Re: Let's return to saner arguments....


"Keith Willshaw" <keithnospam@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:zLmfl.1$wH1.0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

"Jeff Crowell" <jeff.crowell@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:glkjq8$hkm$1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
In my opinion, the main defect of the ABDA force wasn't the total
heterogeneity or the lack of leadership (not of Doorman, but of the
higher command in Batavia) but the limits of their firepower; a score of
modern 6" guns with state-of-art turrets and fire control will be a
definite improvement. Also, in 1944-6 timeframe the Java and Sumatra
perhaps are still available....

IMO ABDA's main defects were:
- Language. IIRC the way things worked was Doorman would issue
orders via voice radio, in Dutch, and then the English-speaking ships
either had to have someone aboard who spoke Dutch, or depended on
another ship in the force translating into English and then
rebroadcasting the orders (in the midst of the battle, forsooth!).
Failing that, they just followed-the-leader and hoped for the best!
- Communications in general--ineffective tactical voice radios.
- No agree-upon tactics. No battle plans.

Indeed although it should be said that the aim of attacking the Japanese
invasion fleet was understood by all

- Ineffective (an awfully polite word for an inexcusable situation!)
torpedoes, at least for the Americans.

During the daylight battle only one ship was hit by torpedoes, the long
range
of the long lance gave them an advantage but they still had to fire over
90 of them to achieve a single hit

- No air cover, let alone air superiority. That, alone, doomed
their efforts.


Air cover during the Battle of the Java Sea was not in fact a problem.
The allies had air support from ground bases while the Japanese had no
naval air
available. Earlier air attacks had reduced the allied efficiency both in
terms
of damage done (Houston had one turret knocked out for example) and
by exhausting the crews who had been at action stations for a prolonged
period.

The Japanese definitely had the edge in firepower. Their two heavy
cruisers
could each bring 10x8" guns while only Exeter and Houston had only 12
operational
8" guns between them. Nachi and Haguro were also very well protected with
a 4" main belt and displaced over 13,000 tons . Exeter by comparison had a
3" belt and displaced around 10,000 tons while Houston was even smaller
and less well protected often being referred to as a 'treaty tinclad'

When you include the powerful Japanese secondary armament its clear they
were a handful even for the most modern US heavy cruisers.

The 2 Dutch light cruisers were pretty ineffective, De Rutyer displaced
a light over 6,500 tons and mounted 7 x 6" guns .HMNLS Java was
practically a museum piece and her 10 guns mounted on single
mouts with shields were not much use frankly

The other key advantage the Japanese held was their training in night
action
amply displayed when the Japanese sank 2 cruisers in quick succession.
Only Exeter had radar and she was out of the fight by the time the night
action took place.

Keith


My great uncle tony was on the Marblehead and in an odd way she was saved
by japanese air-power.
a bomb hit ruined her steering gear and she had to retire before the night
massacre.
but more modern scholarship gives more credit to Houston and Perth in the
final battle and in the sinking of the several japanese transports
sunk in the final fight.


.

Relevant Pages
Loading