Re: OT: Latest deception by Bush/Cheney


"Matthew Silverstein" <msilverz@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:1ddgo4nnw2y8x$.l3mxn4678qgt$.dlg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
On Thursday, June 28, 2007, Matt wrote:


There has to be *some* theoretical (rather than pragmatic) justification
for your belief, though. Surely we have to have *some* reason for
believing
the things that we belief. Why do you believe that tolerance is desirable?

On the contrary, I believe *all* our beliefs are contingent and pragmatic
(not just philosophic ones). If I have any theoretical position or method,
this is it: that descriptions about reality (facts-- moral or otherwise) are
only true in the sense that they are useful. That there is no non-circular
way of justifying my belief in tolerance is a consequence of my belief that
any external criteria, whether it is reason (Kant) or communicative
discourse (Habermas) or some teleological endstate (such as Marx's belief in
an inevitable communism) or philosophical method (such as rule
utilitarianism), are nothing more than an attempt to fabricate a
supernatural justification (replacing God as a lawgiver) for my beliefs in
order to end debate. I believe tolerance is desirable because I try to
place myself in the position of others before I act; I believe cruelty is
the worst form of behavior; and I believe a society that embodies these
views is the best of possible alternatives that we currently have.

I can recognize the contingency of my own belief (as an expression of my
own particular place in time and history), and still defend it as
desirable.

I'm not sure what you mean. The fact that your *belief* is desirable is
not
something that counts in favor of your belief. I suspect that I would be a
happier person if I believed in an afterlife. But the fact that such a
belief is desirable in this pragmatic respect is not really a reason to
believe in the afterlife, or at least not "the right sort of reason." This
is why it is impossible just to believe something at will.

I do not advocate conveniant beliefs. I do not believe in an afterlife
(although I would argue it *can* engender happiness as it gives actual
meaning to human lives, which is to say that our life has meaning insofar as
we construct it) because it is the best description of my own contingent
understanding of the world. If I recognize this and choose to go on
believing in an afterlife, I would be living a life of "bad faith" (to crib
from Sartre), but then it is no longer a belief in any case (since I really
don't believe it). My belief is pragmatic, however, in the sense that it
best describes the world in which I inhabit. I refuse to privelage my
beliefs, however, by an appeal to some claim to know ultimate truth, relying
instead upon my own justifications and reasons (the other stuff isn't very
convincing anyway).

But perhaps I'm misinterpreting you. If you mean that you can defend
*tolerance* (rather than your belief in tolerance) as desirable, despite
being aware of your particular place in time and history, then I certainly
agree with you. But I don't see what this has to do with relativism.

Because I do not think my stance has any justification beyond the warrants
for the claims that I propose. What you seem to want is some fallback
position that will always settle disputes between, for example, a Nazi
philosopher and someone committed to Western liberal ideas of respect,
tolerance, and equality, but there is no neutral standpoint from which to
conduct this debate. The Nazi philosopher and the Western liberal are
always going to seem to be begging the fundamental questions of the debate
from the other's point of view. Rather than appealing to some Platonic
essence or first principal, it is more useful to evaluate competing goals
and go from there. Further, that there are universal principals to which we
could appeal I would liken to a belief in an afterlife-- a comforting
fiction.

I can, by way of analogy, be convinced that Schnabel is better
interpreter of Beethoven than Arrau, but I need not claim that I am
uncovering some objective truth or relying on some objective criteria by
which I arrive at truth to hold this belief.

Forgive the abstractness of this question, but what precisely are you
believing, when you believe that Schnabel is better than Arrau, if it is
not some objective truth? In what sense should we call your conviction a
*belief* if it is not the belief in some truth?

By the criteria by which I judge a good Beethoven performance (whatever they
may be), Schnabel is preferable to Arrau. There is, however, no intrinsic
criteria of correctness in performance to which I can appeal. I can only
appeal to my own description of the world around me and try to convince you
that my ideals should be accepted, to try to get you to adopt my vocabulary.

There is something paradoxical about stating, "I believe X, although I
don't believe that X is true." If you don't believe that it's true, then
you don't believe it.

I can believe something while still admitting that there are alternate
viewpoints (some potentially as valid as my own). Just because I do not
believe in Truth (with the capital "T") does not mean I have no beliefs.

Regards,
Matt


.

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