Re: Intercept Algorithms and V1.

<eunometic@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
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On Apr 2, 12:46 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
<eunome...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message

news:a6344109-dd94-422e-842b-679dab8204e0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

The German Navy used a burst message system that could send 7
baudot characters (it was enough with code tables) in 0.46 seconds.

This sounds like the late war Kurier system.

By the way this version of the burst idea started testing
in August 1944, but was never deployed beyond test beds.

It was deployed.
U-234 had one when she surrendered and it was used.

I just love Eunometic's desperate belief as soon as the Germans
think of something they all have it.

http://users.telenet.be/d.rijmenants/en/kurzsignale.htm

Look at the reference.

It was compromised due to an earlier u-boat capture in which code
documents revealed its existence so allies were occasionally able to
listen to it (via photgrpahs of oscilicopes) especially when the
standard
enigma 'shark' code base station was used to transmit the frequencies
to use for the day to the subs also since its 7 character message was
short and encrypted by shark it actually helped crack into shark since
it often transmitted weather data and this was often an excellent crib.

Shark was the allied name for the enigma system the Atlantic U-boats
began using from 5 October 1941. It was promptly cracked. Called
Triton by the Germans. On 1 February 1942 it was the system in use
when the fourth code wheel was introduced.

The allies cracked this in December 1942, though it took months
before it was read consistently. The cracking was helped by code
books taken from U-559 when it was sunk in the Mediterranean.

The allies cracked the codes, the German navy under Doenitz direction
introduced a 4th rotor and lost the abillity to read it in usefull
time for nearly a year.

Eunometic simply defines things as necessary again. The basic code
was used on the 3 rotor machines and cracked. The Germans went
to 4 rotor machines and the allies took about 10 months before they
could read it. Thanks to a lack of 4 rotor bombes it was another
10 months before the code was read routinely with minimal delay.

The allied abillity to read the codes had no effect till March 1943.

That no doubt explains the allied successes in January and February,
the short message weather code taken from U-559 gave the allies
lots of clues. It was changed on 10 March and it took 9 days to
break back into the U-boat traffic.

Cribs were very useful while the allies had only 3 rotor bombes
to run, the 4 rotor bombes arrived in mid 1943 and from around
September 1943 on they meant the allies had usually broken the
keys within 24 hours.

They were always useful, essential when a new rotor was distributed
and had to be reconstructed.

Try and understand the 4 rotor bombes made a big difference,
reducing the need for cribs.

One of the first items discovered was the Germans were reading the
allied "Convoy Code". It took until June 1943 for the allies to be
able to change the code.

Ludicrous to say they 'couldn't change the code' it wad merely
incompetence: the admiralty were told by Blechely Park, the Admiralty
chose to ignore them and cited printing and distribution costs
(equally ludicrous)

Ah yes, the people being non German Eunometic declares
incompetence, not the logistics of distributing thousands of code
books to all those merchant ships as well as the warships.

In one regard it was luck for the allies: the Germans assumed that the
British couldn't read their codes because they were reading the allied
codes and there was no indication the allies were reading theirs;
which they weren't.

The Germans repeated verbatim the cracked message, the British
tried to always paraphrase the intercepted message, to disguise its
origins.

And the Germans were reading the allied codes in use in the
Atlantic quite regularly up until mid 1943. This gave clues, along
with allied successes, that their codes had been cracked but the
conclusion was always the codes were safe, something else was
to blame.

The physical transmitter is not the code. The allies understood
the short message idea and countered it.

The burst message system was not countered.

The burst message idea was effectively not used.

It was monitored during its trials because the Germans transmitted the
frequencies and deviation frequencies to use from shore to u-boat on
standard naval enigma and so they knew what frequencies to listen for.

Is this the short message system or the actual late war Kurier system?
And D/F can scan the horizon automatically.

If they didn't have that initial info an intercept was far less
unlikely and even if detected as a kurier burst the actual code could
often not be readable since the iformation on the deviation
frequencies needed to be recorded at the same time and these were hard
to find.

I am talking D/F, not code breaking. In short Eunometic is
over selling the system again.

No doubt, rhetorical little *** that you are your fabricate some
other 'fact' which you'll mix in with just enough truth.

Eunometic really wants to believe the fiction.

Its purpose was to significantly reduce the effectiveness of Huff Duff
which it could do quite well.

Except the allied HF/DF system was upgraded during the war with
automatic scanning, which helped catch smaller signals, scanning at
20 times per second if I remember correctly.

Still not enough, apparently even in 1947 the US navy was worried
lest the Soviets start using it and still had no solution.

The USN did not have the wartime D/F network by that stage. And
I note the USN did little work on the system post war, since the
demobilisation was in full swing.

Oh yes, note the article Eunometic uses states Kurier could not
be used for all signals, rather a selection of short messages.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3926/is_199901/ai_n8847244/pg_12/?tag=content;col1

What did help the U-boats was strict radio silence when in a patrol line,
enforced from April 1943 and the stopping of wolf pack tactics and the
associated signalling.


Huff Duff wasn't the problem ultra was
so kurier addressed the wrong problem.

This is rather wrong actually, the wolf packs were needed if the
Germans were to break the supply lines to England. HF/DF
was useful in a strategic sense, giving an idea of numbers and
locations, and highly useful in a tactical situation for the escorts,
as experienced operators could gain an idea of how close the
U-boat was, things like whether they were in the "ground
wave", as well as signal strength. If there was air escort the
aircraft could run down the bearing.

The less signalling the more Ultra played a part.

This is double talk.

Accurate talk actually.

The primary problems the Germans Navy had was Ultra.

In actual fact the usefulness of Ultra varied. The more the U-boats
signalled the less it was needed as ships as well as shore stations
carried D/F sets.

Furthermore in 1943 the allies had the ships to reinforce threatened
convoys, and the USN started to use Ultra to seek out U-boats.
That is where it was most useful but also at most risk of compromise.

Also look up the U-boat losses September 1939 to April 1940,
no Ultra but a high concentration of escorts with the U-boats
limited in what areas they could operate in.

Without it HF/DF and ASV microwave radar was relatively ineffective
asnd HF/DF was used
as an cover for Ultra. These devices while somewhat effective but
ultra meant that not only were convoys routed around.

The short answer here is no. The direction finding and radar enabled
the allied ships and aircraft to accurately locate the U-boat so they
could attack.

Ultra was very useful in evasive routing, because the signals told the
allies
where the U-boats would be, as opposed to D/F which told them where
the U-boat was.

The proof is in the massive increase in u-boat losses when the 4 rotor
codes started being cracked. ASV and HF/DF had been available for a
long time prior to that and made little difference.

I note Eunometic says Ultra was good for evasive routing, which means
no fights, but then says the proof of Ultra is lots of fighting.

You know Eunometic will one day actually try and learn about the radar
war. The allies introduced ASV, the Germans countered it with a search
receiver, the allies went to centimetric waves and the Germans were
side tracked into believing the search receiver as being homed into. The
capture of H2S sets helped the Germans sort out what was going on.

Also in early 1943 the allies released a significant number of ships from
the North African operations to take part in the convoy battles. The
Escort carriers started appearing regularly. Allied warships were being
equipped with centimetric radar, devices like Hedgehog gave better
chances of kills and so on.

Support and Escort groups could reinforce threatened convoys, then
stay to hunt a U-boat to destruction because there were enough
escorts in the area.

Eunometic simply tries to believe only one factor changed at a time.
When in fact several factors kept changing.

My assesment is that though
ingenious it was belated,

What a surprise about the ingenious part.

could have been combined with a bit of
frequency agillity to improve its LPI (low probability of intercept)

Ah yes, the 1950's and 1960's technology given to the Germans.

1935 Telefunken engineers patented a spred spectrum system for
modulating voice on to a noise signal. 1942 Rommel is using it.

As opposed to using several transmitters to break up a signal onto
different frequencies. And modulating, like the US devices.

1940 Hutmann patents chirp pulse radar; 1944 it is under development.

And it arrived when?

Hint, they made the chirp using a crystal and as an ultrasonic delay
or a quarter wave transformer to mix in saw tooth wavers. There were
ways.

Seen the Swiss patents from 1938?

and most of all needed to be used with its own seperate code system.

The whole point of the burst system is to use it all the time, one
signal in burst and one in normal speed does not make the U-boat
much safer from direction finding. So the code in use would have
been the standard U-boat one.

The burst is from ship to shore, the long codes are from shore to
ship.

So far so good. Except the burst system could not be used for
all signals.

The bulk of u-boat traffic could be transmitted by kurier and it would
allows days of radio silence.

Wow so for days the U-boats do nothing.

Basic information such as weather and sightings of allied ships could
be transmitted via kurier.

The short message system was designed for such routine messages.
Hence the allied upgrading of D/F.

And Kurier was simply in test bed stage at the end of the war.

As usual with Eunometic the Germans are so brilliant they are
going to create war winning weapons after they lose the war.

The Germans deserve better.

Rommel used a secure radio voicelink from Tunisia to Berlin based
on a spread spectrum techniques: the pseudo random signal was
encrypted on a rotating glass disk through which a photocell shone.
The voice signal was multiplied with the pseudo random sequence
which being a 'squarish wave' actually consists of a series of sine
wave of differing frequencies, amplitudes and phases that could only
be demodulated to its original form at the other end by a glass disk
of the same type.

I like the assumption it could not be demodulated.

It was obviously a fairly compact device.

I really like the assumption it was "fairly compact". Several
transmitters
coupled together plus the electronics to encode and determine which
transmitter to use are hardly compact using WWII technology. Plus
of course there are the power requirements.

It was movable by vehicle.

Motorcycle or a convoy of 10 ton trucks?

Would be nice to see a reference to it.

An experimental German radar called "Kugelschale" used pulse chirping
to spread and expand a radar pulse into a unique pulse which had a
range of time varying frequencies across a range of frequencies to
provide both coherent Doppler for resolution of chaff and to
distribute radar pulse energy over a broad enough range of frequencies
to avoid both noise or spot jamming.

The idea was being trialled in a laboratory.

Kuglelschale means 'layered
sphere' (like an onion) and the radar had 75m thick 'skins' that could
be scaned to resolve moving targets against stationary ones while
igoring stationary one.

75 metres sounds rather a lot.

They were movable and and aircraft will fly through a shell in one to
two seconds, stationary objects won;t

A 75 metre skin is rather a lot, so what exactly is being done here?

Flying through shells tends to cause aircraft to crash.

Also note the window clouds were usually not stationary given the
general realities of winds at altitude.

No reply here, the winds aloft could do good impersonations of
WWII heavy bombers. Things like Mosquitoes were too fast.

Reisslaus was an experimental airborne radar
that again used Doppler to avoid chaff and pulse to pulse frequency
hopping to avoid jamming. Both these units were ground based late
war circuit tests rather than actual devices.

Note in the Eunometic world a German planning to build a device
counts as a working device.

There are indeed a few 1940s patents by Proffessor E Huttman of
Germany re spread spectrum and pulse chirping.

Like other countries, the trouble is making it work.

The circuits and devices to simulate it showed it was promising and
the technique is valid today.

Yes folks, the Germans did not make it work but they were thinking
of making it work, that counts as mass production under the Eunometic
scheme.

Late versions of the Wurzburg Riesse radar had automatic frequency
changing though this was not pulse to pulse tanking just over 10
seconds.. In the 'giant' form Wurzburg (with the 7m aerial) this
circuit and the giant aerial seems to have been enough to get through
allied jamming and window.

The short answer here is no. The allies could change jamming
frequencies as well.

The short answer is yes it could.

Oh the frequency could shift and so could the jamming.

The allies could spot jam Wurzburg radars, they used noise over a
broad band of frequencies that covered a particular band a Wurzburg
might be opperating in.

And the allies could monitor signals and change frequencies.

Carpet, automatic search receiver, when it picked up a Wurzburg signal
it jammed the frequency for 2 minutes, then started scanning again.

The trouble was to ensure there were enough jammers.

By the way active emitters are always a risk, the Germans flak
batteries would track USAAF H2X signals to help with ranging.

k-laus was far more resistant to noise and dense chaff and window
clouds. The giant Wurzburg aerial was far more directional so the two
combined managed to opperate in the presence of jamming.

Managed to operate means the did work at times until the
jamming changed.

What Eunometic never seems to get is the effectiveness of the radars
can be measured by things like the number of flak damaged bombers
at night. That dropped in July 1943 and stayed that way for the rest
of the war.

The anti window devices were
wurlaus and freylaus; coherent pule doppler
tastlause: a refined version resistent to upsets by vibration from
canon fire and more capable and cleaner
windlaus; version able to compensate for wind drift of 'chaff' clouds
k-lause a refined verson incorporating anti jamming circuits, higher
immunity to jamming and features of windlause.

k-lause when combined with a Wurzburg Riesse was good enough.

This is a Eunometic term meaning they were degraded but Eunometic
does not want to believe they were degraded as much as the results
indicate. Just ignore the post war trials which showed the jamming
punched holes in the radar network with the best defence being a
chain of radars, so at least one would be outside the jamming signals.

Just ignore the war time flak damage reports.

Just note if there was a really successful anti jamming system why
invent so many?

As policy radars in 3 FLAK towers were
maintained at the highest and latest technical level.

The FLAK tower next to the zoo was given the latest 'pre production'
equipement.

In the case of k-lause the radar functioned despite allied jamming.

Anti jamming helped, the reality was a larger number of radars
was the better answer.

Simply Eunometic over rates the German anti jamming systems.

As the post war analysis noted good basic design and operator
training were the best starts to counter jamming, trying to build
in anti jamming later was considered along the lines of a design
failure.

And were continually jammed, especially the fire control radars, the
statistics on damaged RAF bombers shows that quite well. The
problems in making fighter interceptions showed the longer range
radars also had problems.

The German industry had lost a lot of technical people to the army,
they recalled some 4000 but it was too late to catch up, the caught up
in a technical sense but not in a production sense. The few
specialists left working on radar couldn't keep up were two busy
improving existing designs then production new sets.

You see I provided a good way to measure German radar effectiveness,
the holes in returning bombers. Hence the non reply, anything but admit
the effectiveness of the jamming.

In 1943 the Germans had about 10% the radar research capacity of
Britain, and that was spread over 100 small institutions.

By copying allied radars the Germans could make up some ground,
but it was still years before they started to appear. The Berlin radar
came in at 180 kg on 0.25 cubic metres versus the H2S set it used
as a template at 235 kg and 0.6 cubic metres.

It seems the Battle of Berlin did damage to the significant German
electronic industry there, which helped delay production.

However reports that in August 1943 only 85% of night fighters had
radar and 80% of new airborne radar sets were not ready for use
when delivered shows how much the German electronics industry
was struggling.

Hence why I am confident the Eunometic wonder electronic weapons
have real difficulty in arriving and working.

The Kehl-Strasberg radio control system used on Fritz-X and Hs 293
MCLOS guidence continually had its frequencies expanded. The final
combat versions were capable of one in flight frequency change to
avoid jamming. This is probably why they were still able to hit
allied ships during the Normandy landings.

The last time this claim was made the ships listed were either not at
Normandy or sunk by other means. So what is the sunk ships list
this time?

Your totally full of *** as you usually are.

Translation no list of ship losses will be provided.

Anyone can google the names of the ships sunk from multiple sources.

Eunometic cannot do it of course.

Several ships or landing craft were hit and sunk by Hs 293 missiles
during the Normandy landings. Its no secret despite your nonsense.

Ah yes, the more sound and fury the less information.

The allies pretended (or rather commanded their men to say) that they
were sunk by mines to hide the fact that the Germans had a effective
guided missiles at the time.

This was early in the piece, not at Normandy. Previously Eunometic
has claimed the deception carried over into post war records to
account for the lack of ships sunk.

And for that matter when were the daylight raids in good enough
weather to guide the missiles?

Hs 293 could be used effectively at night with torches replacing the
tracking flares.

Visual acquisition of targets at night does present problems.

The Germans had successfully developed ferrite magnetic tape recorders
(developed by them during the war) and were also therefore able to use
endless loop tapes with accurately spaced multiple read/write heads to
correlate seemingly dispersed and random signals to reconstruct a
coherent message or command. This was how they were planning to pass
corrections to advanced guided versions of the V1.

Yet another idea that was not used.

But the system was built, photographs of it exist.

What can one say, photographs, but the system was not used, and
the idea was a trial.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.


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