Re: Conventionally-Armed Trident Missiles.


"John Dallman" <jgd@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:memo.20060122154551.1496B@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> In article <8oSdnYFr_OxMYU_eRVn-ig@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, brooksvmi@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> (Kevin Brooks) wrote:
>
>> Actually, GPS terminal guidance is envisioned for such a ICBM-based
>> system.
>
> OK, that makes a difference.
>
>> Heck, we were attaining darned good accuracy well before GPS
>> was available with Pershing II
>
> That was terminally guided in some way, wasn't it? Not GPS, obviously.

It used a radar imaging system--input an image of what the terrian should
look like at the impact point, and the radar image of the actual view was
corrected to acheive that image. Not much unlike the terrain-mapping
guidance system used by the cruise missiles of that day.

>
>> And for every jamming advance, we will likely develop countermeasures
>> that make GPS using systems less vulnerable. This far the use of GPS
>> jamming in an operational setting has reportedly been anything but
>> laudatory (IIRC the Iraqis' use of a purchased Russian jammer resulted
>> in the jammer being taken out...by a GBU-31, no less!).
>
> If the jammer is simple and undefended enough to allow a home-on-jam mode,
> then sure. But given the power levels of the GPS satellites, an
> on-the-ground jammer is going to have orders of magnitude more power at
> the receiver, and everyone has microprocessor and signal processor
> technology these days. You really don't want "GPS cannot be effectively
> jammed" to become an "Enigma is secure" type of working rule.

"Can't be jammed" and "countermeasures will be developed" are not the same
thing, IMO. Thus far we have heard all sorts of tales of GPS jamming being
immenent, or already here, which have as yet proved to be untrue. In the
case of the ICBM warhead option, I'd think that the GPS jamming might be
rather hard to make useful, as the most useful period of utilizing GPS
inputs would be rather distant from the target (at mach 4 or so doing "last
second" course corrections might be a bit too much to ask). Plus, as with
the current JDAM system, it may only take one or two discrete GPS fixes to
greatly enhance accuracy, with inertial guidance systems carrying the
majority of the load.

>
>> > You could improve accuracy quite seriously with a manuvering warhead
>> > but that would cost rather more than half a billion dollars.
>>
>> Maybe not; some of the testing and eval work has apparently already
>> been done.
>
> Hang on. You're implying that the DoD procurement system is about to be
> efficient and semi-good-value. Anyone heard porcine sonic booms?

ISTR that various conventional ballistic missile studies and even some
testing (of the use of kinetic penetrator warheads, IIRC) have already been
completed without generating a lot of press to date. While you may choose to
believe that *every* defense program is laden with pork, inefficient, etc.,
you might recall the original DoD program to develop the laser guided bomb,
which was almost a "shoestring" affair and resulted in what anyone would
call an effective program. Similarly, the rapid development of the GBU-28
was none too overly laden with either inefficiency or waste. From what I
have read the development of JDAM was similarly rather efficient. Finally,
even the Defense Science Board has gone on record as advocating the the
conventionally armed ICBM as a potentially viable and effective system--this
ain't a case of a bunch of contractors or nuts advocating an off-the-wall
scheme.

>
>> That is the usual argument tossed out against the use of such a system.
>> IMO it does not hold much water; the number of nations that can detect
>> and track an incoming warhead is currently in the neighborhood of maybe
>> five or six, with half of them being decidedly friendly, and the others
>> not being very likely contenders for targeting with such systems.
>
> However, a problem with an SLBM is that if you want the opponent to
> consider it, he has to be told that it's aimed at him.

Then our current lot must be rather ineffective, eh? Last I heard, the big
scheme was "detargeting" our strategic systems--has that resulted in the
instability you seem to claim would result?

Because otherwise
> he won't know and will ignore it. One of the last bits of US strategic
> thinking that made much sense to me was during GWI, when it was politely,
> but clearly pointed out that there was an Ohio boat in the Mediterranean,
> and that use of WMDs on invading forces would result in the use of WMDs.

I don't recall any such specific warning. I do recall a more general
reference to our being willing to use 'every weapon at our disposal' or some
such wording, in the event Saddam uncorked the nuclear or maybe even the
chem/bio genies. In which case we could also have been referring to B61's
being dropped by myriad fixed wing assets, or even Lance SSM's (which IIRC
we still had in the inventory in 90-91, shortly before they were retired as
part of the 'no tactical nukes' effort)--but nobody assumed that our various
tactical/strategic aircraft strikes, or for that matter the TLAM's or
ALCM's, or the Lance-like ATACMS, were armed with nukes when they crossed
into Iraqi airspace, now did they?

>
>> You could make the same argument about the B-2, or for that matter the
>> B-52 or the SLCM...all have demonstrated a nuclear delivery capability,
>> so why doesn't every nation assume that any incoming heavy bomber or
>> SLCM/TLAM is nuclear armed? They don't; and they won't in the case of
>> the conventional ICBM, either.
>
> Because those systems were not ones that only made sense - in their
> original development context - when nuclear armed. There are going to have
> to be some tests and demonstrations of conventional Trident before people
> believe in it. Sounds crazy, doesn't it?

I disagree. We took the cruise missile, which was originally a purely
nuclear armed creature in its ALCM form, and primarily a nuclear armed
weapon in its SLCM form, and turned them into extremely valuable
conventionally armed attack systems. If you think the cruise missiles were
not in the same class as the ICBM's in terms of primarily being nuclear
armed weapons in their original guise, then you need to reread your Cold War
history. And you are sidestepping the issue of exactly who can even detect,
much less track and determine the likely target of, an incoming ICBM
warhead--the number of nations that can do so is rather small, and unlikely
to grow much in the near-future (even the US is challenged to develop and
deploy a workable anti-ICBM defense...do you really think the Iranians,
DPRK, etc., can do so?), with the ones that can do so in the "unlikely to be
targeted with such a system" category. You think the Chinese or Russians
will drop their current doctrine and assume a LOW (launch on warning)
stature for a missile they detect (if they could do so--trying to pick up
SLBM's without having a dedicated search/track system covering a specific
area is apparently rather hard) which is read to be aimed at Lower Kumquat
in the DPRK, and unleash a retaliatory strike? Doing so means assuming a LOW
stance (something no nuclear power has been willing to do, ever, due to the
relative lack of complete reliability of detection systems), *and* being
willing to go nuclear on behalf of a third party. Sorry, but that does not
add up as a real possibility IMO; the chicken-little crowd will no doubt
disagree, but based upon real world realities I don't see it.

Brooks

>
> ---
> John Dallman, jgd@xxxxxxxxx, HTML mail is treated as probable spam.


.

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