Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT


Howard C. Berkowitz wrote:
> In article <1125417019.600929.225860@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
> rto.trainer@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
> > John Dallman wrote:
> > > In article <1125329523.827838.181560@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
> > > rto.trainer@xxxxxxxxx () wrote:
> > >
> > > > Grand Strategy is simply a statement (or statements) of National
> > > > level
> > > > goals.
> > >
> > > Well, that's not what Dr Biddle of the US Army War College seems to
> > > think,
> > > nor do the authors of previous papers of the last few years from the
> > > same
> > > college. Nor does the NATO-terminology-compliant Royal Navy publication
> > > from which I learned the term and its usage.
> > >
> >
> > I haven't found anything in this paper by Dr. Biddle, or previous work
> > that contradicts the definition I've offered.
> >
> > > > I don't think you'd argue that Containment was ever articulated in
> > > > any
> > > > operational laundry list. It was simply very intuitive and easly
> > > > understood by the bulk of the population.
> > >
> > > And the term "containment" was used reasonably frequently in writing
> > > about
> > > the strategy. However, it is less obvious what the actual grand
> > > strategy
> > > for Iraq is at present.
> > >
> >
> > I'd agree that it is less obvious. The major factor is that it is less
> > simple and can't be boiled down into a one word summation like
> > "containment."
>
> Although "containment" was a fairly well understood concept in the key
> 1947 "X" article (pseudonym for George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet
> Power."
>
>
> > There was plenty that could have gone wrong with containment as well.
> >
> > > > Strategy, Grand or otherwise, is, to oversimplify, the process of
> > > > selecting engagements.
> > >
> > > Indeed, you oversimplify. First you need to decide rationally that
> > > engagements are the most effective method. An awful lot of people round
> > > the world are concerned that this step was skipped and war was pursued
> > > as
> > > an emotional decision. If true, that implies that there isn't a
> > > rational
> > > grand strategy underlying current US actions. Or, as people who aren't
> > > into the formal study of warfare that I've talked to about this put it
> > > "They don't have a clue what they're doing".
>
> I just finished GEN Tommy Franks' book covering the war. While some
> parts seem more justified, I don't have a sense that CENTCOM really was
> involved in the grand strategic level. The question remains: who was?
>

How involved should they have been?

Back to my tactical example, if I'm presented with instructions that
fly in the face of what I know will work, (VHF *through* the mountain
range, Sir?), or theat requires resources that are not available or
inoperative (But, we're all out of WF-16, Sir.), it is my duty to push
that information back up and I don't get to sit in the Commander's
briefing to be certain that he stays in his lane. If I'm smart, I push
back with a workable alternative to recommend. This still assumes that
I know the Commanders Intent, wich is what Grand Strategy is, just at
the National level.

> Franks is quite uncomplimentary to Feith, although he gives good
> examples of how he and Rumsfeld both complemented one another and became
> friends in the process.
>
> My most optimistic view of the Administration and policy assumes
> Rumsfeld is willing to look at alternatives, most of the key PNAC
> ideologues (Feith, Wolfowitz, Perle) are out of power, Rice has more of
> Bush's confidence than Powell and is a pragmatist, and Cheney is lower
> profile. We shall see.
>

I just can't find it that PNAC is such a major player in any of this.

And I don't agree with the Conventional Wisdom view of Powell in this
administration.

> > >
> >
> > Note it says "selecting engagements." This includes the decisions to
> > passively not engage or to actively avoid engaging.
> >
> > Dr. Biddle acknowledges that it may be too soon since being forced to
> > include "lesser challenges" to expect a fully formed grand strategy.
> >
> > I stand by my contention that the Afghanistan campaign was the
> > emotional decision (though correct and necessary) and that Iraq was the
> > rational one.
> >
> > > > The real genius of [Iraq], if successful in the long haul, will be
> > > > that it will have required direct military action in one place
> > > > (the regional schewerpunkt) obviating the need for multiple
> > > > Afghanistan actions.
> > >
> > > If that is the strategy and if it succeeds. It is much riskier than
> > > other
> > > possible strategies and has some really big possible downsides
> > > if it fails.
> > >
> >
> > There is a moral element to it as well. Those less risky courses would
> > be throwbacks to the cold-war stablity-and-damn-the-cost approach. We
> > don't have MAD staring us down on the other side this time, that risk
> > is abated for the present. If I'm going to be used to fight in this
> > war (and I am) then I (to resort to a purely emotional argument) feel
> > far better served to do so in the endeavor to genuinely improve the
> > world for people thaher to consign them to a human-rights,
> > standard-of-living hell that wont' get us "too involved." Even if we
> > fail in the process, how much better to fail in trying to do better.
> >
> I'm afraid I'm cynical enough to believe that slaves have to free
> themselves.

But we spent decades creating envirnoments that prevented that even if
they had the will to try. We don't have to now. Sins of omission are
just as damning as those of comission.

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... > I haven't found anything in this paper by Dr. Biddle, ... >> the world are concerned that this step was skipped and war was pursued ... > include "lesser challenges" to expect a fully formed grand strategy. ... > fail in the process, how much better to fail in trying to do better. ...
    (sci.military.naval)
  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... I haven't found anything in this paper by Dr. Biddle, ... > And the term "containment" was used reasonably frequently in writing about ... it is less obvious what the actual grand strategy ... fail in the process, how much better to fail in trying to do better. ...
    (sci.military.naval)
  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... Well, that's not what Dr Biddle of the US Army War College seems to think, ... it is less obvious what the actual grand strategy ... > selecting engagements. ...
    (sci.military.naval)
  • Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT
    ... a choice among goals, rather than a list of goals. ... it is less obvious what the actual grand strategy ... >> However, you and Dr. Biddle, do a good job of interpolating the ends ... >> selecting engagements. ...
    (sci.military.naval)