Re: Wikileaks, secondary effects
- From: Paul F Austin <pfaustin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2010 21:17:41 -0500
On 11/30/2010 6:41 PM, Ray O'Hara wrote:
"William Black"<blackusenet@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in messageThis is neither the first nor will it be the last and TS and code work material isn't exempt. Our security systems depend ultimately on the vigilance of the people in the system.
On 30/11/10 21:34, Jim Watt wrote:On Tue, 30 Nov 2010 17:47:30 +0000, William Black
On 30/11/10 15:56, Fred J. McCall wrote:William Black<blackusenet@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
As the Wikileaks material was sent over secure lines from US embassies
back to the USA and everything has a 'date/time' stamp. We can
therefore assume that any other material sent over the same lines on
same day is now accessible to anyone who intercepted the same traffic.
No, you can't.
Piss off numpty.
On this occasion Fred has a good point and the suggestion that the
lines were tapped is the rather stupid one, and even if they were
different users would use different encryption.
It is reasonable to assume all traffic is intercepted. Indeed I believe
everyone assumes they are as a matter of course.
Something called 'traffic flow security' tends to mean that lines are not
shut down and restarted when the user changes. That's why they have a
unified classification system.
The Wikileaks stuff is all below Top Secret so far and no special handling
or compartmented or codeword information has yet emerged, but that may
well be an indication of the access level of the leaker rather than
the method they got the files is known, a Pvt who is in deep doo doo stole
them by walking past lax security.
besides the Pvt who will never breath the air of freedom again some other
people from the head of security to the guards detailed to check
on everything leaving the installation should be made severe examples of.
Wen Ho Lee sneaker-netted the entire nuclear weapons design archive out of Los Alamos National Laboratory. He was successful because after his access to the SCIF had been pulled, the Program Security Officer neglected to 1. notify his peers that his access was pulled and 2. suspend his access to the secure network.
According to testimony to Congress by FBI Director Louis Freeh and Attorney General Janet Reno, he tail-gated into the SCIF, logged on to the secure system, loaded the archive onto a removable drive(s) and pedaled back out. The drive(s) were never recovered.
Here is the core of their testimony:
"Over a period of years, Dr. Lee used an elaborate scheme to move the equivalent of 400,000 pages of extremely sensitive nuclear weapons files from a secure part of the Los Alamos computer system to an unclassified, unsecure part of the system, which could be accessed from outside of Los Alamos...Nor was this all. Dr. Lee carefully and methodically removed classification markings from documents; he attempted repeatedly to enter secure areas of Los Alamos after his access had been revoked -- including one attempt at 3:30 a.m. on Christmas Eve; and he deleted files in an attempt to cover his tracks before he was caught. Dr. Lee created his own secret, portable, personal electronic library of this nation's nuclear weapons secrets...
These codes and their associated data bases, and the input file, combined with someone that knew how to use them, could, in my opinion, in the wrong hands, change the global strategic balance. They enable the possessor to design the only objects that could result in the military defeat of America's conventional forces..."
- Prev by Date: Re: Terror plot foiled in Portland Or.
- Next by Date: Re: Oh oh. Interpol looking for Assange
- Previous by thread: Re: Wikileaks, secondary effects
- Next by thread: Re: Wikileaks, secondary effects