Re: Shinano: what if she hadn't been sunk?



Greggie Gibson wrote:
Ken Chaddock <chaddock@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in
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Greggie Gibson wrote:

Ken Chaddock <chaddock@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in
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Andre Lieven wrote:

On Jan 2, 9:14 pm, Ken Chaddock
<chadd...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:


Andre Lieven wrote:


On Dec 31, 4:28 pm, Ken Chaddock
<chadd...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Andre Lieven wrote:
On Dec 29, 11:37 pm, "Matt Wiser"
<MattWiser...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
To get away from the political trash, here's a good
old-fashioned naval topic: this was over on the
J-aircraft.org's board for the IJN, and it was about
what if the Shinano had not been sunk in November
1944, but had made Kure despite having four torpedo
holes and some nasty flooding. Would she have been
on the Yamato's final sortie, sunk in the Kure raids
that sank the IJN's remaining capital ships (though
immobilized for lack of fuel) in July 1945, or taken
as a prize at the end of the war and used as a clay
pigeon at Bikini during Operation CROSSROADS in
1946? Anyone hazard a guess as to which of the three
is likely?
Sunk in port, or at Bikini. There was no fuel for a
ship as big and relatively useless in
1945 as Shinano would have been, without aircraft,
and with only a capacity of 50 planes.
Shinano had a substantially higher capacity than
50 aircraft. The 55 planes were her local defence force. Her concept of
operations was that she would be a very large floating
maintenance and refuel/rearming station supporting
other conventional carriers, allowing them all to
carry larger airgroups than they could effectively
service and maintain during a battle. She also was
intended to carry 125 "unassigned" aircraft, in
addition to her own 55 as replacements for losses by
other carriers. That makes 180 aircarft...whether she could have
operated than number of aircraft as a CV is highly doubtful...probably more
like 150...somewhere around a Midway class
capacity...but her enormous hanger was capable of
carrying a lot more than 50 airplanes.
A cite for that would be nice. As pretty much every
reference source that I have, or have seen, gives her a
capacity of around 50 planes, usually listed as 47
aircraft.
I'll try to find chapter and verse for you. I've
seen a comparison between Shinano, the proposed British Malta Class and
the US Midway class...possibly in Friedman's "British
Carrier Aviation".

OK, that one I don't have, but a plethora of other
carrier books all say
nothing about this issue.



If I recall correctly, Shinano had hanger space
for up to 125 "unassigned" aircraft...though I suppose that would
depend on what aircraft...though the newer fighters and
bombers actually folder up into smaller packages, for
example the A6M only folded it's wing tips whereas the
A7M folded the last 13 ft of each wing. In a similar
manner the new B7As were about 8 feet "narrower" when
folded than the B6 Tenzans. This was in addition to her own self defence air
group of 50 to 55 aircraft that was supposed to consist entirely of
fighters.

<snip>

The point being that if Shinano could carry over a
hunderd planes, why could she not then operate them ?
While the building history of the IJN in the late
30s/early 40s shows several cases of disfunction (Ise, Hyuga and Mogami conversions, and CL Oyodo.), the
notion that a navy who was then reeling from having
lost so many carriers would not use their biggest ship
as a full carrier is rather... insane.
I pretty much agree, I can only think that the
Japanese may have been having issues with turning their aircraft around quickly
and wanted another (very large) flight deck to refuel
and rearm strike aircraft between sorties.
Also, the ability to re-equip and re-inforce
diminished air groups shouldn't be sneered at. This would give the IJN the
ability to press any advantage they might have achieved.
For example, if they had engaged and severely depleted
the air groups of a US carrier task group, they would
have been able to quickly come back up to strength and
continue their attacks while the US group would have had
to fight on with their diminished air groups...likely
being overwhelmed in the process.

The basic problem here is that the very concept is deeply
flawed. If one has a fast carrier, and one doesn't use it
as a first line unit, then one needs *both* enough first
line units to meet the enemy fleet, and their first line
units, *and* the " spare " first line units such as this
notion of Shinano.

The USN in 44/45 could have afforded to do that. They
didn't. No one else could afford such a silly " plan. "
While "silly" from a USN perspective, perhaps not
from the Japanese perspective. The USN perfected the ability to run 'round
the clock continuous air ops with large numbers of
aircraft over extended periods. The Japanese never did
match that and consequently, the availability of another
giant flight deck that, unencumbered by it's own strike
group squadrons, would allow the (relatively) quick turn
around of strike squadrons from other carriers might have
seemed far more attractive to their mindset.
This is particularly interesting when you consider
that Shinano's bunkerage and weapons storage capacity far exceeded what
any airgroup she could have carried would need. When
considered from that perspective, it makes some sense to
have such a ship act as a floating service station with
strike squadrons operating from her on an almost continuos
basis, rather than have all sorts of ammunition and fuel
that you'll never be able to make use of.

But doesn't that in fact make the Shinano a very appealing
target which also means that more resources would be used
to protect her? Which sort of negates any advantage.
That's where her own 50 - 55 plane defensive air-group
comes in. Also, she still had a Yamato hull and on top of that her flight
deck had 8 inches of steel reinforced concrete on the 2.5
inches thick steel deck over a 3.5 in armored deck. It's
unlikely that fleet dive bombers could have seriously
effected her.



I bow to your knowledge...but, do you have to sink such a ship to take it out of the battle? The superstructure seems pretty vulnerable (and yes I understand the difficulty of aiming for a particular type of destruction.) And weren't there still some torpedoe bombers?

IJN specifically outfitted nearly half of its DBs with HE, for the express purpose of taking out superstructure and defensive armament.

Dan
.



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