Re: Dubya's major crusade

In article <6czy30i4hjt.wg5zkbel9slx$.dlg@xxxxxxxxxx>, Matthew Silverstein
says...

On Friday, June 9, 2006, Simon Roberts wrote:

Why isn't it the proposition that it might suddenly stop working that requires
justification?

Because as a statement about a mere possibility it is obviously true?

It has to be more than a mere possibility for it to be taken seriously enough to
make us worry about whether, say, the sun will rise in the east tomorrow.

Are you seriously suggesting that inductive reasoning is unjustified?

I don't have a settled view. If it is justified, I have no idea what
justifies it.

If you were to decide it has no justification, what difference would it make to
your life? If you were to decide that it does have a justification, what
difference would it make to your life?

Alternatively, you might be saying: it's working now and so it's
justified. And that, most philosophers agree, is no justification at
all.

As I said earlier, it depends what "justification" means.

Again, I don't see what the ambiguity is. How about: the fact that nature
has been uniform in the past is not by itself a reason to think that it
will be uniform tomorrow. (Next Simon response: it depends what "reason"
means.)

Or at least what would count as a (good) reason; but then, that's a crucial
question in explaining why it's a "problem", isn't it? It's a "problem" only
if you insist on certain sorts of explanations) Which leads to such other Simon
responses as: (a) Why isn't it "a reason to think that..." (as opposed to, say,
certain proof)? Why believe that this tomorrow should be any different from all
the tomorrows which consitute the past? And (b) assuming that by "not by itself
a reason" you meant "not a basis for philosophical certainty" (or some such), I
would simply say that the mere fact that we don't know for certain that
regularity will continue is not a good reason to stop assuming that/acting as
though it will.

But isn't this the case for almost *all* philosophical problems?

Doesn't matter whether it is or isn't. It's an example of inductive
reasoning in action. Explain why boarding up the windows is
unjustified.

If it is unjustified (as I said I don't have a settled view on this), it is
because the belief that a hurricane is coming is based (in some way) on a
belief that nature is uniform, and that belief is in turn unjustified. Or
so the problem of induction is supposed to go.

I understand how "the problem" goes. (In writing the above, do you not perceive
even the slightest hint of absurdity? You're willing to entertain the
possibility that taking hurricane warnings seriously is unjustified because of
"the problem of induction"?) But it's a bogus problem: no-one who thinks qua
philosopher that it's a problem acts "in real life" as though it's a problem. Do
induction skeptics ignore hurricane warnings as a result of their skepticism?
(Of course, a thorough-going induction skeptic would be unable to justify his
identification of the noises he heard as hurricane warnings in the first place,
etc.)

[ . . .] you seemed to be saying that the problem of induction is
unique in being irrelevant to non-philosophers. If your point is that
philosophical problem X is irrelevant to people who don't care about
philosophical problem X, then of course I agree with you . . . .

I don't think that's *all* I'm saying. Induction isn't just something that only
philosophers do; it's something everyone does all the time, including people who
claim to be induction skeptics (if it really were a problem, it would be a
problem for everyone). To that extent, "the problem of induction" is irrelevant
to everyone: it makes absolutely no difference to anyone's use of induction
whether he proves that induction is unjustified or justified. A philosophy
tutor at Oxford who is firmly of the opinion that induction is unjustified
nevertheless necessarily uses it in the course of explaining that opinion; and
he uses it in exactly the same way as his colleague who believes there's no
"problem" at all. Which is why I think "the problem of induction" is just a
toy.


Does that mean that thinking philosophically about the foundations of
morality is another one of those "internal" philosophical problems that
matters only to philosophers?

It is, isn't it? Non-philosophers typically go about applying their
moral beliefs rather than inquiring about "the foundations of morality."

I suppose, although I think many people have what we might call
"philosophical moments" when they stop to wonder about the justification of
their moral commitments.

Sure. But I thought that by "the foundations of morality" you meant something
more than that.

Simon

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Inductive Reasoning
    ... What is the basis or justification for that belief? ... Nature has always been uniform in the past, ... This is how the problem of induction works. ... without Hume and Kant big chunks of philosophy departments ...
    (rec.music.classical.recordings)
  • Re: Inductive Reasoning
    ... enough tomake us worry about whether, say, the sun will rise in the east ... What is the basis or justification for that belief? ... This is how the problem of induction works. ...
    (rec.music.classical.recordings)
  • Re: Inductive and deductive practices
    ... > If the problem of induction is that we can't articulate a justification ... isn't there a parallel problem for deduction? ... > So either you give them a circular justification or no justification. ...
    (sci.logic)
  • Re: Dubyas major crusade
    ... And that, most philosophers agree, is no justification at ... since you seemed to be saying that the problem of induction is ... philosophical problem X is irrelevant to people who don't care about ...
    (rec.music.classical.recordings)
  • Re: Dubyas major crusade
    ... but that is only a legitimate justification if inductive reasoning (drawing ... What we're looking for is a reason to suppose that the world *won't* ... philosophers agree, ... pondering "the problem of induction;" you board up the windows and head inland. ...
    (rec.music.classical.recordings)