Re: Universality as warrant for relative truth value

Consciousness is the exact thing we can't be directly aware of.

Afraid I don't understand. What do you mean by "directly aware"? Do you
mean that we don't have sensory experience of consciousness? If so, is
this not an instance of the old "brute facts" theory? I don't accept
it, nor do most others. There are many things of which I have no direct
awareness, but certainly are real. I have the power of sight, but can't
see it; I'm in love; I have mental powers and know how to make my cup of
coffee, etc. If you are not saying that observation alone is the basis
of "brute facts", the only real facts, or the only reliably known facts,
then just what do you mean?

Yes, the camera can't take a picture of itself analogy. You can't see
your power of sight, although in a lab you can see eye balls and the
part of the brain where the visual processing goes on. But it's the
experience of sight that's the bit we can't get at, not the impression
it leaves in our memory or the commentary "I know I'm seeing right
now". The subject pole of the subject-object axis, is the exact thing
that can't be the object of our awareness. If you take away the
object the awareness vanishes, in this picture of things. We can't
simply say that because we are aware of an object then there must be
awareness, because it's begging the question.


I offered the conventional meaning of truth and suggested it does not
reduce to utility. You don't address the point I raised.

I thought I did elsewhere. Talk of truth and utility are
incommensurable. Utility, from economics, doesn't just mean useful
but what we find desirable. For our own reasons of desire we trade
stories that we might call "true", so there is no reduction of truth
to utility and I haven't suggested there is one. I'm suggesting to
let go of using terms like "truth" and "knowledge" after the old
manner, and start using new terms in new ways.


On what grounds do you say that no theory has any truth? If no theory
has truth, then your theorem that they have no truth is surely not
true. In other words, you are free to argue that no theory is true, but
you must justify that position, for it seems illogical and is surely
unconventional.

I'm not asserting my theory is true, like I said, assertions are
possible without the idea of truth.

Logic relies on the idea of truth, so under logical analysis you would
get a contradiction. But why do we need an artificial language and a
system of symbol manipulation to tell us how to think? I'm surely
being unconventional too, but since when is popular vote good criteria
for argument?


What does warrant have to do with god? I only meant the word in the
sense of justify. My dictionary definition for warrant does not mention
any gods.

I used "god" as a marker pen for where the idea of warrant departs
human durastiction and so can only be followed by faith.


On what grounds do you believe that no one knows anything? If that were
true, how could I discuss it with you?

I'm not saying that the truth is there is no truth, or that I know
that we don't know. I'm not looking for the grounds under which to
support truth, or the grounds in which the tree of knowledge can be
planted. There is no such garden of eden. Moreover, this doesn't
mean I believe our claims of truth and knowledge stand over an abyss.
I'm abandoning this whole picture of a grounds altogether because it
is a religious one, and adopting a more mundane picture of things; at
this point, one that involves the idea of utility.

It doesn't mean we can't talk about things either or that we should
stop using the terms. I'm trying to get across that the whole picture
of truth and knowledge is so entrenched in our cultural word game that
we've lost the ability to do without them, and that there are other
word games that we might play, ones that do without religious
beliefs. These beliefs are a relic from times when it was thought the
world was spoken into existence, a time when it was thought that
language mediated reality.


I have no more theory of truth than is conventional, and I hope I've
stated it plainly enough. But just in case:

1. Truth refers to a quality of statements of fact in that they
correspond in some sense with the world.

2. This is because knowledge of the world arises from our intervention
in the world; the consciousness that emerges as a result of this
intervention is a product of the mind that is constrained by the
world.

3. The point raised in objection to point (2) is that knowledge of the
world is socially transmitted and is the emergent effect of past
intervention in the world and therefore does not reduce to
interventions. As social beings we accept social convention as being
true unless we have reason not to because it is the basis of our
development. Since we know that people develop as human beings,
whatever is the cause of that development must have some truth value
because otherwise such development would be miraculous.

4. The correspondence between statements of fact and the world is
approximate in the sense that a) it is the creation of the mind, not
of phenomena, and b) it is based on necessarily incomplete data. For
this reason, we speak of it as only an analog, a model, as being
one-sided, although our progressive power over nature and society
suggests that it is generally an ever better approximation.

5. That there is truth is warranted by successful praxis (in the sense
that we often achieve what we set out to achieve, where if there were
no truth in our knowledge, any success would be a miracle), and it is
a precondition for action, for while our map of the world may be false
in its particulars, it must be based on the reality that we are actors
in the world.

I set out to ask if universality of knowledge is one factor that
warrants our accepting the relative truth value of a statement. I did
not raise the issue of whether there is truth. My argument for this
proposition would be that since all processes are in principle open,
knowledge of a system must include knowledge of ifs surroundings, and
since these surroundings are not normally bounded, our knowledge of the
process is always incomplete in that it can't encompass all possible
environmental influences and because all things are in principle
processes that necessarily have no defined state (are fuzzy) except in a
short range or practical way. I did not present this argument because I
was interested in what others had to say about it, but so far no one has
said anything.

Based on point (3) above, I add to this ontological universality
argument an epistemological argument that our mental representation of
the world is constrained by our social location, and to the extent that
location is parochial or otherwise limited, the narrower will be our
ability to grasp features of the world. In other words, the working
class, being a universal class in the sense that a society that consists
of only the working class is conceivable, has a greater capacity for
approximating truth than any other class.

I've put these cards on the table here because so far I've not received
any constructive response to my question.

Well, if I believed in truth and knowledge, then I suppose I'd have to
say yes to your question. If I understand it correctly that it. The
more points of view you have on the world the richer its apprehension,
so presumably, if you have many points of view agreeing then you've
covered off more potential reality.

Someone might argue that many points of view are open to propoganda
effects or that truth isn't decided on popular vote, but they
shouldn't be difficult to curtail.


Give that truth has the same ontological status as a relation, and
that relations there no such thing as relations "out there", the in
what way do relations exist? What connects similar things? It's the
old nominalist/realist debate, which we're not about to settle here.

I don't understand what your problem is. Yes, truth is a relation
between a statement and the world, but it is a causal relation in that a
truth statement is caused by the mind under conditions constrained by
the world. What do you mean there are no causal relations out there?
Obviously there are, for there's all kinds of things going on of which
we presumably are unaware.

As far as I'm aware, this is the first time you've started to get at
the nature of your truth correspondence relation.

You say truth is a causal relation but it is also caused by the mind.
Does the mind cause a causal relation or do you mean that this causal
relation, if we traced it, would be the truth relation? (although
reading what you say below I'm not sure either are right)


Well, I just gave you an example. If I go through red lights, I'll
probably be arrested. What is circular about this? Does not my
assessment of the dangers of running the light correspond to the
probability of being arrested? True, a crude and simplistic example,
but doesn't it warrant some kind of correspondence theory? My
understanding is that the problems lie with specific correspondence
theories, not correspondence in general, and that the only
alternative to correspondence in general is solipsism.

It can be explained as cause and effect. There is no need to reflect
on the situation and claim that the reflection has truth and warrant.
This reflection process can also be explained as cause and effect.

Not sure, but I believe you are only taking the empiricist objection to
causal relations in that since they are only inferred and represent
uncertain knowledge, we are better to use a Humean definition of
causality in that it is a relation of events that are proximate in time
and space, etc. But you said you did not want to pursue this path. The
only basis for not accepting my own propositions is that a) you show why
they are wrong, or b) you offer an alternative that you show has better
features. You don't do either. If there is no reason to prefer the
empiricist over the realist position on causality, why did you bring it
up?

Hey, what happened to c?

I remember objecting to the idea that truth and warrant are necessary
preconditions for the possibility of stopping at a red light. I
figured causality was enough.


If you discredit the idea of correspondence, then all correspondence
theories suffer, surely.

Not my position. In fact, I thought it was you who doubted any
correspondence because you doubted that our statements have any truth
value.

Sorry, by "you" I meant anyone and everyone.


My remark here doesn't cast any doubt on correspondence. It doesn't
get us closer to truth because that's exactly the idea I disagree
with. It's a remark to direct suspicion to common sense. It's the
foundation of our world views and the cause of a lot hand-waving,
"full of sound and fury". My question is, why do we base so much of
our views on something we almost never question? And once it does
take the witness stand, why is it full of contradictions, circular
arguments and blind assumptions?

No idea what you are talking about. Does the first sentence mean you do
accept a correspondence theory? But then does your second sentence deny
it? The third sentence make no sense to me in terms of English. Next do
you say that correspondence is the foundation of our world view (and so
good and necessary) and the cause of a lot of hand waving (ans so bad
and unnecessary)? Who doesn't question the truth of statements? I assume
everyone does it all the time. What is this about witness stand? What is
full of contradictions?

Yes, re-reading it its poorly written. I'm saying firstly that I'm
not trying to prove correspondence right or wrong - just remove the
need for it. The best I can claim to do is make it look
unattractive. I certainly don't accept it because of the assumptions
it has. I think it can be made to work, but the price to be paid is
too high. Second, that our common sense is full of contradictions,
circular and blind assumptions, so it's a poor choice for grounds for
a theory.


It's not the discovery of hidden dogma but the letting go of this
dogma that's the important point. Once we do this, we are basically
letting go of the world view we've inherited and therefore free to
create our own. But as I say, I think this is just another bogus
schema. The whole idea for going down this road is to tear down the
old, on the grounds that there is no truth, and and replace it with
the new because it's more interesting. So it's quite happy to admit
it's bogus.

I'm not persuaded. We don't develop by becoming detached, but by being
engaged. Otherwise, we would learn more by not going to school or
experiencing the world, but we know very well that the opposite is the
case. Detachment is death, not freedom.

I'm sure the buddhists would disagree with you :)

Well, I'm not persuaded either so at least on this we agree. I don't
believe in the idea of development however, unless by development you
mean getting better at surviving.


I though I did a bit more than just say "ah... no." For example,
question what ontological status correspondence has and if we can say
that it exists at all, the offering of an alternative view of things
that lives without the idea that is being refuted, etc.

Well, OK. See my mention of radical empiricism above. Are you taking
that position vs. say, critical empiricism, pragmatism or realism? One
of these three, or a mix of these three, represent the consensus today
in the philosophy of science. So anyone who chooses to differ, needs to
justify their position. It does not mean anything to negate or caste
doubt on a position without any justification.

I suppose I'm a pragmatist at the moment, but my main "position" is
that I don't really believe in the truth of positions, only in their
current utility, which will is personal and will inevitably change. I
doubt I'll come back to truth however.


I don't believe in morality, good and evil. I think they're social
constructs and meaningless outside of human discourse.

Why do you bring this up now?

Oh. You meantioned morality a few times... just a passing comment.


"Effective action" hasn't found traction on me for some reason. Maybe
because I'm not sure quite where it fits in.

Effective action is often taken as a warrant for the truth value of our
statements. You are free to disagree with this common view, but only if
you say why and justify that position.

If I were to disagree, I'd say that effective action is close to
sounding like useful action, and if useful action warrants us to say
that a sentence is "true" then it sounds to me like it's a realist
position couched in the language of a pragmatist. Let's call this
position the "new realist" (after the "new right" from politics). So
I'd probaby say great, that sounds good, but why bother with the word
"true"?


My world view is that there is no foundations for truth and knowledge
and that it doesn't stop us from stopping at red lights, paying our
taxes or helping old ladies cross the street.

The issue is what causes us to stop at the red light. What causes us not
to stop may be that we think we can get away with it, etc., which is not
the issue I raised. I made a simple point that my stopping at the red
light required that I have truthful knowledge about color, about the
rules of the road, about the brake pedal, etc.

Yes, I understood you mean that. I was generalising to say that we
can live our lives quite happily without the notions of truth and
knowledge.


Note that my reasons for this equally have to claim to truth. My
reasons are, at bottom, emotive at best. I can't offer you any
constructive arguments, only critical feedback on constructions.

This critical feedback I don't see beyond a generalized nihilistic
skepticism. The question I raised had to do with the relation of the
universality of theories and their truth value. To doubt there are
theories, to doubt truth means anything, is hardly critical feedback.

If I just said "truth and theories don't exist", you'd be right. But
I come with a story of why we use words like "truth" and "knowledge",
that their notions aren't needed to make sense of the world and that
there is another set of notions that could replace them. Under the
view I offer, what I'm offering you is critical feedback. What you
see is contradiction, non-sense and nihilism, which I appreciate
because I felt the same way when I first started trying to make sense
of it.


The thing you learn in history 101 is that there is not truth about
the past, just interpretation. That's exactly why it's not a science.
While science is only interpretation too, the interpretation has
observable constraints to offer a metric that lets them say it's the
/best/ interpretation so far.

Not true. Science does not have to do with absolute truth, but degrees
of truth. That is, the interpretation offered in History 101 is presumed
to have truth value, and the theorem offered in Physics 101 is supposed
to represent an approximate truth. Your notion of science seems
radically empiricist, when in fact it has not been for a very long
time. Some sciences, such as quantum mechanics, are not based on
observables at all.

You'll find that some physicist appreciate that "truth" is a tenuous
notion. Many mathematicians and logicians realise that "truth" is a
techincal term particular to their field.


Richard Rorty was my pied piper, in particular "Contingency, irony,
and solidarity" (Cambridge), the best I've read. His "Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature" was very influential too, but for philosophers.

Aha, you might have said this in the first place.
.

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