Re: IRAQ: Game Even More Over (NDC)




Johnny wrote:
> I would like to hear what Rumsfeld is thinking from the man himself.
> Kristol speclates that we have here "the inescapable whiff of weakness
> and defeatism" (what is it about conservatives that they want to turn
> every disagreement on policy into an ad hominem--and utterly
> speculative--attack on someone's character? are they incapable of
> thinking in sober analytical terms? or do they just figure it plays
> better with the yahoos?). But Mr. Chair here has told us on a few
> occasions that the "insurgency" is a small number of foreigners. I
> would like to know if Rumsfeld sees it that way. If he does, I wonder
> if he's thinking that without the US presence in Iraq, these outsider
> insurgents will no longer be seen as battling the great crusading
> satan, but rather as threats to Iraqis? Does he think that such an
> alteration in the equation would then de-legitimize the insurgency,
> motivate Iraqis (to fight for themselves, rather than serve as the
> sepoys of ther US), and mobilize others in the Middle East to condemn
> and fight them (something they can't really do as long as the US has a
> military presence in Iraq)? If that is Rumsfeld's thinking, I'd say he
> might have a point. Kristol would disagree, but then I doubt very much
> that Iraq is his real priority.


I just read this piece posted on David Corn's blog and I thought of
this thread. It's by Larry Johnson, a former C.I.A. analyst and
counter-terrorism specialist at the State Department, so he knows a
little bit more about these things than most of us. Anybody got any
brighter ideas on how to salvage the mess, just give Rummy a call.

http://www.davidcorn.com/archives/2005/08/larry_johnson_l.php

Larry Johnson: Leave Iraq Now

In desperate defense of his war in Iraq, George W. Bush resorts more to
rhetoric and repetition than to reason and informed argument. We must
stay the course--and take more deaths--to honor the deaths that have
already occurred, he told National Reservists on Wednesday. And he yet
again misrepresented the war in Iraq as a simple clash between the
United States and Islamic terrorists who want to destroy America due to
their hatred of freedom--that is, he ignored the bulk of the
insurgency. (I can't see you. I can't see you.) With a fellow like this
in charge, the war effort is probably doomed. And if it is doomed, why
not support withdrawing troops as soon as possible? After all, as one
almost-president once said, who wants to be the last man to die for a
mistake?

Sentiment against the war seems to be growing. At least, that is what
polls appear to suggest. Still, war-backers--and even some war
skeptics--warn about the dangers of disengagement. With this
counter-argument in mind, I was interested to read a piece sent to me
by Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst and counterterrorism official at
the State Department. He's been in the news as a defender of Valerie
Wilson (with whom he attended CIA training). But his true calling is
intelligence analysis. The title of his article, "Why We Must Leave
Iraq," is rather clear. I am not sure I endorse all aspects of it. But
it is a straightforward case made from the perspective of a strategic
and tactical thinker whom I gather is not antiwar per se. I post it
here as an antidote to the nonsense Bush has been spouting these past
few days.

WHY WE MUST LEAVE IRAQ
by Larry C. Johnson

Sometimes in life there are no good options. It is part of our nature
to always assume that we can fix a problem. But in life there are many
problems or situations where there is no pleasant solution. If you were
at the Windows on the World Restaurant in the North Tower of the World
Trade Center at 9 am on September 11, 2001 you had no good options. You
could choose to jump or to burn to death. Some choice.

A hard, clear-eyed look at the current situation in Iraq reveals that
we are confronted with equally bad choices. If we stay we are
facilitating the creation of an Islamic state that will be a client of
Iran. If we pull out we are likely to leave the various ethnic groups
of Iraq to escalate the civil war already underway. In my judgment we
have no alternative but to pull our forces out of Iraq. Like it or not,
such a move will be viewed as a defeat of the United States and will
create some very serious foreign policy and security problems for us
for years to come. However, we are unwilling to make the sacrifices
required to achieve something approximating victory. And, what would
victory look like? At a minimum we should expect a secular society
where the average Iraqi can move around the country without fear of
being killed or kidnapped. That is not the case nor is it on the
horizon.

We may even be past the point of no return where we could impose
changes that would put Iraq back on course to be a secular, democratic
nation without sparking a major Shiite counteroffensive. Therefore the
time has come to minimize further unnecessary loss of life by our
troops and re-craft a new foreign and security policy for the Middle
East.

The Current Situation

Iraq has devolved into a tripartite state, split among the Kurds in the
North, the Shias in the South, and Sunni tribes in the middle. While
things are relatively peaceful in the North and South, the central part
of Iraq is in the grips of a defacto civil war. Most of the trained and
deployed Iraqi police and military forces are Shia. Most of their
operations are directed against Sunni targets. The Sunnis do not feel
that they have a legitimate voice in the political process. As a result
they have decided to fight.

The Shia majority, long oppressed in Iraq, are not willing, nor likely,
to relinquish their new status as the tops dogs. They are receiving
significant intelligence, economic, and political support from the
Islamist government in Iran. The Shia also are well positioned to
control a significant portion of Iraq's vast oil resources. They are
not likely to share this wealth with the Sunnis.

There is no effective national government in Iraq. The current group
meeting inside the Green Zone to draft the constitution has no real
clout. True power is held by tribal chieftains and religious leaders
scattered around country. Those leaders are playing both sides of the
fence--keeping a toe in the political negotiations in Baghdad while
providing money and protection to insurgents.

The insurgency in Iraq is comprised of at least 20 groups. Some of
these are Baathists, some are Sunni Islamic extremists, and a few are
Shia. They agree on one thing--the United States is an invader and must
be expelled. While there is no single leader who can claim the status
or mandate as did Ho Chi Minh during the Vietnam days, the insurgents
in Iraq are as firm and serious as those we faced in Vietnam.

The continued presence of U.S. combat forces and our operations against
Iraqi civilians is recruiting new jihadists from around the Muslim
world. Notwithstanding U.S. efforts to win the ,Äúhearts and
minds,Äù of the Iraqi people, the sectarian strife and the images
of U.S. soldiers kicking in the doors of peoples,Äô homes while
searching for insurgents is creating more anger rather than support.

The Sunni insurgents have control of the battlefield in the central
belt of Iraq. Even today the United States military cannot keep a six
mile stretch of highway open that runs from downtown Baghdad to the
International Airport. U.S. diplomatic personnel and many key Iraqi
Government officials live inside a security ghetto known
euphemistically as the Green Zone. Even during the bleakest days of the
war in South Vietnam, U.S. diplomats and soldiers could travel freely
around Saigon without fear of being killed in bomb blast or kidnapped.
We don't have that luxury in Baghdad.

Options?

We could potentially defeat the Sunni insurgents if we were willing and
able to deploy sufficient troops to control the key infiltration routes
that run along the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys. But we are
neither willing nor able. It would require at least 380,000 troops
devoted exclusively to that mission. Part of that mission would entail
killing anyone who moved into controlled areas, such as roadways. In
adopting those kinds of rules of engagement we would certainly increase
the risk of killing innocent civilians. But, we would impose effective
control over those routes. That is a prerequisite to gaining control
over the insurgency.

We cannot meet the increased manpower requirements in Iraq without a
draft. We do not currently have enough troops in the Army and the
Marine Corps to supply and sustain that size of force in the field.
But, even with a draft, we would be at least 15 months away from having
the new batch of trained soldiers ready to deploy. More importantly,
there is no political support for a draft. In other words, we're
unwilling to do what is required to even have a shot at winning.

While the insurgency is not likely to acquire sufficient strength to
fight and defeat our forces directly in large set piece battles, they
do have the wherewithal to destroy infrastructure and challenge our
control of lines of communication. The ultimate test of a government's
legitimacy is whether or not it can protect its citizens from threats
foreign and domestic. Thus far the Iraqi Government has made scant
progress on this front. Today's attack in central Baghdad, by a
uniformed unit of masked insurgents, represents another disturbing
milestone in the continued growth of the insurgency. One of these days
we should not be surprised when an insurgent force breaches the Green
Zone and takes some U.S. diplomats hostage.

An ideal, but unlikely outcome, is that the secularists, who are trying
desperately to craft a legitimate government, will persuade a
sufficient number of Shia and Sunni leaders to turn their back on a
religious-based government. Unfortunately, they don't control weapons
or militia. Force remains the ultimate means for deciding a country's
fate. In this case the guns are in the hands of those who favor an
Islamic state over a secular nation.

If the United States tries to intervene now to compel power sharing on
behalf of Sunni interests we are likely to trigger a backlash by the
Shia majority. Mullahs like Moqtada al Sadr have demonstrated that they
can mobilize combat units to kill Americans when their interests are
challenged.

There are some indications that once we are out of the picture that the
insurgency will turn on itself. As noted earlier a significant portion
of the insurgents are not Islamic extremists. There is evidence that
the different groups will fight each other. Sunni tribal chiefs are not
likely to cede control of their territory to foreign Islamists once the
United States is no longer on the scene. Our departure will likely lead
to a brutal civil war, but such a war creates opportunities for the
United States where it can rebuild its credibility with those forces
who represent modernity and secular progress.

So What's Next?

Staying the course and enduring further casualties while the insurgency
grows stronger is an insane policy. If we persist on that front we will
end up strengthening the hand of Islamic extremists and their role
within the Iraqi insurgency.

Our choice is simple--either we invest in the military resources and
personnel required to defeat the Sunni insurgents and allow the Shia
and Kurds to consolidate power or we withdraw and let the Shia, Sunni,
and Kurds find their own solution. We cannot ask our soldiers and
Marines to give their lives and sacrifice their bodies for a new
Islamic state. It is true that our withdrawal will create a major
vacuum and damage our prestige. But the alternative, i.e., that we stay
and try to train up sufficient Iraqi forces and help the fledgling
Islamic Government get on its feet, will leave us the favorite target
of insurgents and terrorists. And after we have shed the blood of our
sons and daughters in trying to create a new government that will be
controlled by Islamists, those Islamists will ultimately insist that we
leave Iraq and no longer meddle in their affairs.

Rosy scenario does not live in Iraq. Until we come to grips with this
truth American soldiers will continue to be killed and maimed for no
good reason.

.



Relevant Pages

  • Re: Is Osama in Iraq?
    ... Iraq, obviously. ... Hersh loathes you almost as much as he ... that the "insurgency" in Iraq died down to a whisper. ... being conducted by Sunni insurgents. ...
    (alt.politics)
  • 14/9/05:IRAQ/TIME TO GET EXIT STRATEGY(F.P.FOCUS)
    ... Looking for Peace in Iraq ... Nearly all Iraqis universally condemn these killings. ... incidents now where some elements of the insurgency are attacking ... The United States has shown all insurgents in the Muslim world ...
    (soc.culture.asean)
  • 14/9/05:IRAQ/TIME TO GET EXIT STRATEGY(F.P.FOCUS)
    ... Looking for Peace in Iraq ... Nearly all Iraqis universally condemn these killings. ... incidents now where some elements of the insurgency are attacking ... The United States has shown all insurgents in the Muslim world ...
    (soc.culture.australian)
  • 14/9/05:IRAQ/TIME TO GET EXIT STRATEGY(F.P.FOCUS)
    ... Looking for Peace in Iraq ... Nearly all Iraqis universally condemn these killings. ... incidents now where some elements of the insurgency are attacking ... The United States has shown all insurgents in the Muslim world ...
    (soc.culture.burma)
  • 14/9/05:IRAQ/TIME TO GET EXIT STRATEGY(F.P.FOCUS)
    ... Looking for Peace in Iraq ... Nearly all Iraqis universally condemn these killings. ... incidents now where some elements of the insurgency are attacking ... The United States has shown all insurgents in the Muslim world ...
    (soc.culture.asean)

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