decide
the way the world (or the satellite) is, based on those true
statements. So we are using truth to indicate that the statements
are consistent with conventions, and we then use correspondence to
establish what reality is like.

I present that as an example of why I think it better to consider
the correspondence theory to be a theory of reality, rather than
a theory of truth.

.

Relevant Pages

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