Re: How much can science tell us about sculling?


"Charles Carroll" <charles_carroll@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:78nujkF1n2ut7U1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Alexander,

It is always flattering whenever anyone offers reply to your arguments,
whether they merely want to reaffirm what you have to say, or elaborate
upon it, or disagree. The important factor is that they are giving serious
attention to the argument. By the way, I find that disagreement often
engages me more than reaffirmation or elaboration; for it takes me on
journeys I had never imagined.

Your objections to my having quoted Donald Knuth in "A=B" are well taken.
This is not the first time I have been accused of attempting to imitate
Procrustes and stretch other people's comments to fit the bed of my own
theories.

While I am quite prepared to discuss the objections you have raised, I am
uncertain as to their relevance, so without conceding anything on my part,
will you permit me to set aside these objections, if only for the time
being, and go on to the question of science - what it is and what it might
be able to tell us about sculling?

It seems to me that among the various explanations and definitions two in
particular have come to stand out: Kieran's model for how a coach uses
science and Carl's attempt to distinguish between empiricism, application,
and true science.

Kieran presents a coach who observes that taller rowers row faster than
shorter rowers. The coach asks why, analyzes what he has observed, and
discovers that taller rowers have a longer stroke than shorter rowers.
From his analysis he forms a hypothesis: a longer stroke produces greater
speed. He then finds ways to test his hypothesis. The tests prove that the
hypothesis is valid. The coach formulates a rowing law: for any given
stroke rate the speed of the boat is directly proportional to the length
of the stroke.

I have to agree with Walter. It seems to me that Kieran has offered a
nicely succinct model of how science works and how a rowing coach might
use it.

But Carl elaborates on what Kieran wrote. Not content with one model, he
gives us three to consider.

The first is just learning from experience without seeking a deeper
understanding of why things are the way they are.

The second is a little more complicated. Carl describes it as doing lots
of experiments, correlating the results, working out relationships between
different variables, plotting results, and finding better ways to do
something. He writes: "You learn what works, in a repeatable & provable
way which gives you some degree of predictive power, but you still don't
learn why."

But it is Carl's third example that is important example. Here Carl
presents a model for what qualifies as science. He writes: "if you are
able to analyze the fundamental physical processes underlying those causes
& effects, so that you come actually to understand from first principles
which basic factors are at play & their mathematical inter-relationships,
& if from that basic understanding you are able mathematically to predict
outcomes, that's science."

I must tell you that I am having trouble understanding the difference
between Carl's third example and Kieran's model. Don't both make use of
meticulous observation and rigorous analysis? Don't both lead to a basic
understanding that enables one mathematically to predict outcomes? And do
not both eventually lead to first principles, that is, laws that govern
why things work the way they do?

Carl's is decidedly the more elaborate. But Kieran never made any claims
that his model was anything more than rudimentary.

What I am proposing is that Carl's model of science and Kieran's model are
re-phrasings of the same model.

But regardless of whether or not you embrace what I am proposing, don't
Carl and Kieran's models share an essential feature? Don't they both
presuppose that the questions of scientific inquiry lie squarely within
the province of human reason?

To understand the kinds of questions that lie within the province of human
reason, let's first look at questions that lie outside it. Let's take
Socrates' question in "The Gorgias" - is it better to suffer injustice or
to do injustice? Socrates spends the better part of the dialogue trying to
convince Gorgias, a famous rhetorician, and others that it is better to
suffer injustice than to do injustice. But not only do they refuse to
accept any of the proofs Socrates offers, they counter Socrates' arguments
with their own proofs, which neatly demonstrate that it is actually
contrary to reason to suffer injustice rather than do injustice. The
question it would seem lies squarely outside human reason.

Now for a second question that lies completely outside the province of
human reason: does God exist? Let's look at Anselm's proof, which many
consider the first great proof on the existence of God.

Anselm proposes that "God is that than which nothing greater can be
conceived."

Notice Anselm doesn't concern himself with God's anatomy, whether God is a
man or a woman, or even God's famous attributes, i.e. benevolence,
omniscience and omnipotence. Anselm only says that "God is that than which
nothing greater can be conceived."

He then argues that given this insight into God, "God cannot be conceived
not to exist, because he would not be that than which nothing greater can
be conceived."

Anselm's proof is stunning in its simplicity and elegance. But it also
immediately raises a question. Has Anselm proven that God exists? Or has
he only proven that we cannot prove that God doesn't exist?

Almost everyone who encounters Anselm's proof immediately sees this
question. But what they miss - and what Anselm clearly understood - is the
larger question. Anselm has demonstrated logically and reasonably the
futility of trying to use logic and reason to prove the existence of God.
He uses logic to demonstrate the limitations of logic and concludes thus:
"Seekest not to understand that thou mayest believe, but believe that thou
mayest understand."

What Anselm has done is distinguish between the treatment of knowledge
that lies within the province of human reason and the treatment of
knowledge which lies outside this province. If it lies outside the
province of human reason, then belief must precede understanding. If it
lies within, then understanding must precede belief.

And there we have what the secure path of science is about. It is about
understanding preceding belief - or to paraphrase Anselm, about seeking to
understand that thou mayest believe. Science is about understanding and
the methods we use to prove that we understand.

If you have gotten this far, please don't be frustrated with my
introducing the notion of belief into science. Didn't you actually
introduce it first when you wrote: "All scientific theories, (so far as we
know of course) are approximations, and, again so far as we know, but
based on experience over thousands of years, will be replaced in due
course by closer approximations to ultimate truth, if there is such a
thing."

Consider Ptolemy's "Almagest." Doesn't it perfectly conform to Carl and
Kieran's models? Ptolemy makes make use of meticulous observation and
rigorous analysis, which leads to a basic understanding that enables him
mathematically to predict outcomes, and even eventually leads him to
formulate first principles, namely that the earth is at the center of the
heavens, and that heavenly bodies orbit around it, and that their orbits
are in perfect circles. That is the way things work! Or rather it is the
way we believed things worked centuries. It was Ptolemy's genius to make
this belief plausible.

And we embraced this belief because Ptolemy offered us rigorous proofs
that it was so.

So I hope I have produced an argument that science is about understanding
preceding belief.

Allow me to restate my original proposition. Science treats only that
knowledge which lies within the province of human reason and may be
understood very simply as the search for proof so that our beliefs may
seem plausible to us.

Cordially,

Charles

Golly, that's a lot of stuff to comment on.

First the difference between KC's empiricism and Carl's scientific
understanding. I don't think I can add much to what Carl has written.
There is a very real difference. For what Carl and I, and I suggest the
vast majority of scientists, mean by science, there must be an understanding
of the reasons why things happen. Not just that they do because we see that
they always do, but because we understand the deeper level mechanisms which
cause them. If we have that level of understanding, then we can make
quantitative predictions of what will happen in new situations. This is
really important because it is a test of the validity of the theory.

If KC's coach's understanding was scientific, then one might expect him to
be able to predict correctly the best stroke length for a new type of oar in
a new type of boat, for different distances and in different sets of weather
and water conditions.

There are usually lots of theories which could explain what we see.
Scientific theories have to be tested in order to valide them (NOT prove;
that's impossible). A useful new theory will predict some as yet unknown
effect(s). An experiment will tell us whether the prediction is fulfilled.
If so, then all is well; we accept the new theory for the time being. If
not, the theory is falsified and must be rejected or modified. A classic
example of this the experiment in 1919 to test Einstein's prediction that a
ray of light would be deflected if it passed close to a star. This had
never been observed. The General Theory predicted it, in strict
contradiction to Newtonial theory, and also predicted the size of the
deflection. The experiment confirmed the prediction reasonably accurately.
Had it not, then the theory would have been falsified. So the theory was
not falsified and may be considered "true" for the time being, but only
until something occurs which it cannot explain. That's why scientist keep
on testing current theories. Eventually an anomaly will be found, and then
a newer, more nearly "true" (in the sense that it explains more phenomena)
theory may be developed.

This brings me on to some of your later remarks. If we accept the above
methodology, (due largely to Karl Popper) then a theory is only scientific
if there is some conceivable way in which it could be falsified. So most
statements about God are not scientific, because no observation could
demonstrate that they are untrue. Try to think of what could falsify Anselms
idea. So too are statement about ethics, morality, beauty, etc, etc. I
suspect this is what you are refering to when you write of subjects "outside
the province of human reason". But are they? We can perfectly well reason
about them. You have above, when discussing Anselm. I think what you are
getting at is that they are outside the province of science. I would agree.

Will that do for the time being?

Alexander


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