Re: Less OT: Grand Strategy and the GWoT

On Mon, 29 Aug 2005 23:27:36 -0400, "Howard C. Berkowitz"
<hcb@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>In article <r5g7h1103cv7eg1agi5us52unourlppid0@xxxxxxx>, RTO Trainer
><bill.white@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 29 Aug 2005 21:30:07 -0400, "Howard C. Berkowitz"
>> <hcb@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> >In article <1125329523.827838.181560@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
>> >rto.trainer@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>> >
>> >> John Dallman wrote:
>> >> > In article <q872h1lc7r4e45017s5lirduce4in4iujh@xxxxxxx>,
>> >> > bill.white@xxxxxxxxxxx (RTO Trainer) wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > > On Sun, 28 Aug 2005 02:00 +0100 (BST), jgd@xxxxxxxxx (John
>> >> > > Dallman)
>> >> > > wrote:
>> >> > > > Besides, political speeches aren't the places to look for clear
>> >> > > > descriptions of grand strategy.
>> >> >
>> >> > > Why doesn't this qualify?
>> >> > > http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf&e=747
>> >> >
>> >> > It's a list of political objectives, written in US-political
>> >> > language,
>> >> > not a to-do list. The classical statement of grand strategy comes
>> >> > from
>> >> > WWI
>> >> > and said something like:
>> >> >
>> >> > - Open supply routes to Russia by taking control of the Turkish
>> >> > Straits.
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> I disagree. This is a statement of Operational Art, though it would
>> >> not have been called such at that time.
>> >>
>> >> Grand Strategy is simply a statement (or statements) of National level
>> >> goals.
>> >
>> >I will have to disagree. War is the extension of national policy by
>> >military means. Grand strategy includes military means, but balances
>> >them with economic warfare, psychological warfare, diplomacy, and
>> >clandestine operations. It includes managing national resources and
>> >industrial capacity, including the balance between assigning people to
>> >the military versus critical jobs that support the operations.
>> >
>> >Above, I mentioned economic warfare, which is quite different than
>> >financing the war. For example, especially after the Schweinfurt raids,
>> >the WWII Germans were desperate to import bearings from Sweden. British
>> >missions went to Swedish industry and outbid anything the Germans
>> >offered.
>> >
>> >Another aspect of grand strategy is selecting and guiding national-level
>> >research and development. WWII choices, at this level, included massive
>> >commitments to radar, nuclear weapons, cryptanalysis, antisubmarine
>> >weapons, and amphibious landing technology.
>> >
>>
>> I don't see the disagreement.
>
>There is a distinct difference between a statement of national goals,
>and the national grand strategy. The latter selects the broad means to
>achieve those goals, and often the assignment of responsibility (e.g.,
>DoD, State, CIA, etc.).
>
>This is a level where the resources and requirements are balanced at the
>highest level. In the US, this is not talked about that much, but is
>generally called net assessment. The Soviets had a much better term for
>it: the correlation of forces.
>>


I still don't see the difference. I do argue that Grand Strategy is
not concerned with means. The means are determined at the Operational
and Strategic levels, though certainly assignmetns are onvloved, those
may never be disclosed to the public an in any meaningful way.

An illustration: My Battalion Commander directs the S-6 to establish
and maintain communications in the BN AOR. The S-6 directs the
Communications Platoon Leader touse Retrans sites to cover forward
positions in the AOR. The Platoon Leader directs me to take my truck
and team to a grid coordinate and place the Retrans in operation.

The goal is to have communcations in the entire AOR. The BN CDR could
direct the establishment of a specific kind of net (say HF instead of
VHF-FM) but at that level that would be inappropriate. The S-6 could
specify the grid coordiate, but again that would be inappropriate.

What will happen is that I'll arrive at the assigned grid coordiante
and there will be somethign about the site that makes it undesireable
(lack of cover and concealment for example) and I'll end up selecting
an alternate coordiate and repoirt that back up the chain.

Who's choosing the means to accomplish the goals?

>> >
>
>> >>
>> >> > One of the reasons why people who should be supporting the GWoT, in
>> >> > the
>> >> > US
>> >> > Administration's view, are reserved or half-hearted about the idea
>> >> > is
>> >> > that
>> >> > there's no official answer to that question. In the case of the
>> >> > Vietnam
>> >> > war, the grand strategy AFAIK was to prevent Vietnam becoming
>> >> > communist,
>> >> > not so much because the US cared about Vietnam more than other
>> >> > countries,
>> >> > but because it was feared that if any country became communist,
>> >> > other
>> >> > countries in the area would rapidly follow suit. This was the
>> >> > "domino
>> >> > theory". One could argue about its correctness, and it doesn't in
>> >> > fact
>> >> > appear to have been correct, but knowing that it was the theory made
>> >> > it
>> >> > much easier for other countries to decide what their attitude to the
>> >> > war was.
>> >
>> >
>> >I would disagree with that assessment of US goals. See
>> >http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/doc253.htm for the full
>> >context of what turned out to be the key internal policy document, from
>> >Assistant SecDef (National Security Affairs) McNaughton to SecDef
>> >McNamara. The key statement of priorities:
>> >
>> >1. US aims:
>> >
>> >
>> >70% --To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a
>> >guarantor).
>> >20%--To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.
>> >10%--To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.
>> >
>> >ALSO--To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods
>> >used.
>> >NOT--To "help a friend," although it would be hard to stay in if asked
>> >out.
>> >.
>> >> >
>> >> > Now, that paper I posted the link to has some guesses about what the
>> >> > grand
>> >> > strategy might be, such as (my paraphrase) "Once the peoples of the
>> >> > Middle
>> >> > East see the benefits democracy brings to Iraq, they'll replace
>> >> > their
>> >> > existing governments with democracies of their own accord. Since
>> >> > those
>> >> > will be fair and just governments, the political issues that give
>> >> > rise
>> >> > to
>> >> > Islamist terrorism will be addressed, so the threat will naturally
>> >> > evaporate."
>> >
>> >The question that must be asked is whether Arab society will consider
>> >those benefits as relevant to them. This was properly addressed by the
>> >draft Iraq constitution, which establishes that no law contrary to
>> >Islamic law will be passed. Of course, there's room for interpretation,
>> >since the next clause guarantees freedom of religion.
>> >
>>
>> No law contrary to *undisputed* Islamic law. It's a weighty
>> distinction.
>
>Exactly, and not one that lends itself to stability, when there remains
>such a debate about the proper succession of the Prophet's authority: is
>modern Iraq to be the center of the new Caliphate, or the place the
>Twelfth Imam will appear?
>

Are those things tghat would be legislated?

>>
>> >
>> >> > Having a declared grand strategy would avoid the problem of the
>> >> > large
>> >> > numbers of people worldwide who feel that there isn't one because
>> >> > either
>> >> > (a) the decision to attack Iraq was emotional, rather than logical
>> >> > or
>> >> > (b)
>> >> > the grand strategy is something discreditable, that can't be
>> >> > announced
>> >> > without provoking even more opposition. Almost none of these people
>> >> > would
>> >> > use the term "grand strategy", but that's what they want, without
>> >> > knowing
>> >> > the name.
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> Strategy, Grand or otherwise, is, to oversimplify, the process of
>> >> selecting engagements.
>> >
>> >Would you accept "theaters of operations" rather than "engagements",
>> >much as the "Germany first" Allied WWII policy was at the grand
>> >strategic level?
>> >
>>
>> WWII isn't always a good choice for illustrating this stuff as it's
>> just too big.
>
>Somehow I have the image of it requiring "Really Grand Strategy".
>Seriously, I would argue that the GWoT is as wide in scope, and as
>information intensive as WWII was in materiel and men.
>

No. We simply need to understand that the European Theater and
Pacific Theater are actually collections of theaters.

>>
>> "Germany first" was a Grand Strategy selection of engagement. The
>> decision to persue that in North Africa then Sicily, then Italy... was
>> Operational.
>>
>> However, "Germany First" wasn't really Germany first. We fought the
>> Japanese nearly simultaneously. We did hold early on when we might
>> have brought more to bear but the denouement in each "theaters"
>> (really multi theater areas) came fast on the heals of each other.
>
>It certainly wasn't clear-cut. TORCH (North Africa) was seen as a
>peripheral operation, where WATCHTOWER (Guadalcanal) took more of an
>offensive character. While we didn't understand the impact until after
>the war, the Doolittle Raid had immense effects on Japanese strategy, as
>much or more than the Berlin raid that caused Hitler to switch from what
>we now call SEAD to city bombing.
>>
>> >> Who, where and with what means are the major
>> >> questions. Iraq was a stroke of genuius in this regard. In some
>> >> respects it represented the greatest challenge and in others it would
>> >> be the easiest to undertake.
>> >
>> >I remain unconvinced.
>>
>> Okay. I'm not sure how to convince you.
>
>At best, it's too early to tell. My chief concern is the assumption that
>Arabs, especially of the Middle East, will see democracy as desirable.
>As sociologic evidence, the nations of the Maghreb tend to be more
>homogeneous than Iraq. While to some extent they were colonial
>constructs, they also are defined by the Sahara and the Mediterranean.
>The Sahel is not part of the Maghreb.
>
>Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco have had roughly half a century since
>independence. Only within the last ten years, and less in some cases,
>have they had free, multiparty elections.
>
>Why should Iraq, with a divided population, so quickly move to an
>internalized acceptance of democracy? With other Middle Eastern
>nations, there will need to be a calculus of survival on the part of the
>leadership, especially in Syria and Saudi Arabia: should they repress,
>exile themselves, risk overthrow, or throw in with reformers? Jordan,
>Lebanon and Kuwait may well be able to move to democracy. Egypt has a
>complex situation, especially the balance of the Muslim Brotherhood.
>>

And that goes to the heart of my estimation that we will be
continuously engaged there for at least a generation (like
Bosnia/Kosovo). I firmly beleive that we were on the cusp of success
in Haiti in 1934, with only another five to ten years that might not
have been the perennial problem it has been. Of course, maybe not.

>> >
>> >> IMO, if it were not a moral (and
>> >> therefore emotional) imperative to have invaded Afghanistan, we would
>> >> not have done it at all.
>> >
>> >I see it as far more an operational than moral requirement, to deprive
>> >al-Qaeda of sanctuary. In most unconventional wars involving the US,
>> >the enemy had at least some level of sanctuary, be it the Yalu River in
>> >Korea, and Laos and Cambodia for much of the Viet Nam war.
>> >
>>
>> Allow me to revise and extend my remarks. There was an operational
>> benefit, without doubt. If Iran wasn't a bordering state I think it
>> would have been possible to forego any involvement there.
>
>There has been relatively little attention given to it, but some
>evidence exists that Iran and Afghanistan may exert some stabilization
>on one another. After the Taliban fell, Radio Iran's Dari service stayed
>quite nonpolitical, emphasizing shared culture. Iran did fund creation
>of several radio stations in Afghanistan, and again focused on shared
>culture and education. Persian, as opposed to Arab culture tends to look
>at invasions as transient things, with the eventual absorption of the
>foreign culture.
>>

Yes, but at least part of the strategy has been to try to isolate
Iran. Less success there than might have been, but that would require
telling Iraq and Afghanistan what to do, which we aren't doing. Still
it has reastrained Iran,making them, if not cooperative, at least not
obstructive, of our aims.

>> >> Iraq would have been invaded, after 9/11,
>> >> regardless of action in Afghanistan. It represents the rational
>> >> strategy as the political, ideological and territorial "high ground"
>> >> in
>> >> the region. The real genius of it, if successful in the long haul,
>> >> will be that it will have required direct military action in one place
>> >> (the regional schewerpunkt) obviating the need for multiple
>> >> Afghanistan
>> >> actions.
>> >>We already see this working as we'd hoped; libya has
>> >> abandoned its WMD programs and Kaddafi is trying to reinvent himself
>> >> as
>> >> the diplomat of the Mahgreb,
>> >
>> >Yet there were ten years of diplomatic engagement leading to this point.
>> >
>> >
>>
>> I was under the impression that serious dicussions had only been going
>> on since 9/11 with a lot of interveining attempts and rebuffs.
>
>It really started with the Lockerbie incident. Trace when Khaddafi
>began taking some responsibility. This may sound strange, but Khaddafi
>is mystic as well as dictator, and I believe has an unusual amount of
>concern for his people. He simply has to be beaten repeatedly with clue
>sticks to get his attention.
>

He's relatively recently decided that Libya should be Black instead of
Arab. Kaddafi started sounding conciliatory about Lockerbie (in
response to economic pressure) in 1999, but no agreements were reached
until after 2001. Indeed, no actual allocution from Libya came until
2003.

>>
>> >
>> >Anyway, Algeria probably has dibs on that role.
>> >
>>
>> I agree, though I don't beleive that Kaddafi will be daunted in
>> trying.
>
>Indeed, Khadaffi historically is very trying.
--
COFFEE.EXE missing. Insert CUP and press ENTER to retry.

SGT Robert White
25U20, OKARNG
.

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