Re: Universality as warrant for relative truth value

On Jun 30, 11:56 pm, Haines Brown <bro...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
jason <jasonkstev...@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
It would be interesting to see how you avoid semantics. If you assign
truth values to bits of language then meaning is involved.

Of course. I meant "semantics" in the sense of a study of language as a
source of truth independent of the world. That may not be how you use
the word.

Okay.


I kind of see where you're headed, but I don't have any citations for
you. My only contribution besides general discussion would be to
point out some of your assumptions and problems inherent in them. But
you may already be aware of them and/or not have a need for that.

My question was meant to be framed in terms of the current consensus in
the philosophy of science, or at least major positions today, and so I
didn't feel the need to offer any justification for it. Yes, some issues
in contemporary science are contested. For example, I was presuming a
realist position, and there are some antirealists who would disagree,
but realism and pragmatism seem the main alternatives today.

You don't need to justify anything to me - unless you're asking me to
consider something. You're asking for citations, so I figured you
could be writing a philosophy paper. If you are, I'd recommend that
you table you assumptions. Otherwise no worries if you're following
consensus.


I'm refering to the infinite regress you end up with if you claim that
truth is relative. It sounds like you're talking about another kind
of "relative truth".

While OT, let me reply. I assume that truth is a relation of the person
and the world. It emerges in consciousness and therefore is constrained
by the powers of the mind, although having a character of its own
distinct from both mind and brain. But consciousness also emerges
through our engagement with the world (in action rather than
observation), and so is constrained by the nature of the world and
thereby acquires truth value. It is subjective and truthful in relation
to self and truthful about the world at the same time. The potential for
truth value depends in part on universality, both in relation to the
world we engage, and in terms of our social location (class). I was
looking for discussions in the literature concerning the first half of
this proposition.

So if I understand you, you primarily assume that truth is
correspondence between the world and what is presented to our
consciousness. You add to this idea that consciousness is constrained
by the mind which is in turn constrained by the world. And you assume
that truth is absolute or universal in the sense that it is grounded
by the world on the one end, and by society on the other. Would this
be about right?


This is a simple and straightforward response to your remark, but I
realize that there are all kinds of issues it raises that would lead us
into a swamp. I only bring it up to help you understand where I'm coming
from. But for a standard discussion of one of my points, you might take
a look at a representation of how consciousness emerges from brain
matter: Gerald M. Edelman and Guilio Tononi, _A Universe of
Consciousness: How matter becomes imagination_ (New York, 2000).

Yes it does raise lots of philosophical issues, but most things do.
At the same time most people would agree with you I think.

Thanks for the reference but I don't really believe in consciousness.


As for the basic issue that I see lurking behind your remarks, I should
note that I give priority to our changing the world rather than just
understanding it (i.e., we understand it through changing it). I reject
Cartesian dualism, and this is an existential a priori for me because I
am committed primarily to a change the world. I do not happen to be a
member of an elite and so cannot indulge myself to mere armchair
speculation.

Okay. I don't think there's anything behind what I'm saying. I'm
trying to get to grips with what you're saying and I think my
background and the terms I'm use to using is getting in the way.


I appreciate your responding to my question, even though you were unable
to offer any citations. It is odd that in a newsgroup such as
sci.philosophy.meta that there is so little interest in such obvious
basic question in the philosophy of science as we have been discussing.

This newsgroup use to be good. I come back from time to time to seem
how it's shaping up, but it would be nice if more people contributed.
These days most of the posts seem to be about Islam or something
equally as random.
.

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