Re: Intercept Algorithms and V1.

On Mar 27, 6:11 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
"Ken S. Tucker" <dynam...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in messagenews:e20440fe-7811-4889-afc9-a38edc3d145f@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

On Mar 26, 5:58 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
"Ken S. Tucker" <dynam...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in
messagenews:83326dba-e5d3-408d-b2cb-dbbb23923bc0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

On Mar 25, 4:59 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
"Ken S. Tucker" <dynam...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in
messagenews:3d043d6d-fed9-4c7a-80fc-2c49c4aef613@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
What we found with the SIM is how much an early warning
is important to line up the interception.

What sort of range from missile launch to target?
Was the 2,000 mph interceptor in the air already or was it
waiting on the ground?

Ground.

Which would impose a significant time delay putting the pilot
in the cockpit, staring the engines and moving to the end of the
runway.

The SIM follows KISS, (Keep It Simple Stupid), intercepter is going
at 150 mph, it's minimum, when the SIM is run.

So the SIM has the interceptor actually about to take off, just about
take off speed at zero feet.
No pilot to cockpit, engine start up and taxi delays.
In effect a low altitude standing patrol.

Yes. (Following KISS the throttle control must maintain
150 mph).

The RAF did trial Wellingtons as AWACS late in the war
in order to hunt the V1 launching He111s.
This followed on from using radar equipped Wellingtons to
search for axis ships in co-ordination with allied naval forces.

Was it successful? How about spotting subs, such as
periscopes and snorkels?

Submarine detection was already being done in 1940 and 1941,
centimetric radar could pick up snorkels and periscopes. The later
war anti surface operations required the aircraft talk to the ships.
And the "eyes in the sky" approach was successful.

Interesting, was the RAF 1st with AWAC?

Essentially yes.

http://www.angelfire.com/trek/rcaf/exag0306.html

For a personal view. Apparently development was being done
as early as 1941 but dropped for a time.

Also, the US in the Pacific used PBY's for visual search,
did you know if they or when they used AWAC?

The USN had project Cadillac

http://www.geocities.com/Lucktam/awacs/early.htm

For a summary.

http://www.vectorsite.net/ttwiz.html

For an overview of the electronics war.

Intel Theory:
At the moment the V1 was launched a brief encypted
radio signal was transmitted and RAF scrambled, but
the Nazi's would figure it was the AEWC that did the
detection, so ULTRA protected the real Intel source with
the Wellington hoax.

The allies ran standing patrols with back up if the early
warning system detected a number of launches. The
speeds involved forced this.
Who exactly claims the Germans betrayed each V1 launch
with a radio message?

LOL, the underground.

This is simply wrong, the underground could not have possibly
managed to monitor German launches and send real time alert
radio messages. The survival time of the transmitters would have
been very short.

Naa, it's easy to spot a launch and possible preparation within a
few miles of the site, the TX is code keyed for 5 seconds, and
alert a/c are scrambled.

No. For a start a few miles is defined as? How far do you think
people can usually see standing on the ground? Note the Germans
liked putting sites in forests.

Or is the idea someone is placed within a group of V1 launch sites
with a transmitter ready to go and keys their code as soon as
they hear a launch? Then what, moves to a new location?

Then allow the time for the allied operator to get the message,
send it to Fighter Command, for them to decide which fighter
to launch and climb to about 5,000 feet.

Not going to work.

The 155th regiment deployed 9 battalions to fire V1s. They
covered most of the coast from Bruges in Belgium to Cherbourg
in France, with a gap where the allies landed on 6 June.

Each battalion had 30 or so deployment and alternative sites in
battalion areas that varied from 20 by 20 km to 50 by 50 km
depending on the battalion. The Germans kept building more
sites, they were cheap and useful, even if a main use was diverting
allied bombs from more important targets.

The sites were generally within the coastal defence area, with plenty
of soldiers available to help track down any transmitters.

Please tell us which V1 launches were reported to London by radio,
in real time. Also all up you have something like 320 by 50 or
16,000 sq km of land to cover. How many radio stations are you
expecting to need to cover this area and how many people at each
station to provide 24 hour operation, plus guards plus mobility, and
how is all this supposed to be kept operational in the largest
concentration of German troops in the West, that is the 15th army
area? Plus expand into new areas as the Germans move launch
sites?

Also the system has to handle about 125 launches a day, plus
the fact while most bombs were aimed at London some were
aimed at the invasion ports.

The clandestine radio station has a very small lifetime, the
delays in the system will not allow good interceptions.

Next if there is only 5 seconds for the allies to receive the radio
message how big is the allied radio system and what chance
the signal is missed?

The British already had quite low level radar coverage over the straits
of Dover and could park ships with radar quite close to the French
coast. No need for clandestine radio transmitters, plus the ground
radars were already tied into the air defence system. They still relied
on standing patrols.

In planning deception measures R V Jones was well aware agent
reports are usually good for place, but often bad for the rest, like
the time.

To give an idea of delays in the radio communication systems,
which include the coding time in this case.

D-Day, Bradley's 07:30 Sitrep received by Montgomery at 14:54
Montgomery then asks for an urgent update. He receives one
two hours later.

BTW, I worked with Bayly Engineering in Ajax, Ont, Canada,
(that's the same Bayly that worked with William Stephenson
who had Camp X down the road), as an electronics comm
designer.

You do know much of Stephenson's memoirs etc. have big holes
in them?

Yes, once a psycho commitment is made to file that
secret data somewhere inside the mind, it's pretty
much inaccessible, in fact, I don't see how he could
reveal most of it.

The US and UK memoirs about resistance operations often
simply omit the reality, most active resistance operations cost
a lot of lives. The Germans were quite ruthless in their choice
of suppression techniques.

The best use of the resistance was help allied personnel in
their area and watch and report. Active operations resulted
in retaliation. One of the most useful parts of the resistance
work was helping the allied army's advances in France in
1944, providing information and even relief guards so the
troops could obtain some rest.

The Germans also had a very efficient radio detection system,
which meant transmitters had to be used carefully.

Frequency hopping did not exist.

See above.

The WWII fighters started off at a lower speed than the V1,
but at enough extra altitude so they could use a dive to
increase their speed, approaching from behind.

Nope, that tactic failed, it was sucidal.

No, that is what they did.

Apart from what I've read, your can peruse this link,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb#Assessment
see the pilots killed by a machine that doesn't fight back,
that's damn dangerous!

You have noticed that 351 aircraft and 805 men were lost ?
Or about 2.3 men per aircraft? Quite a trick when the
majority of the anti V1 interceptors were single seaters and
almost all the rest were two seater Mosquitoes.

The 351 aircraft is the number of allied aircraft lost attacking
V1 sites as well as the defending interceptor losses.

The allies dropped some 97,838 long tons of bombs on
V1 sites according to the UK Defence of United Kingdom
history.

Bomber Command lost some 132 aircraft attacking V1 targets,
dropping 63,400 tons of bombs, the 8th Air Force lost 54 aircraft
while dropping 25,900 tons of bombs, then add the medium bombers
and fighter bombers.

Norman Franks published the Fighter Command Losses series,
there are a number of holes in his work, he tried for losses on
operations instead of all losses like the Bomber and Coastal
Command series do.

Looking at the loss figures I think about 14 RAF interceptors
were destroyed by V1s, 5 in June, 7 in July, 1 in August and
1 in September, to compare to the 1,800 to 1,900 kills claimed
by the fighters.

Also not all the above casualties are to V1's exploding.

17 June aircraft failed to return, plot killed, presume exploding V1
19 June V1 explosion caused engine failure, pilot safe
24 June Mosquito nose split open while chasing V1, crew safe
28 June Two fighters destroyed by exploding V1s, 1 pilot killed
10 July, Mosquito destroyed, both crew killed, presume exploding V1.
12 July Three fighters destroyed by exploding V1s, 2 pilots killed
17 July V1 exploded, Mosquito destroyed, crew safe
25 July V1 exploded, Mosquito destroyed, crew killed
26 July V1 collided with fighter, pilot killed
3 August, Fighter deliberately rammed the V1, pilot killed
24 September, Mosquito lost attacking V1, crew killed, presume
V1 exploded.

And of course other fighters on anti V1 patrols were lost to accidents,
friendly fire, collisions and so on.

Yes the V1 could explode and take the intercepting fighter with
it, but then again so could a bomber or a fighter bomber. The
bombers could have a lot more explosive on board. Plus they
tended to fire back and move about, which raises the risk of
collision.

That depends on the explosive detonation sensitivity.
Some explosives were very benign, others much more
shock sensitive. It's details but I think bombers used
the former, ad the V! the later.

Battle of Britain, 3 Spitfires, 1 Dornier 17. Two Spitfires collide
with each other, the third is shot down by the bomber gunners.

The figured out harmonising the guns to 300 yards was the best
compromise, the V1 was a small target but at least it was not
trying to dodge

It was hard to shoot down because it was highly rugged.
Think about it, 300 yards is pretty close when a ton of
explosive scatters shrapnel into your flight path, much headed
in your direction at a closing speed of 1000 mph.

No one in WWII was going to do a head on shot on the V1,
the target was too small, the closing speed to high for accurate
gunnery, they came on it from behind.

Finally in terms of V1s shot down the UK history The Defence
of the UK says 1,846 and 5/6 by fighters, 1,878 and 1/3 by AA
guns and 231 and 5/6 by barrage balloons.

Fighter kills in the 10 June to 5 September period amount to
1,771 and 1/3, with another 75.5 kills for the rest of the war.

The 1,878.33 and 1,771.33 figures can be compared to the
Bowyer figure of 1,900 and the Wiki figure of 1,759. The
Wiki figure would appear to be for the period ending early
September, not the entire campaign.

PS: I replied to "soc.history.war.world-war-ii" about Einstein,
but I'm waiting to see the post.

Look at the moderator comment about valid email addresses and
the amount of new material required to see if that was a problem.
Also being a moderated group it has a higher chance of messages
going missing.

Good suggestion! I'll reply in the moderated group, and also
in RAM.

Geoffrey Sinclair

Regards
Ken
.

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