Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT

In article <1125417019.600929.225860@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
rto.trainer@xxxxxxxxx wrote:

> John Dallman wrote:
> > In article <1125329523.827838.181560@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
> > rto.trainer@xxxxxxxxx () wrote:
> >
> > > Grand Strategy is simply a statement (or statements) of National
> > > level
> > > goals.
> >
> > Well, that's not what Dr Biddle of the US Army War College seems to
> > think,
> > nor do the authors of previous papers of the last few years from the
> > same
> > college. Nor does the NATO-terminology-compliant Royal Navy publication
> > from which I learned the term and its usage.
> >
>
> I haven't found anything in this paper by Dr. Biddle, or previous work
> that contradicts the definition I've offered.
>
> > > I don't think you'd argue that Containment was ever articulated in
> > > any
> > > operational laundry list. It was simply very intuitive and easly
> > > understood by the bulk of the population.
> >
> > And the term "containment" was used reasonably frequently in writing
> > about
> > the strategy. However, it is less obvious what the actual grand
> > strategy
> > for Iraq is at present.
> >
>
> I'd agree that it is less obvious. The major factor is that it is less
> simple and can't be boiled down into a one word summation like
> "containment."

Although "containment" was a fairly well understood concept in the key
1947 "X" article (pseudonym for George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet
Power."


> There was plenty that could have gone wrong with containment as well.
>
> > > Strategy, Grand or otherwise, is, to oversimplify, the process of
> > > selecting engagements.
> >
> > Indeed, you oversimplify. First you need to decide rationally that
> > engagements are the most effective method. An awful lot of people round
> > the world are concerned that this step was skipped and war was pursued
> > as
> > an emotional decision. If true, that implies that there isn't a
> > rational
> > grand strategy underlying current US actions. Or, as people who aren't
> > into the formal study of warfare that I've talked to about this put it
> > "They don't have a clue what they're doing".

I just finished GEN Tommy Franks' book covering the war. While some
parts seem more justified, I don't have a sense that CENTCOM really was
involved in the grand strategic level. The question remains: who was?

Franks is quite uncomplimentary to Feith, although he gives good
examples of how he and Rumsfeld both complemented one another and became
friends in the process.

My most optimistic view of the Administration and policy assumes
Rumsfeld is willing to look at alternatives, most of the key PNAC
ideologues (Feith, Wolfowitz, Perle) are out of power, Rice has more of
Bush's confidence than Powell and is a pragmatist, and Cheney is lower
profile. We shall see.

> >
>
> Note it says "selecting engagements." This includes the decisions to
> passively not engage or to actively avoid engaging.
>
> Dr. Biddle acknowledges that it may be too soon since being forced to
> include "lesser challenges" to expect a fully formed grand strategy.
>
> I stand by my contention that the Afghanistan campaign was the
> emotional decision (though correct and necessary) and that Iraq was the
> rational one.
>
> > > The real genius of [Iraq], if successful in the long haul, will be
> > > that it will have required direct military action in one place
> > > (the regional schewerpunkt) obviating the need for multiple
> > > Afghanistan actions.
> >
> > If that is the strategy and if it succeeds. It is much riskier than
> > other
> > possible strategies and has some really big possible downsides
> > if it fails.
> >
>
> There is a moral element to it as well. Those less risky courses would
> be throwbacks to the cold-war stablity-and-damn-the-cost approach. We
> don't have MAD staring us down on the other side this time, that risk
> is abated for the present. If I'm going to be used to fight in this
> war (and I am) then I (to resort to a purely emotional argument) feel
> far better served to do so in the endeavor to genuinely improve the
> world for people thaher to consign them to a human-rights,
> standard-of-living hell that wont' get us "too involved." Even if we
> fail in the process, how much better to fail in trying to do better.
>
I'm afraid I'm cynical enough to believe that slaves have to free
themselves.
.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... >> I haven't found anything in this paper by Dr. Biddle, ... >>> the world are concerned that this step was skipped and war was pursued ... I know the Commanders Intent, wich is what Grand Strategy is, just at ... >> fail in the process, how much better to fail in trying to do better. ...
    (sci.military.naval)
  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... I haven't found anything in this paper by Dr. Biddle, ... > And the term "containment" was used reasonably frequently in writing about ... it is less obvious what the actual grand strategy ... fail in the process, how much better to fail in trying to do better. ...
    (sci.military.naval)
  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... War is the extension of national policy by ... Grand strategy includes military means, ... >>>draft Iraq constitution, which establishes that no law contrary to ... >nations, there will need to be a calculus of survival on the part of the ...
    (sci.military.naval)
  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... The classical statement of grand strategy comes from ... War is the extension of national policy by ... >> that the Royal Navy could do the job by itself, and didn't need troops ... >> Now, at present, it's less than clear how creating a democracy in Iraq ...
    (sci.military.naval)
  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... Well, that's not what Dr Biddle of the US Army War College seems to think, ... it is less obvious what the actual grand strategy ... > selecting engagements. ...
    (sci.military.naval)