Re: Inductive Reasoning


Matthew Silverstein wrote:
On Friday, June 9, 2006, Simon Roberts wrote:

It has to be more than a mere possibility for it to be taken seriously
enough tomake us worry about whether, say, the sun will rise in the east
tomorrow.

We seem to be going in circles here, so let me try again. The problem of
induction gets going when we ask: what is the basis or justification for
believing that the sun will rise tomorrow, or that gravity will continue
to work tomorrow the way it has in the past. Let's focus on the sun
example--your example.

Simon: The sun will rise in the east tomorrow.

Hume: What is the basis or justification for that belief?

Simon: It has always risen in the east in the past.

Hume: How does that provide a basis for your belief that it will rise in
the east tomorrow? What does that fact about the past have to do with what
will happen in the future?

Simon: Nature is uniform, and it will behave tomorrow the way it has in
the past.

Hume: OK, I see how this claim--if it is true--would support your belief
that the sun will rise tomorrow. But what is the basis for this new claim?

Simon: Nature has always been uniform in the past, and so it will be
uniform tomorrow.

Hume: That is blatantly circular. In order for nature's past uniformity to
support or justify a belief that it will continue to be uniform, we would
already have to know (or at least be justified in believing) that nature
is uniform.

This is how the problem of induction works. I'm not at all sure what point
you're trying to make in the face of this problem. If you're simply saying
that this problem never gets going if we never stop to question the
justification of our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, then you are
certainly correct. The problem only gets going once we go in search of a
justification or basis for beliefs like that. If you're saying that the
belief in the uniformity of nature is justified, then you need to explain
how it is justified. What is doing the justifying?

Perhaps this where you want to appeal to the "It works" claim. The fact
that induction has worked in the past is what justifies believing that it
will work in the future. I don't see how that's a further response,
though, since it's no less circular than the last line I gave to "Simon"
above. If we're worried about the validity of inductive reasoning--that
is, if we're interested in understanding what justifies such
reasoning--using induction to show that is valid will give us little
comfort.

If you're trying to say something else, I have absolutely no idea what it
is.

If you were to decide it has no justification, what difference would it
make to your life?

I don't know.

If you were to decide that it does have a justification, what difference
would it make to your life?

I'd sleep better.

Or at least what would count as a (good) reason; but then, that's a
crucial question in explaining why it's a "problem", isn't it? It's a
"problem" only if you insist on certain sorts of explanations

Of course. But who ever said that philosophical problems are (or should be)
problems for people who aren't inclined to think philosophically--that is,
for people who don't care to question everyday beliefs, concepts, and
practices? The problems of so-called dark matter and dark energy are only
problems if you're interested in understanding the fundamental nature of
the universe. The problem of the omniscient narrator in *Middlemarch* is
only a problem for people interested in thinking critically about
literature.

Which leads to such other Simon responses as: (a) Why isn't it "a reason
to think that..." (as opposed to, say, certain proof)? Why believe that
this tomorrow should be any different from all the tomorrows which
consitute the past?

Again, Hume is not trying to convince us that nature is not uniform. He's
trying to convince us that it's not at all clear what reason we have to
reason to believe that it is.

And (b) assuming that by "not by itself a reason" you meant "not a basis
for philosophical certainty" (or some such), I would simply say that the
mere fact that we don't know for certain that regularity will continue
is not a good reason to stop assuming that/acting as though it will.

Oh, the problem of induction has nothing to do with certainty. The
argument is not that we cannot be certain that nature is uniform, but
rather--as I stated above--that we have no reason at all to believe one
way or the other. In other words, Hume is presenting a challenge: show me
something that constitutes *any reason at all* to believe that nature will
behave tomorrow as it did today.

I understand how "the problem" goes. (In writing the above, do you not
perceive even the slightest hint of absurdity? You're willing to
entertain the possibility that taking hurricane warnings seriously is
unjustified because of "the problem of induction"?) But it's a bogus
problem: no-one who thinks qua philosopher that it's a problem acts "in
real life" as though it's a problem.

Eh? First of all, being confused as to how something is justified is
different from believing that it's unjustified. (Hume actually thought
that we couldn't help but engage in inductive or causal reasoning.) But
that said, I don't buy your definition of a bogus problem. The fact that a
particular problem has no bearing at all on how I act "in real life" says
nothing about whether it's a real philosophical problem. Again, if your
point is that real philosophical problems are bogus problems when it comes
to the real world, my response is: so what?

I don't think that's *all* I'm saying. Induction isn't just something
that only philosophers do; it's something everyone does all the time,
including people who claim to be induction skeptics (if it really were a
problem, it would be a problem for everyone).

Off the top of my head, I can't think of a philosopher who would qualify as
an induction skeptic (if by skeptic you mean somebody who thinks that
induction is actually unjustified). Even Hume (on some readings, at least)
thinks that it's justified, albeit in a rather strange way. As I said
above, there's a difference between thinking that there is a real puzzle
to solve here--thinking that it's not at all obvious how inductive
reasoning is justified--and thinking that it isn't justified.

Matty

AND..... it's useful to note.... Hume got Kant thinking pretty hard
about the nature of the world and how we come to "know" it. Just
think, without Hume and Kant big chunks of philosophy departments
world-wide wouldn't exist! All those philosophers (well, teachers of
philosophy) would be out of work!

Seriously, though, while the nature of induction may not turn your
crank, the question of how we come to know things should. In this
newsgroup, for example, we have at least two quite different
presuppositions in discussions about matters "aesthetic."

Some folks write as if their aesthetic beliefs were "objectively true"
or, at least, capable of being so. Others write as if their aesthetic
beliefs were merely statements of personal preference. Then there is
a pretty vast array of positions in between.

It really helps to know where a person stands on this issue, when
locking horns here at rec.music.....

The study of philosophy is mainly about "thinking," and it would be a
fabulous idea to have it made compulsory in Canadian and American high
schools. Start with a course in inductive or practical reasoning!

A scary proposition, one would think, for those politicians whose
continued employment depends on folks not being able to seriously
question anything.

JG
http://www.pianosociety.com/bak/index.php?id=98

.

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