Re: If Today's Media reported WWII......
- From: "Jack Linthicum" <jacklinthicum@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 30 Jun 2006 12:21:50 -0700
dumpster4@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=062906E
Are you curious as to how the real situation was handled in the Chicago
Tribune case?
Notice the message sent May 17, before the operations at Midway began
and long before the Chicago Tribune story on June 7th. As an additional
point the practice of ships and stations decrypting traffic that was
not meant for them continued until the implementation of the encrypted
fleet broadcast in the 1960s.
EPILOGUE
The Battle of Midway continued long after the combatants retired.
Because of the confusion that surrounded the nascent and relatively
unfamiliar U.S. Navy policies governing secrecy and need to know in
1942, the Battle of Midway was refought in the newspapers and
courthouses of three major U.S. cities - New York, Chicago, and
Washington - for several weeks after the battle actually ended. At
issue was how the Navy knew of Japanese plans, how that knowledge came
into the possession of a newspaper reporter, and how the government
should handle a serious security violation. In the end no one was ever
formally punished for revealing to the public the role communications
intelligence played in the Japanese defeat. Whether the Japanese ever
discovered that U.S. cryptologists had successfully penetrated their
most secret operational code, or even suspected the magnitude of the
warning provided by COMINT, remains a matter of conjecture to this day.
At the time, however, officials within OP-20-G were certain that
subsequent almost draconian corrections in Japanese communications
procedures and cryptography were traceable directly to the following
events.
On 17 May 1942, the survivors of the Lexington were en route to San
Diego and San Francisco aboard the USS Barnett and the USS Elliot. (One
account said that Admiral Fitch and Captain Sherman were aboard the
transport Chester.) Anticipating their arrival in the United States,
CINCPAC sent the following message to Admiral Fletcher, CTF 17, with
information copies to COMINCH and the Commandants of the 11th and 12th
Naval Districts:
It is imperative that all survivors Coral Sea action being returned
Mainland be instructed that they are to refrain from any mention of the
action upon their arrival west coast port. Com11 is requested berth
transports where debarkation can be conducted without contact with
newsmen. All personnel will probably require reoutfitting. There will
be no publicity regarding this matter until Navy Department release.
Barnett and Elliot will stop at San Diego to discharge excess personnel
en route San Francisco. 174
Despite these precautions by CINCPAC, events aboard the Barnett
resulted in even more damaging revelations than those CINCPAC had hoped
to prevent. In ancillary actions, CINCPAC learned that medical reports
filed in Navy Bureau of Medicine channels revealed the status of
American carriers after the battle. In a hasty message on 3 June 1942,
CINCPAC notified COMINCH and requested immediate action to suppress the
errant reports.175 At 2050 on 8 June 1942, COMINCH sent the following
message to CINCPAC:
Contents of your 311221 May were published almost verbatim in
several newspapers yesterday. Article originated with correspondent
Stanley Johnson [sic] embarked on [USS] Barnett until June 2d. While
your despatch was addressed Task Force Commanders it was sent in
channel available to nearly all ships which emphasizes need of care in
using channels para. Cominch investigating on Barnett and at San Diego.
176
CINCPAC's message of 311221 May contained his final appreciation of the
Japanese order of battle prior to Midway.
True to his word, COMINCH immediately convened several formal inquiry
panels, which began gathering depositions from witnesses. The panels
inquired into the circumstances aboard the Barnett, which, in addition
to most of the crew, carried the executive officer of the Lexington,
Commander Morton T. Seligman, and a newspaper correspondent, Mr.
Stanley Johnston, back to the United States, and in Chicago in the
headquarters Colonel R.R. McCormick's newspaper, the Chicago Tribune,
where the story had originated.177 According to Admiral King's
biographer, Thomas B. Buell in Master of Seapower, Admiral King "was in
a white fury at his headquarters while his staff frantically tried to
discover the source of the leak."
By 11 June all of the principals had been interviewed. Those aboard the
Barnett were interviewed more than once. Out of this work emerged a
very unpleasant picture of official neglect and confusion concerning
the safeguarding of communications intelligence both on the Barnett and
in the newspapers. Because of the perception that newsmen accompanying
U.S. forces were sworn to secrecy, indictments of the principal
employees of the Chicago Tribune were sought on 9 June, even before the
inquiries were completed. They were returned on 7 July by a Chicago
grand jury. At this point serious snags appeared at every turn, and the
matter lay in the hands of the grand jury and a special prosecutor for
several weeks while the navy added depositions to a record that
increasingly showed that Johnston, a British subject, had, with the
help or negligence of others, betrayed the trust placed in him.
While many in the navy focused on finding a suitable punishment for
Johnston, COMINCH issued another memorandum on 20 June 1942 similar to
those he had originated in March and April. It was sent to CINCLANT,
CINCPAC, and CDR- SWPACFORCE bearing the subject "Control of
Dissemination and Use of Radio Intelligence." Within the navy this
would prove to be the only remedial action to come out of the Johnston
case.178
On 24 June the New York newspaper PM published a story without
attribution announcing that the Justice Department did not plan to
prosecute anyone, either in the newspapers or in the U.S. Navy,179 as a
result of their role in the revelations. Ironically, three days later
the navy discovered that Johnston's own government had earlier declared
him "unreliable" as a correspondent.180 It was the same government,
however, that subsequently forged the ultimate solution by addressing
the correlation between the Johnston revelations and safeguarding
communications intelligence.181
On 14 July, the special prosecutor, Mr. William D. Mitchell,
transmitted his comprehensive "Report on the Chicago Tribune Case" to
Attorney General Francis Biddle and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.
His conclusion, after he had reviewed the law, the evidence, and the
circumstances surrounding the "leak," ended by suggesting that "the
game may not be worth the candle" and that the national effort would be
better served if the case were dropped.182
In the mind of the special prosecutor, none of his major reasons for
dropping the case concerned the safeguarding of communications
intelligence. Three salient points concerning the merits of the
government's case were cited instead. All were related to the personal
behavior of the principals: "1) Johnston said (on 8 June) that he got
the information from a paper he found on his desk; 2) Two officers
testified seeing Seligman working at a table in his quarters and that
before him was a 'writing on Navy paper' giving a list of Jap vessels
divided into a 'striking force, support force, etc.'; 3) If, as appears
likely, some officer left a copy of that dispatch lying around, it may
fairly be said there was as much carelessness on the ship as the
Tribune was guilty of, and the Jury may think so." 183
No further action was taken until 15 August 1942, when the British
Admiralty delegation in Washington sent a letter to Admiral King
expressing concern that the Hearst revelations posed a danger to
special intelligence methods, that a trial would further compromise
this source, and that "preservation of this invaluable weapon outweighs
almost any other consideration." King's reply reassured the British
that the U.S. Navy would not do anything to increase the harm already
inflicted by the original news story. 184 Five days later, the Chicago
Daily Tribune carried the front page story, "U.S. Jury Clears Tribune."
This story signaled the end of the grand jury investigation, though no
reasons were ever given to the press by Mr. Mitchell, the special
prosecutor.
What were the facts in the strange case of Stanley Johnston? As noted
above, CINCPAC 311221Z May 42, was the message that passed CINCPAC's
final appreciation of the Japanese order of battle for the Battle of
Midway to the commanders of Task Forces 16 and 17, Admirals Spruance
and Fletcher, respectively. The message was passed in communications
channels available to other ships. Contrary to normal practices, which
expected communicators to ignore traffic not addressed to their ship or
commander, it was probably decoded by communications officers from the
Lexington en route home from the loss of their ship at Coral Sea, who
were acting as watch standers aboard the transport USS Barnett (AP11).
Their reason for doing so may have been the presence of the Lexington's
executive officer, Commander Morton Seligman. The message was given to
Commander Seligman, who, apparently under the impression that he was
authorized to do so, showed the message to Johnston, who had been
aboard the Lexington during the battle and was being evacuated with the
crew. Johnston and Seligman may have shared the same quarters aboard
the Barnett. 185
On 7 June 1942, five days after Johnston's arrival in San Diego and one
day after CINCPAC's "POA Communique #3" appeared announcing "a
momentous U.S. victory," Johnston's story of U.S. foreknowledge of
Japanese forces and their plans appeared in the Chicago Tribune and
other newspapers in Washington and New York.186 The headlines that
introduced the story on page 4A in the Washington Times Herald for 7
June 1942 revealed without a doubt that the author had been privy to
secret material concerning Japanese intentions and strategy: "U.S. KNEW
ALL ABOUT JAP FLEET. GUESSED THERE WOULD BE A FEINT AT ONE BASE, REAL
ATTACK AT ANOTHER."187
Though he could not know the extent of the duplicity involved, Walter
Winchell, in his column in the New York Daily Mirror, characterized the
Tribune as having "tossed security out the window." Understandably,
Johnston's repeated denials that he had ever seen CINCPAC's message
were received with cynical disbelief in Washington. Even his media
superiors readily admitted they could not otherwise account for the
similarities. 188
On 8 June, following an inconclusive meeting between high naval and
newspaper officials, Johnston and his editor in Washington, Arthur
Henning, met privately with Vice Admiral Russell Willson, Admiral
King's chief of staff. It was during this meeting, as noted by the
special prosecutor, that Johnston may have contradicted himself
(Admiral Willson was to say that Johnston "confessed") and admitted
seeing a list of Japanese vessels. 189 With the concurrence of the
secretary of the navy and the president, Admiral King barred Seligman
from promotion forever. Seligman retired in 1944. 190
OP-20-G's assessment of the damage done by the Johnston revelations
took a long time to develop primarily because the Japanese themselves
were slow to change their procedures. Nevertheless, OP-20-G maintained
it was no mere coincidence that within a few weeks of the Johnston
expose drastic changes were made in virtually all Japanese codes and
ciphers including the Japanese Fleet General-Purpose System, which
changed on 15 August, only two months into the current cipher.
Consistent with these changes, navy monitors also noted the omission of
message serial numbers beginning on 15 August and a major change in the
Japanese callsign system on 1 October 1942. 191
All of the Japanese refinements were justifiably described by OP-20-G
analysts as serious threats to their capability to produce current
intelligence. 192 Thus, it is difficult to say at this point that a
single event occurred that prompted Admiral King to decide what course
of action he would take. It may have been OP-20-G's concern that a jury
trial would have even more painful consequences than those already
experienced, or Admiral Willson's reading of the meeting he had had
with Johnston, or the trauma of preparing highly classified testimony
to be given before a Chicago grand jury. Clearly, Admiral King had
decided not to implement the 7 July grand jury indictment when he
responded to the British letter in August; and the evidence suggests,
albeit weakly, that as early as 20 June he had begun to regret even
seeking the indictment.
Throughout the Johnston affair, OP-20-G consistently sought a plausible
cover story to minimize the damage already done. They appealed to King
for future safeguards to prevent the loss of a vital advantage to the
navy. King's reiteration of his restrictions on distribution on 20
June, while perhaps not all that OP-20-G wanted, strongly suggested
that these appeals were heard.193
Questions concerning the appropriate applications of communications
intelligence to wartime emergencies of all types continued to arise.
One problem addressed in December 1942 affected how newspapermen and
radio broadcasters treated information they knew originated from enemy
communications. A new paragraph was prepared for insertion in the "Code
of Wartime Practices for the American Press" by the secretaries of war
and navy and sent to the director of censorship for implementation:
ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS
To the end that the enemy may not have information concerning any
success the U.S. may attain in deciphering his encoded or enciphered
communications, no mention should be made of available or captured
enemy codes or enemy ciphers, or about the intelligence gained from
intercepting and studying enemy radio messages.
A prestigious trade journal gave immediate approval to the addition
while at the same time registering the idea that after the war
censorship should not continue. After citing a post-Pearl Harbor report
that "monstrously exaggerated" U.S. losses as an example of
irresponsible behavior, the editorial concluded with some ideas that
are still relevant:
As between an ethical professional requirement that a journalist
hold nothing back and a patriotic duty not to shoot one's own soldiers
in the back, we have found no difficulty in making a choice. Freedom of
the press does not carry with it a general license to reveal our secret
strengths and weaknesses to the enemy. 194
It was not until 1985 that anyone from the Pacific COMINT centers
received any formal recognition for his contribution to either the
Coral Sea or Midway victories. In 1985, in response to a massive
outpouring of affection from his friends, Joseph Rochefort received the
Distinguished Service Medal posthumously from the secretary of the
navy. For the rest, their epitaph was most fittingly expressed by a
perfect stranger many years later:
History, with its flickering lamp, stumbles along the trail of the
past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and
kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days. What is the worth
of all this? The only guide to man is his conscience. The only shield
to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very
imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so
often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our
calculations, but with this shield, however the fates may play, we
march always in the ranks of honour. 195
http://www.centuryinter.net/midway/priceless/
and footnotes
http://www.centuryinter.net/midway/priceless/footnotes.html#note195
.
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- If Today's Media reported WWII......
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