Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Larry Dighera <LDighera@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 10 May 2008 16:57:10 GMT
On Sat, 10 May 2008 10:29:51 -0500, "Steven P. McNicoll"
<roncachamp@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in
<t7udnV158P7sIrjVnZ2dnUVZ_o3inZ2d@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
"Larry Dighera" <LDighera@xxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:1dcb24lvhtagsko1kdrm60p12ooogjgnnb@xxxxxxxxxx
On Sat, 10 May 2008 09:28:03 -0500, "Steven P. McNicoll"
<roncachamp@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in
<z5-dnXNNxptoLbjVnZ2dnUVZ_hzinZ2d@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
"Larry Dighera" <LDighera@xxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:14bb24dkglabbn6du4aut5ljtsieh9kec5@xxxxxxxxxx
How much experience have you had arguing cases in court?
None.
That's why you don't understand my position.
How much experience have you had arguing cases in court?
Over the years, I've argued more than a couple of dozen I'd reckon. I
win about half of them.
Please explain your conclusion that altitude is a lateral distance by
disclosing your analysis.
Of course, that is your inference, not my conclusion.
If one regulation prohibits an aircraft from approaching closer than
500' to a person or structure located on the ground (that distance
includes laterally as well as vertically), why do you believe that
that distance would not be applicable to aircraft in flight?
Because the lateral distance between aircraft in flight is not an altitude
But that FAR is not strictly limited to regulating altitude, as it
specifies a hemispherical distance. After 45 degrees the 500'
limitation is more lateral than vertical. Altitude is a vertical
distance, not a lateral distance, but 91.119(c) also contains a
lateral restriction by implication, so it is obviously not limited
exclusively to governing altitude.
and is covered by another regulation.
To which particular regulation(s) that addresses lateral distance
between aircraft are you referring?
Didn't you recently criticize someone for answering your question with
another question? Why don't you practice what you preach?
My question was more socratic than literal.
Further, in the above instance you requested my explanation; you did
not ask a question; notice the lack of a question mark at the end of
your sentence.
If you truly desire to debate the issue, I will continue to indulge
you. But if your desire is to attack me personally, or attempt to
feign a sincere interest in the subject as a thinly masked veil to
conceal your attempt to establish your superiority, or some other
nonsense, you will not find my future responses forthcoming.
If the FAA had grounds for the former, why wouldn't they be applicable in
the latter?
Because the former applies to the surface and the latter applies in flight.
So you believe the grounds for the hemispherical distance restriction
imposed by FAA regulation are not valid nor applicable to lateral
distance restriction? If not, why not? Clearly, 91.229(c) implies a
lateral distance, does it not?
If you don't believe that the "person, vessel, vehicle, or structure" of FAR
91.119 is limited to persons, vessels, vehicles, and structures on the
surface, then please explain what persons that are not aboard aircraft,
airborne vessels, airborne vehicles other than aircraft, and airborne
structures that are covered by it.
Huh?
The point I'm attempting to make is that a lawyer can use the 500'
distance in 91.119(c) to generalize, and persuade the court, that the
FAA saw fit to impose the 500' limit in the name of safety, and that
if safety is an issue there is no stated reason to limit such a
distance restriction to the surface.
Do the reasons for the prohibition against "getting too close" to people
or structures located on the ground not apply in flight?
No.
For reference, here is 91.119(c):
(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet
above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated
areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer
than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.
Clearly, the last sentence of (c) implies a lateral component, as
there is no altitude restriction over open water and sparsely
populated areas, and a pilot may fly as low as he pleases there.
Presumably there was a reason the FAA chose to implement a 500'
proximity limit in 91.119(c). But you believe that that reason or
justification for that restriction is inapplicable to two aircraft in
flight? I'm not referring to the jurisdiction of FAR 91,119(c); I'm
referring to the _justification_ for the distance limitation contained
in it.
Just as an aside to provide an example of how the court and the NTSB's
interpretations may differ, I offer the court's recent decision (see
my article on that subject) in the Torrance helo crashes. The NTSB
found the pilot to be the cause of the mishap, but the court found the
controllers culpable. Who's right? Who's likely to collect damages
from whom? Courts can be capricious. A successful attorney knows
that, and uses it to his advantage.
I didn't read it.
For reference, I've appended it below.
If the aircraft were operating where ATC has
responsibility for separation the controllers were probably at fault. If
they were operating where the pilots were responsible for separation then at
least one of the pilots was probably at fault. Given that the NTSB tends to
have a better understanding of aviation than judges it's likely the NTSB's
finding is correct and the judge's is wrong.
I agree with your conclusion, but it misses the point I was attempting
to make: courts are perfectly capable of making substantially
different determinations from other government agencies that may be
more familiar with the regulations involved. Courts deal with a
significantly larger body of law than either the NTSB or FAA. And an
attorney arguing for the Pilatus pilot (or indeed the Pilatus pilot,
being an attorney, himself) could exploit the distance prohibition
contained in 91.119(c) to persuade the court that a similar distance
restriction is prudent and objectively applicable to infilght
situations.
====================================================================
Below is an excerpt of this morning's Los Angeles Times article that
details a federal court judge's ruling that contradicts the NTSB
finding in this case; use the LA Times link to read the complete
article. Below that are the NTSB documents. And below that is the
airport diagram.
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-torrance7-2008may07,0,3483774.story
Tower controllers to blame for fatal helicopter crash in Torrance,
judge rules
Ruling contradicts an FAA finding that the surviving pilot caused
the collision that killed two in a second chopper.
By Joe Mozingo, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
May 7, 2008
Air traffic controllers at Torrance Municipal Airport made a
critical mistake that caused two helicopters to collide in front
of the control tower in 2003, killing two men in one chopper and
seriously injuring the pilot of the other, a federal judge has
ruled.
U.S. District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper's ruling Monday in Los
Angeles directly contradicted a report by the National
Transportation and Safety Board that concluded the surviving
pilot, Gavin Heyworth, was to blame for the crash.
Cooper determined that both pilots "properly relied upon and
complied with the control instruction they were given by" air
traffic controller Edward Weber.
The judge found that Weber and controller Cynthia Issa made a
string of procedural violations and negligent decisions that led
to the fatal crash.
They acted "negligently and carelessly" in failing to keep
"adequate vigilance and positional/situational awareness of the
air traffic at and around Torrance Airport," Cooper wrote. And
Weber "failed to issue clear and concise instructions" to
Heyworth.
The ruling came in a lawsuit filed by Heyworth against the Federal
Aviation Administration last year.
"I hope this case is a wake-up call for the FAA," said his
attorney, James L. Pocrass. "When you and I are on an airplane and
we're coming into LAX, we expect the air traffic controllers are
going to do their job, and they didn't in this case."
The government's lead attorney, Debra D. Fowler, special aviation
counsel for the U.S. Justice Department, and Assistant U.S. Atty.
James Sullivan said they could not comment on pending litigation.
Cooper still has to decide what, if any, damages to award the sole
survivor and the families of the deceased.
Heyworth was a 22-year-old student pilot the afternoon of Nov. 6,
2003. He had just returned from a tour of duty as a Marine in Iraq
and hoped to become a professional helicopter pilot. Torrance
Municipal Airport-Zamperini Field is a major training ground for
new pilots and is home to Robinson Helicopter, the nation's
largest manufacturer of civilian helicopters.
Heyworth met with his instructor at Pacific Coast Helicopters near
the control tower and prepared for a solo flight in a Robinson
R-22.
The Torrance control tower does not have radar, so controllers and
pilots rely on sight. The controllers work in a glass enclosure
atop the tower where they have unimpeded views of the two parallel
runways.
That day, staffing was down, with three controllers instead of the
normal four. One supervised, while the others were each
responsible for a runway.
At some point after Heyworth took off and did some training
exercises north of the airport, controller Issa needed to take a
break, leaving Weber watching both runways, the judge found.
...
About the same time, the supervisory controller noticed that
"traffic was getting quite heavy. Weber was talking fast." He
called Issa back from her break to help.
When Issa returned and put on her headphones, she and Weber
conducted a quick briefing to note the position of each aircraft
in the area. But the judge found that Weber failed to mention
Heyworth's position.
...
Neither pilot could see the other because of their positions.
Weber turned away, so he was not looking at the runways in the 16
seconds before the collision, Cooper concluded. Issa did not see
Heyworth's helicopter until the impact.
"Based on the manner in which the helicopters collided, the pilots
could not have seen each other," Cooper wrote.
...
Pocrass, who is a pilot, said there was nothing his client could
have done to avoid the collision.
...
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20031119X01921&key=2
NTSB Identification: LAX04FA037B
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, November 06, 2003 in Torrance, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/29/2007
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N442RH
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious.
A Robinson R22 Beta II and a Robinson R44 collided in midair while
in the traffic pattern. The R22 pilot did not broadcast that he
was a student pilot, and the controller did not think that the R22
pilot was a student pilot based on the quality of his radio
transmissions. The R22 pilot had been practicing at a helipad
north of runway 29R, and was returning to his parking area on the
ramp south of runway 29L. The R44 pilot was departing from runway
29L on a touch-and-go. The R22 was above the R44, and descending
to the southwest while the R44 was climbing straight ahead on
runway 29L at the time of the collision. A tower controller
instructed the R22 pilot to hold when he requested to go from the
helipad to parking. After traffic passed, the controller advised
him that he could proceed in right traffic flying a downwind
traffic pattern for runway 29R to the helipad. The R22 pilot
requested takeoff to land at his parking area. The controller
instructed him to fly westbound. A few seconds later, the
controller cleared the R44 pilot for the touch-and-go option on
runway 29L, and in the same transmission cleared the R22 pilot to
make a right turn to the downwind on runway 29R. About 45 seconds
later, the controller informed the R22 pilot that he could expect
a clearance to cross midfield when the controller got a chance.
About 20 seconds later, the controller instructed the R22 pilot to
turn right. About 30 seconds after that, he cleared the R22 pilot
to land on runway 29R; the R22 pilot acknowledged about 5 seconds
later with his call sign. The controller immediately transmitted
for him to turn right, and cleared him to land on runway 29R.
There was no further communication from the R22 pilot. The R22 was
still in a position to turn and land on runway 29R. It began a
right turn, but then instead of landing on the runway, it crossed
29R and continued descending toward 29L at a continuously reducing
angle. The controller had looked away to work other traffic. As he
turned to inform the R44 of the R22 landing on the parallel
runway, he observed the collision. Reconstruction of the collision
geometry placed the R22 above and slightly forward of the R44, and
on a similar track. Based on a visibility study, once the R22
pilot turned toward his pad while he was north of runway 29R, he
was not in a position to see the R44. During the takeoff, the R44
pilot was not in a position to see the R22 prior to impact.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable
cause(s) of this accident as follows:
the failure of the pilot of the R22 to comply with an ATC
clearance.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20031119X01921&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20031119X01921&ntsbno=LAX04FA037A&akey=1
LAX04FA037A
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On November 6, 2003, at 1528 Pacific standard time, a Robinson R22
Beta II, N206TV, and a Robinson R44, N442RH, collided in midair
while in the traffic pattern at Zamperini Field, Torrance,
California. Pacific Coast Helicopters was operating the R22 under
the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. Robinson Helicopter Company was
operating the R44 under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The solo
student pilot in the R22 sustained serious injuries. The certified
flight instructor (CFI) and the private pilot undergoing
instruction (PUI) in the R44 sustained fatal injuries. Both
helicopters were destroyed; a post crash fire partially consumed
the R44. The R22 departed on a local instructional flight about
1442. The R44 departed on a local instructional flight about 1449.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plans
had been filed. The R22 came to rest between runways 29R and 29L;
approximate global positioning system (GPS) coordinates of the
primary wreckage were 33 degrees 48.275 minutes north latitude and
118 degrees 20.536 minutes west longitude. The R44 came to rest on
the departure end of runway 29L; approximate global positioning
system (GPS) coordinates of the primary wreckage were 33 degrees
48.277 minutes north latitude and 118 degrees 20.584 minutes west
longitude.
The instructor for the solo student had been watching him during
his flight. The student flew the R22 from its parking area between
taxiways D and E to a helipad north of runway 29R. The student
practiced on the helipad, and then completed several touch-and-go
landings to the helipad. He requested a return to his parking
area. Upon hearing this request, the instructor turned the volume
of his radio down, and turned away to talk to a bystander.
One witness reported that the R44 was speeding up and increasing
in altitude as it took off straight ahead on runway 29L. He first
observed the R22 when it was over runway 29R, or slightly north of
it. The R22 was starting to descend as it was transiting across
the left runway to the southwest, and appeared to be heading
toward its landing area.
Other witnesses pointed out that the R22 was above the R44. The
R44 seemed to increase its climb rate just before the collision.
The two helicopters collided about 50 feet in the air over runway
29L. The R22 spun left several times before it contacted the
ground.
A National Transportation Safety Board specialist interviewed the
controllers, and obtained recorded radar data. He prepared a
factual report, and pertinent parts follow.
Because of technical difficulties with the recordings of the ATC
voice channels, times in this report prior to 1523:02 are based on
draft transcripts provided early in the investigation. Times after
that are valid times.
The R22 pilot first called the LC1 controller at 1442 requesting
to fly from the Pacific Coast Helicopters parking area to the
North Pad. He did not indicate that he was a student pilot; the
controller did not think that he was a student, because his radio
technique was good. He flew to the North Pad, which is a
helicopter-only practice landing point that is at midfield on the
north side of runway 29R.
Pilots operating at the North Pad typically fly right closed
traffic patterns at 600 feet msl. They are required to keep their
pattern within the lateral confines of the runway 29R displaced
thresholds. They are required to contact the LC1 controller for
each circuit around the pattern, or if they wish to extend their
pattern beyond the 29R threshold limits.
The R44 pilot contacted the LC1 controller at 1449, and requested
a northeast departure from the "antennae site," which is at the
intersection of the ramp area and taxiway G. The LC1 controller
cleared him for takeoff from runway 29R, and the pilot departed
the airport area to the northeast. The R44 pilot returned at 1505;
he reported 6 miles north of the airport, and requested to operate
on the North Pad. The controller advised him that the pad was in
use (by the R22), and asked the pilot if he wanted to use the
runway instead. The pilot accepted, and the controller instructed
him to report a 2-mile right base entry. At 1507, the controller
provided a traffic advisory of a departing helicopter, cleared him
for the option on runway 29R, and told him to enter right closed
traffic. The pilot continued routine traffic pattern operations
until 1525, including landings on runway 29L.
At 1523:14, the R22 pilot requested a North Pad takeoff and
landing at PCH parking. PCH parking referred to the parking area
used by Pacific Coast Helicopters. It is west of the tower, on the
ramp between taxiways D and E. The controller instructed him to
hold, and the pilot acknowledged holding. At 1524:33, the
controller advised him that he could proceed in right traffic to
the North Pad after a Cessna passed off his left. At 1524:56, the
R22 pilot transmitted, " takeoff and land PCH parking." At
1524:59, the LC1 controller responded, "Helicopter six tango
victor fly westbound." Between 1525:18 and 1525:52, there was some
confusion caused by the pilot of a departing helicopter (29M) who
incorrectly used the call sign 2RH when requesting departure from
the ramp area. The controller resolved the confusion.
At 1526:01, the controller cleared the pilot of the R44 to, "make
your base your discretion two niner left cleared for the option",
and at 1526:15, in the same transmission, continued, "helicopter
six tango victor make a right turn to the downwind." At 1526:19,
the R22 pilot acknowledged, but only with his call sign. At
1526:32, the controller again cleared the R44 for the option on
runway 29L, and the pilot acknowledged.
At 1526:59, the controller advised the pilot of the R22, "ah
you're gonna cross midfield as soon as I get a chance." At
1527:17, the controller instructed the R22 pilot to, "turn right,"
and the pilot acknowledged with his call sign. At 1527:49, the
controller transmitted, "Helicopter six tango victor runway two
niner right cleared to land." At 1527:53, the R22 pilot
acknowledged with his call sign. At 1527:54, the controller
transmitted, "turn right helicopter six tango victor runway two
niner right cleared to land." There was no communication from the
R22 pilot. At 1528:12, the LC1 controller advised the R44 pilot,
"robinson two romeo hotel caution for the helo oh."
A review of recorded radar data showed a target that turned off
the right downwind leg, crossed runway 29R, and approached runway
29L in the immediate area of the accident. The last target for
this track was at 1528:10, approximately 2 seconds before the
collision. A plot of this track on a street map indicated that it
was perpendicular to the runways at 1527:49, and the target was
between Lomita Boulevard and Skypark Drive. At 1527:54, this
target was still approaching Skypark Drive and north of runway
29R. After crossing Skypark about 5 seconds later, the target
appeared to turn toward the southwest, and the last two targets
were approaching runway 29L at a shallow angle. Another target
turned from right downwind to base to final for runway 29L. Its
last target appeared at 1527:15; its track lined up with runway
29L, and was westbound abeam the approach end of runway 29R.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
R22 Pilot
A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airmen records
revealed that the R22 pilot held a student pilot certificate, and
a first-class medical certificate issued in September 2003.
An examination of the student pilot's logbook indicated that his
first flight occurred on September 7, 2003. He had an estimated
total flight time of 32 hours. He logged 16 hours in the last 30
days. He had solo time on two previous flights that totaled about
1.5 hours.
R44 CFI
A review of FAA airman records revealed that the pilot held a
commercial pilot certificate with ratings for rotorcraft
helicopter and instrument helicopter. He had a mechanic
certificate with ratings for airframe and powerplant. He had a
second-class medical certificate issued on October 3, 2003. It had
no limitations or waivers.
No personal flight records were located for the CFI. The FAA
indicated that the pilot reported that he had a total time of
8,900 hours on his last medical application.
R44 PUI
A review of FAA airman records revealed that the pilot held a
private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine
land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane; he also had a
helicopter rating. He held a second-class medical certificate
issued on January 16, 2003. It had the limitation that the pilot
must wear corrective lenses.
No personal flight records were located for the PUI. The FAA
indicated that the pilot reported that he had a total time of 370
hours on his last medical application. An application for the
Robinson safety course indicated that he had 52 hours in
rotorcraft; all were in this make and model.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
R22
The helicopter was a Robinson R22 Beta II, serial number 2753. A
review of the helicopter's logbooks revealed that it had a total
airframe time of 2,974.6 hours. The logbooks contained an entry
for an annual inspection dated February 1, 2003. A 100-hour
inspection occurred on October 30, 2003, and the helicopter
accumulated 23.9 hours since its completion. The Hobbs hour meter
read 2,974.6 at the accident site. The time since an airframe
overhaul was 783.7 hours.
The engine was a Textron Lycoming O-360-J2A, serial number
L-32698-36A. Total time recorded on the engine was 1,976.2 hours,
and time since major overhaul was 789.3 hours.
R44
The helicopter was a Robinson R44, serial number 0002. A review of
the helicopter's logbooks revealed that the helicopter had a total
airframe time of 1,046.5 hours. The logbooks contained an entry
for an annual inspection dated April 3, 2003. It had a 100-hour
inspection on July 15, 2003. It accumulated 74.7 hours since that
inspection.
The engine was a Textron Lycoming O-540-F1B5, serial number
L-25143-40A. Total time on the engine was 2,672.5 hours, and time
since major overhaul was 479.1 hours.
COMMUNICATIONS
Both helicopters were in contact with the Torrance airport traffic
control tower (ATCT) on frequency 135.6.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The Airport/ Facility Directory, Southwest U. S., indicated that
runway 29L was 3,000 feet long and 75 feet wide. The runway
surface was asphalt. Runway 29R was 5,001 feet long and 150 feet
wide. The runway surface was asphalt and concrete.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The FAA and Robinson were parties to the investigation.
Investigators from the Safety Board and the parties examined the
wreckage at the accident scene.
The debris field was on runway 29L, and extended over 500 feet.
The first identified debris (FID) pieces were shards of Plexiglass
and R44 main rotor blade. A section of one R44 main rotor blade
was 135 feet from the FID, and another piece was about 145 feet.
The tip cap from this blade was at 174 feet.
A piece of R22 lower frame was 234 feet from the FID. The main
wreckage of the R22 was at 270 feet, and about 70 feet north of
the runway. About the same distance and another 120 north was a
piece of R44 spar. Another piece of R44 spar was on the runway at
412 feet.
The main wreckage of the R44 came to rest inverted at 495 feet and
about 25 feet right of the runway centerline. The left skid of the
R44 was at 515 feet, and just off the right edge of the runway.
The last piece of debris was the main rotor of the R44 at 525 feet
and near the runway centerline. One entire blade was present; it
exhibited a wavy appearance, and buckled in several places. It had
a scrape mark that was 2 inches wide across half of the blade
chord (from the leading edge) and 36 inches from the tip. This
scrape was dimensionally similar to the aft right strut of the
R22. The second blade fractured and separated about 2.5 feet from
the rotor hub; the fracture ran chordwise from the leading edge
back to the trailing edge doubler, with the doubler remaining
intact. The blade bent aft about 120 degrees at this point. The
next 4.5 feet of blade exhibited some buckling. The rest of the
honeycomb/skin section of the blade separated, as did the outboard
4.5 feet of spar. Two pieces of this blade, one being about 1.5
feet with the tip weights (3.5 pounds), and the other being the
tip cap, were in the R22's engine compartment behind the left
pilots seat.
The R22 exhibited rotational scoring on the fan shroud, on the fan
itself, and the tail rotor drive shaft twisted.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The Los Angeles County Coroner completed autopsies of both pilots
in the R44. The FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing of
specimens of the pilots.
Analysis of the specimens for the CFI contained no findings for
tested drugs in the liver. They did not perform tests for carbon
monoxide or cyanide. The report contained the following findings
for volatiles: no ethanol detected in muscle; 28 (mg/dL, mg/hg)
ethanol detected in the brain; 11 (mg/dL, mg/hg) methanol detected
in muscle; 212 (mg/dL, mg/hg) methanol detected in the brain; and
30 (mg/dL, mg/hg) of 2-butanol detected in the brain. The report
stated that the ethanol found in this case might potentially be
from postmortem ethanol formation, and not from the ingestion of
ethanol.
Analysis of the specimens for the PUI contained no findings for
carbon monoxide, cyanide, volatiles, and tested drugs.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
The aft strut of the right skid of the R22 separated about 1-foot
from the bottom of the skid, with the skid placed in its
approximate installed orientation. The fracture surface was
relatively flat, and the round tubing bent inboard. The right side
of the engine exhibited crush damage to the mid portion of the
rocker covers and valves that was similar in dimension to an R44
rotor blade. The narrow band of damage continued around to the
accessories between the engine and cabin. Tubing in this area and
the back of the front seat exhibited fractures across a similar
plane. A section of rotor blade from the R44 was imbedded in the
lower left side of the R22 near the battery, which was behind the
front left seat.
Robinson personnel provided the following information.
The radius of the R44 rotor, from the centerline of the hub to the
tip is 198 inches. The distance between the aft strut and forward
strut of the R22 is 50.5 inches (centerline to centerline). The
distance between the left and right struts on the R22 (at the
level of the first contact point) is 55 inches centerline to
centerline).
Based on unique impact markings and color transfers, the Robinson
air safety investigators opined that first R44 blade hit the
center of the aft right strut of the R22, 36 inches from the tip
of the blade, cutting through the strut without hitting anything
else. The second R44 blade hit the R22 across the valve covers of
the engine, 29 inches higher then the first hit. The blade
fractured and separated about 48 inches from the tip. This blade
also made contact with the engine cooling fan and scroll. The tip
of this blade struck the cabin of the R22, 48 inches forward of
the aft strut (12 inches of movement from the first blade hit to
second blade hit).
This information could not yield a collision angle; however, it
placed the R22 above, slightly forward of the R44, and on a
similar course.
Visibility Study
The IIC and Robinson investigators examined exemplary helicopters
at the Robinson factory. Pilots of the approximate height of the
R44 pilots sat in an R44. Looking forward, they could see as high
as the outboard 8 feet of the main rotor blade. Looking to the
right, they could see eye level and no higher. They could see
nothing aft. A pilot of similar height to the R22 pilot sat in the
right seat of an R22. He could see about 10 degrees aft with the
left door not installed. With it installed, he could only see
abeam his seat, and no higher than eye level. The accident R22 had
the door installed.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
There were several procedures for helicopters to return from the
helipad to the parking ramp.
One controller stated that helicopters could travel directly
across both runways, and land on the ramp if there was no
conflicting traffic. The next method was to land on runway 29R;
then the controller would clear the pilot to hover taxi across the
runways to the ramp. A third method was to have the pilot cross
both runways at midfield, land on taxiway A, and then taxi to the
ramp.
The student pilot's flight instructor described the procedures for
returning to the ramp from the North Pad. One method was to
request a direct air taxi crossing both runways and taxiway A. A
second method was to depart west on the up wind. After reaching
pattern altitude at the end of runway 29R, the controller would
clear the pilot for a left turn to the south. After crossing
Airport Drive, the pilot could turn downwind, fly east to the east
"tees," turn left to base, and then turn left to final for taxiway
A or runway 29L. A third method was to take off to the west to
pattern altitude, make a right crosswind turn, and then turn to a
right downwind until abeam the east end of the 29R threshold. Here
the pilot would turn right base and right final for either taxiway
A or 29L. A fourth method was to take off to the west, make a
right crosswind, make a right downwind to midfield, make a right
turn to cross both runways at midfield, turn left to a left
downwind for 29L, and then left base and final to either taxiway A
or 29L.
The LC1 controller stated that he intended to have the R22 pilot
depart the pad westbound along runway 29R, turn right to the
downwind, and then turn right and land on 29R. He would then clear
the pilot to hover taxi along taxiway C to the ramp. As the R22
passed the North Pad area as it traversed eastbound on the
downwind leg, he instructed the pilot to turn right. There was no
response, and the helicopter did not turn. A few seconds later, he
cleared the pilot to turn right and land on 29R. He did not hear
an acknowledgement, so he repeated the instruction. The R22 turned
at that point. The controller saw the R22 north of the approach
end of 29R with the nose pointed roughly at the tower. He then
looked away to his radar display as he worked another aircraft.
After talking to that aircraft, he decided to advise the R44 that
the R22 would be landing on 29R abeam the R44 as it departed. He
looked back just as the helicopters collided.
The Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) released the R22
wreckage to the owner's representative on February 12, 2004. The
IIC released the R44 wreckage to the owner's representative on
April 30, 2007.
**This narrative was modified on May 14, 2007.**
http://www.airnav.com/airport/KTOA
KTOA Zamperini Field Airport
Torrance, California, USA
Airport diagram:
http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0804/05179AD.PDF
[Un-formatted from Adobe Acrobat file]
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=LAX04FA037B&rpt=fa
National Transportation Safety Board
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Aircraft Information Summary
Sightseeing Flight: Air Medical Transport Flight:
Narrative
Brief narrative statement of facts, conditions and circumstances
pertinent to the accident/incident:
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Airport Proximity: Distance From Landing Facility: Direction From
Airport:
Type of Aircraft
Aircraft Registration Number:
This space for binding
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On November 6, 2003, at 1528 Pacific standard time, a Robinson R22
Beta II, N206TV, and a RobinsonR44, N442RH, collided in midair while
in the traffic pattern at Zamperini Field, Torrance,California.
Pacific Coast Helicopters was operating the R22 under the provisions
of 14 CFR Part91. Robinson Helicopter Company was operating the R44
under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. Thesolo student pilot in the
R22 sustained serious injuries. The certified flight instructor (CFI)
and the private pilot undergoing instruction (PUI) in the R44
sustained fatal injuries. Bothhelicopters were destroyed; a post crash
fire partially consumed the R44. The R22 departed on alocal
instructional flight about 1442. The R44 departed on a local
instructional flight about 1449. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed, and no flight plans had been filed. The R22 came to rest
between runways 29R and 29L; approximate global positioning system
(GPS) coordinates of the primary wreckage were 33 degrees 48.275
minutes north latitude and 118 degrees 20.536 minutes west longitude.
The R44 came to rest on the departure end of runway 29L; approximate
global positioning system (GPS) coordinates of the primary wreckage
were 33 degrees 48.277 minutes north latitude and 118 degrees 20.584
minutes west longitude. The instructor for the solo student had been
watching him during his flight. The student flew the R22 from its
parking area between taxiways D and E to a helipad north of runway
29R. The student practiced on the helipad, and then completed several
touch-and-go landings to the helipad. He requested a return to his
parking area. Upon hearing this request, the instructor turned the
volume of his radio down, and turned away to talk to a bystander.
One witness reported that the R44 was speeding up and increasing in
altitude as it took off straight ahead on runway 29L. He first
observed the R22 when it was over runway 29R, or slightly
north of it. The R22 was starting to descend as it was transiting
across the left runway to the southwest, and appeared to be heading
toward its landing area. Other witnesses pointed out that the R22 was
above the R44. The R44 seemed to increase its climb rate just before
the collision. The two helicopters collided about 50 feet in the air
over runway 29L. The R22 spun left several times before it contacted
the ground.
A National Transportation Safety Board specialist interviewed the
controllers, and obtained recorded radar data. He prepared a factual
report, and pertinent parts follow.
Because of technical difficulties with the recordings of the ATC voice
channels, times in this report prior to 1523:02 are based on draft
transcripts provided early in the investigation. Times after that are
valid times.
The R22 pilot first called the LC1 controller at 1442 requesting to
fly from the Pacific Coast
No No
Robinson R44 Helicopter
On Airport
Torrance CA 90505 1528 PST
Accident NTSB
11/06/2003 Fatal
LAX04FA037B N442RH
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Narrative (Continued)
Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
Helicopters parking area to the North Pad. He did not indicate that he
was a student pilot; the controller did not think that he was a
student, because his radio technique was good. He flew to the North
Pad, which is a helicopter-only practice landing point that is at
midfield on the north side of runway 29R.
Pilots operating at the North Pad typically fly right closed traffic
patterns at 600 feet msl. They are required to keep their pattern
within the lateral confines of the runway 29R displaced thresholds.
They are required to contact the LC1 controller for each circuit
around the pattern, or if they wish to extend their pattern beyond the
29R threshold limits.
The R44 pilot contacted the LC1 controller at 1449, and requested a
northeast departure from the "antennae site," which is at the
intersection of the ramp area and taxiway G. The LC1 controller
cleared him for takeoff from runway 29R, and the pilot departed the
airport area to the northeast.
The R44 pilot returned at 1505; he reported 6 miles north of the
airport, and requested to operate
on the North Pad. The controller advised him that the pad was in use
(by the R22), and asked the
pilot if he wanted to use the runway instead. The pilot accepted, and
the controller instructed
him to report a 2-mile right base entry. At 1507, the controller
provided a traffic advisory of a
departing helicopter, cleared him for the option on runway 29R, and
told him to enter right closed
traffic. The pilot continued routine traffic pattern operations until
1525, including landings on
runway 29L.
At 1523:14, the R22 pilot requested a North Pad takeoff and landing at
PCH parking. PCH parking
referred to the parking area used by Pacific Coast Helicopters. It is
west of the tower, on the
ramp between taxiways D and E. The controller instructed him to hold,
and the pilot acknowledged
holding. At 1524:33, the controller advised him that he could proceed
in right traffic to the
North Pad after a Cessna passed off his left. At 1524:56, the R22
pilot transmitted,
"<unintelligible> takeoff and land PCH parking." At 1524:59, the LC1
controller responded,
"Helicopter six tango victor fly westbound." Between 1525:18 and
1525:52, there was some confusion
caused by the pilot of a departing helicopter (29M) who incorrectly
used the call sign 2RH when
requesting departure from the ramp area. The controller resolved the
confusion.
At 1526:01, the controller cleared the pilot of the R44 to, "make your
base your discretion two
niner left cleared for the option", and at 1526:15, in the same
transmission, continued,
"helicopter six tango victor make a right turn to the downwind." At
1526:19, the R22 pilot
acknowledged, but only with his call sign. At 1526:32, the controller
again cleared the R44 for
the option on runway 29L, and the pilot acknowledged.
At 1526:59, the controller advised the pilot of the R22, "ah you're
gonna cross midfield as soon as
I get a chance." At 1527:17, the controller instructed the R22 pilot
to, "turn right," and the
pilot acknowledged with his call sign. At 1527:49, the controller
transmitted, "Helicopter six
tango victor runway two niner right cleared to land." At 1527:53, the
R22 pilot acknowledged with
his call sign. At 1527:54, the controller transmitted, "turn right
helicopter six tango victor
runway two niner right cleared to land." There was no communication
from the R22 pilot. At
1528:12, the LC1 controller advised the R44 pilot, "robinson two romeo
hotel caution for the helo
oh."
A review of recorded radar data showed a target that turned off the
right downwind leg, crossed
runway 29R, and approached runway 29L in the immediate area of the
accident. The last target for
this track was at 1528:10, approximately 2 seconds before the
collision. A plot of this track on a
street map indicated that it was perpendicular to the runways at
1527:49, and the target was
between Lomita Boulevard and Skypark Drive. At 1527:54, this target
was still approaching Skypark
Drive and north of runway 29R. After crossing Skypark about 5 seconds
later, the target appeared
to turn toward the southwest, and the last two targets were
approaching runway 29L at a shallow
angle. Another target turned from right downwind to base to final for
runway 29L. Its last target
appeared at 1527:15; its track lined up with runway 29L, and was
westbound abeam the approach end
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Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
of runway 29R.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
R22 Pilot
A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airmen records
revealed that the R22 pilot held a
student pilot certificate, and a first-class medical certificate
issued in September 2003.
An examination of the student pilot's logbook indicated that his first
flight occurred on September
7, 2003. He had an estimated total flight time of 32 hours. He logged
16 hours in the last 30
days. He had solo time on two previous flights that totaled about 1.5
hours.
R44 CFI
A review of FAA airman records revealed that the pilot held a
commercial pilot certificate with
ratings for rotorcraft helicopter and instrument helicopter. He had a
mechanic certificate with
ratings for airframe and powerplant. He had a second-class medical
certificate issued on October
3, 2003. It had no limitations or waivers.
No personal flight records were located for the CFI. The FAA indicated
that the pilot reported
that he had a total time of 8,900 hours on his last medical
application.
R44 PUI
A review of FAA airman records revealed that the pilot held a private
pilot certificate with
ratings for airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and
instrument airplane; he also had a
helicopter rating. He held a second-class medical certificate issued
on January 16, 2003. It had
the limitation that the pilot must wear corrective lenses.
No personal flight records were located for the PUI. The FAA indicated
that the pilot reported
that he had a total time of 370 hours on his last medical application.
An application for the
Robinson safety course indicated that he had 52 hours in rotorcraft;
all were in this make and
model.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
R22
The helicopter was a Robinson R22 Beta II, serial number 2753. A
review of the helicopter's
logbooks revealed that it had a total airframe time of 2,974.6 hours.
The logbooks contained an
entry for an annual inspection dated February 1, 2003. A 100-hour
inspection occurred on October
30, 2003, and the helicopter accumulated 23.9 hours since its
completion. The Hobbs hour meter
read 2,974.6 at the accident site. The time since an airframe overhaul
was 783.7 hours.
The engine was a Textron Lycoming O-360-J2A, serial number
L-32698-36A. Total time recorded on the
engine was 1,976.2 hours, and time since major overhaul was 789.3
hours.
R44
The helicopter was a Robinson R44, serial number 0002. A review of the
helicopter's logbooks
revealed that the helicopter had a total airframe time of 1,046.5
hours. The logbooks contained an
entry for an annual inspection dated April 3, 2003. It had a 100-hour
inspection on July 15, 2003.
It accumulated 74.7 hours since that inspection.
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Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
The engine was a Textron Lycoming O-540-F1B5, serial number
L-25143-40A. Total time on the engine
was 2,672.5 hours, and time since major overhaul was 479.1 hours.
COMMUNICATIONS
Both helicopters were in contact with the Torrance airport traffic
control tower (ATCT) on
frequency 135.6.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The Airport/ Facility Directory, Southwest U. S., indicated that
runway 29L was 3,000 feet long and
75 feet wide. The runway surface was asphalt. Runway 29R was 5,001
feet long and 150 feet wide.
The runway surface was asphalt and concrete.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The FAA and Robinson were parties to the investigation. Investigators
from the Safety Board and
the parties examined the wreckage at the accident scene.
The debris field was on runway 29L, and extended over 500 feet. The
first identified debris (FID)
pieces were shards of Plexiglass and R44 main rotor blade. A section
of one R44 main rotor blade
was 135 feet from the FID, and another piece was about 145 feet. The
tip cap from this blade was
at 174 feet.
A piece of R22 lower frame was 234 feet from the FID. The main
wreckage of the R22 was at 270
feet, and about 70 feet north of the runway. About the same distance
and another 120 north was a
piece of R44 spar. Another piece of R44 spar was on the runway at 412
feet.
The main wreckage of the R44 came to rest inverted at 495 feet and
about 25 feet right of the
runway centerline. The left skid of the R44 was at 515 feet, and just
off the right edge of the
runway.
The last piece of debris was the main rotor of the R44 at 525 feet and
near the runway centerline.
One entire blade was present; it exhibited a wavy appearance, and
buckled in several places. It
had a scrape mark that was 2 inches wide across half of the blade
chord (from the leading edge) and
36 inches from the tip. This scrape was dimensionally similar to the
aft right strut of the R22.
The second blade fractured and separated about 2.5 feet from the rotor
hub; the fracture ran
chordwise from the leading edge back to the trailing edge doubler,
with the doubler remaining
intact. The blade bent aft about 120 degrees at this point. The next
4.5 feet of blade exhibited
some buckling. The rest of the honeycomb/skin section of the blade
separated, as did the outboard
4.5 feet of spar. Two pieces of this blade, one being about 1.5 feet
with the tip weights (3.5
pounds), and the other being the tip cap, were in the R22's engine
compartment behind the left
pilots seat.
The R22 exhibited rotational scoring on the fan shroud, on the fan
itself, and the tail rotor drive
shaft twisted.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The Los Angeles County Coroner completed autopsies of both pilots in
the R44. The FAA
Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
performed toxicological
testing of specimens of the pilots.
Analysis of the specimens for the CFI contained no findings for tested
drugs in the liver. They
did not perform tests for carbon monoxide or cyanide. The report
contained the following findings
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Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
for volatiles: no ethanol detected in muscle; 28 (mg/dL, mg/hg)
ethanol detected in the brain; 11
(mg/dL, mg/hg) methanol detected in muscle; 212 (mg/dL, mg/hg)
methanol detected in the brain; and
30 (mg/dL, mg/hg) of 2-butanol detected in the brain. The report
stated that the ethanol found in
this case might potentially be from postmortem ethanol formation, and
not from the ingestion of
ethanol.
Analysis of the specimens for the PUI contained no findings for carbon
monoxide, cyanide,
volatiles, and tested drugs.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
The aft strut of the right skid of the R22 separated about 1-foot from
the bottom of the skid, with
the skid placed in its approximate installed orientation. The fracture
surface was relatively
flat, and the round tubing bent inboard. The right side of the engine
exhibited crush damage to
the mid portion of the rocker covers and valves that was similar in
dimension to an R44 rotor
blade. The narrow band of damage continued around to the accessories
between the engine and cabin.
Tubing in this area and the back of the front seat exhibited fractures
across a similar plane. A
section of rotor blade from the R44 was imbedded in the lower left
side of the R22 near the
battery, which was behind the front left seat.
Robinson personnel provided the following information.
The radius of the R44 rotor, from the centerline of the hub to the tip
is 198 inches. The distance
between the aft strut and forward strut of the R22 is 50.5 inches
(centerline to centerline). The
distance between the left and right struts on the R22 (at the level of
the first contact point) is
55 inches centerline to centerline).
Based on unique impact markings and color transfers, the Robinson air
safety investigators opined
that first R44 blade hit the center of the aft right strut of the R22,
36 inches from the tip of
the blade, cutting through the strut without hitting anything else.
The second R44 blade hit the
R22 across the valve covers of the engine, 29 inches higher then the
first hit. The blade
fractured and separated about 48 inches from the tip. This blade also
made contact with the engine
cooling fan and scroll. The tip of this blade struck the cabin of the
R22, 48 inches forward of
the aft strut (12 inches of movement from the first blade hit to
second blade hit).
This information could not yield a collision angle; however, it placed
the R22 above, slightly
forward of the R44, and on a similar course.
Visibility Study
The IIC and Robinson investigators examined exemplary helicopters at
the Robinson factory. Pilots
of the approximate height of the R44 pilots sat in an R44. Looking
forward, they could see as high
as the outboard 8 feet of the main rotor blade. Looking to the right,
they could see eye level and
no higher. They could see nothing aft. A pilot of similar height to
the R22 pilot sat in the
right seat of an R22. He could see about 10 degrees aft with the left
door not installed. With it
installed, he could only see abeam his seat, and no higher than eye
level. The accident R22 had
the door installed.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
There were several procedures for helicopters to return from the
helipad to the parking ramp.
One controller stated that helicopters could travel directly across
both runways, and land on the
ramp if there was no conflicting traffic. The next method was to land
on runway 29R; then the
controller would clear the pilot to hover taxi across the runways to
the ramp. A third method was
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Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
to have the pilot cross both runways at midfield, land on taxiway A,
and then taxi to the ramp.
The student pilot's flight instructor described the procedures for
returning to the ramp from the
North Pad. One method was to request a direct air taxi crossing both
runways and taxiway A. A
second method was to depart west on the up wind. After reaching
pattern altitude at the end of
runway 29R, the controller would clear the pilot for a left turn to
the south. After crossing
Airport Drive, the pilot could turn downwind, fly east to the east
"tees," turn left to base, and
then turn left to final for taxiway A or runway 29L. A third method
was to take off to the west to
pattern altitude, make a right crosswind turn, and then turn to a
right downwind until abeam the
east end of the 29R threshold. Here the pilot would turn right base
and right final for either
taxiway A or 29L. A fourth method was to take off to the west, make a
right crosswind, make a
right downwind to midfield, make a right turn to cross both runways at
midfield, turn left to a
left downwind for 29L, and then left base and final to either taxiway
A or 29L.
The LC1 controller stated that he intended to have the R22 pilot
depart the pad westbound along
runway 29R, turn right to the downwind, and then turn right and land
on 29R. He would then clear
the pilot to hover taxi along taxiway C to the ramp. As the R22 passed
the North Pad area as it
traversed eastbound on the downwind leg, he instructed the pilot to
turn right. There was no
response, and the helicopter did not turn. A few seconds later, he
cleared the pilot to turn right
and land on 29R. He did not hear an acknowledgement, so he repeated
the instruction. The R22
turned at that point. The controller saw the R22 north of the approach
end of 29R with the nose
pointed roughly at the tower. He then looked away to his radar display
as he worked another
aircraft. After talking to that aircraft, he decided to advise the R44
that the R22 would be
landing on 29R abeam the R44 as it departed. He looked back just as
the helicopters collided.
The Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) released the R22
wreckage to the owner's
representative on February 12, 2004. The IIC released the R44 wreckage
to the owner's
representative on April 30, 2007.
**This narrative was modified on May 14, 2007.**
National Transportation Safety Board
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Landing Facility/Approach Information
Airport Name
Runway Surface Type:
Runway Surface Condition:
Airport ID:
Type Instrument Approach:
VFR Approach/Landing:
Aircraft Information
Aircraft Manufacturer
Airworthiness Certificate(s):
Landing Gear Type:
Homebuilt Aircraft? Number of Seats:
Engine Type:
- Aircraft Inspection Information
Type of Last Inspection
- Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) Information
ELT Installed? ELT Operated?
Owner/Operator Information
Registered Aircraft Owner
Operator of Aircraft
Operator Does Business As:
- Type of U.S. Certificate(s) Held:
Air Carrier Operating Certificate(s):
Operating Certificate:
Regulation Flight Conducted Under:
Type of Flight Operation Conducted:
Operator Certificate:
Operator Designator Code:
Street Address
City
Street Address
City
ELT Aided in Locating Accident Site?
Time Since Last Inspection
Hours
Engine Manufacturer: Model/Series:
Date of Last Inspection
Model/Series
Certified Max Gross Wt. LBS Number of Engines:
Serial Number
Airport Elevation
Ft. MSL
Runway Used Runway Length Runway Width
Rated Power:
Airframe Total Time
Hours
State Zip Code
State Zip Code
No No No
Skid
Instructional
Part 91: General Aviation
None
Same as Reg'd Aircraft Owner
Same as Reg'd Aircraft Owner
Torrance CA 90505
2901 Airport Drive
Robinson Helicopter Company
100 Hour 07/2003 74 1046
Reciprocating Lycoming 0-540-F1B5 225 HP
No 4 2400 1
Normal
Robinson R44 0002
Touch and Go; Traffic Pattern
NONE
Dry
Asphalt
ZAMPERINI FIELD TOA 103 29L 3000 75
Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
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First Pilot Information
Name
Sex: Seat Occupied:
City
Principal Profession: Certificate Number:
State Date of Birth Age
Certificate(s):
Airplane Rating(s):
Rotorcraft/Glider/LTA:
Instrument Rating(s):
Instructor Rating(s):
Type Rating/Endorsement for Accident/Incident Aircraft? Current
Biennial Flight Review?
Medical Cert. Status:
- Flight Time Matrix
Medical Cert.: Date of Last Medical Exam:
Glider
Lighter
Than Air
Rotorcraft
Instrument
Actual Simulated
Airplane
Mult-Engine
Night
Airplane
Single Engine
This Make
and Model
All A/C
Total Time
Pilot In Command(PIC)
Instructor
Last 90 Days
Last 30 Days
Last 24 Hours
Seatbelt Used? Shoulder Harness Used? Toxicology Performed? Second
Pilot?
State Airport Identifier Departure Time Time Zone
State Airport Identifier
Type of Flight Plan Filed:
Departure Point
Destination
Flight Plan/Itinerary
Type of Clearance:
Type of Airspace:
Weather Information
Source of Briefing:
Method of Briefing:
Class D
VFR
1449 PST
TOA
Local Flight
Same as Accident/Incident Location
None
Yes Yes Yes Yes
8900
Class 2 Without Waivers/Limitations 10/2003
Helicopter; Instrument Helicopter
Flight Instructor; Commercial
Helicopter
Helicopter
M Left Occupational Pilot On File
On File On File On File On File 55
Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
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Weather Information
WOF ID Observation Time
Sky/Lowest Cloud Condition:
Time Zone WOF Elevation
Ft. MSL
WOF Distance From Accident Site
NM
Ft. AGL Condition of Light:
Direction From Accident Site
Deg. Mag.
Altimeter: "Hg
Density Altitude: Ft.
Visibility: SM
Wind Direction:
Ft. AGL
Weather Condtions at Accident Site:
°C Dew Point: °C
Gusts:
Lowest Ceiling:
Temperature:
Wind Speed:
Visibility (RVR): Ft.
Restrictions to Visibility:
Type of Precipitation:
Accident Information
Aircraft Damage:
Visibility (RVV) SM
Aircraft Fire:
Intensity of Precipitation:
Aircraft Explosion
Classification:
- Injury Summary Matrix
First Pilot
Second Pilot
Student Pilot
Check Pilot
Flight Engineer
Cabin Attendants
Other Crew
Passengers
- TOTAL ABOARD -
Other Ground
- GRAND TOTAL -
Fatal Serious Minor None TOTAL
Flight Instructor 1 1
2 2
2 2
1 1
Destroyed Ground
No Obscuration; No Precipitation
8 Visual Conditions
21 7 290
None 15 30.01
Few 25000 Day
KTOA 1450 PST 103
Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
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Administrative Information
Investigator-In-Charge (IIC)
Additional Persons Participating in This Accident/Incident
Investigation:
Michael J Pickering
Federal Aviation Administration
Long Beach, CA
Thom Webster
Robinson Helicopters
Torrance, CA
HOWARD D. PLAGENS
Accident
11/06/2003
LAX04FA037B
.
- Follow-Ups:
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Steven P. McNicoll
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- References:
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Steven P. McNicoll
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Steven P. McNicoll
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Larry Dighera
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Steven P. McNicoll
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Larry Dighera
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Steven P. McNicoll
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Larry Dighera
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
- From: Steven P. McNicoll
- Re: USAF F-16 Instructor Discusses Flying Into MOAs
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