Re: Goering’s Big Bungle: the Me-262
- From: "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2009 03:16:40 +1100
<eunometic@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:2a7d8652-bd6f-4638-af50-7cf9bca923c4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
There were directives, apparently originating from Adolf Hitler just
prior to the war with France, the UK, Poland etc (case yellow) that
weapons programs that could not lead to a field able weapon within 2
years (or 6 months) should be suspended. This action was repeated
momentarily prior to the Barabarrossa compaigne.
This seems to be the universal get out clause for those wanting
to believe the wonder Germany ideas.
Several weapons and engine programs were serverly effected by this.
Or alternatively the programs had problems which delayed them
but blame Hitler instead.
It can be argued that the resoruces were best used to get them to a
deplyable form.
So in other words the change of direction produced more weapons
early in the war, that would otherwise have been, is that the idea?
A long war favoured the 'allies' as Germany was a
small over populated country that struggled to feed itself after the
post ww1 borders and had limited access to critical materials.
Fascinating, by that definition most of Europe is small and over
populated.
And of course in mid 1940 the Germans had most of Europe under
its control. Turning the French aircraft industry to German uses
would have been a major boost for example, instead the factories
were looted.
Other programs that were severely affected
1 Microwave development program.
2 Development of proximity fuze.
Both could have been more critical than even jets. Had the Reich had
just one of these: proximity fuzes, microwave radar and jets in
service by the end of 1943 the allied bombing effort would have been
thwarted.
The Germans came to the conclusion centimetric wavelengths were
unsuitable for aircraft radars, it took tests with captured H2S sets
to change the view. In December 1943.
And the allied jamming of German fire control radars was effective
from mid 1943 onwards, as can be seen by the number of flak
damaged Bomber Command aircraft before and after July 1943.
To give an idea of the difference in radar effort, German radar
research capacity was around 10% that of the UK in 1942, and
spread over 100 small institutes.
Hence the way the Germans fell behind.
The system managed to produce 40 Freya radar sets in
September 1943.
In mid 1943 20% of night fighters did not have radar sets. This
had dropped to 15% in August 1943, however 80% of new
AI radars were not ready for use when delivered.
Some 15 of the panoramic Jadgschloss radars were deployed
by the end of the war, to cover Germany and the western occupied
countries required 125. And the set was vulnerable to jamming and
as of July 1944 had no IFF capability.
The conventional fighters did a good job in stopping day allied
bombing of Germany in 1943, the night fighters would do the same
against the night raids in early 1944.
Rheinmettal-Borsig got the proximity fuze working in late 1944 firing
of some 1000 rounds but too late to go to production: it was
electrostaticn and had a 10m range with an 88mm shell almost
impossible to jam. An interesting technology was the molten salt or
thermal battery. The US swapped to using these since the allied
chemical batteries were unreliable.
As usual the Germans are always going to do something wonderful
in the Eunometic world.
By the way at a target profile of 250 mph at 25,000 feet proximity
fuses upped the flak kills from 1.1 to 3.7%.
So much for one advance and bombing stops.
Goering didn't understand technology, at least how it evolved to a
great depth.
A case in point is the 'Duppel' affair. Duppel was the German
equivalent of window/chaff/rope: strips of foil cut to 1/2 wavelengths
designed to clutter up radar.
When German experiments showed how vulnerable radar was to this
Goering simply made it so secret with such strict punishment that no
countermeasures could be developed.
And on the other side the RAF waited a long time because of its
effects. The decline of the German bomber force was a factor in
the decision to use the tactic as was a new generation of radars
that had some immunity,
When the devastating Hamburg raid
in which window was used and 40,000 people died on the first night
Try the second night and 40,000 dead was the toll over the 4 raids,
most of whom died on the second night.
the
Germans were able to put into service a coherent pulse doppler system
within 2-4 weeks called wurzlaus. This technolgy came from
experiments at weather radar and low flying aircraft detection and was
not properly integrated into the frequency hopping anti jamming
methods as well as unstable from shock caused by gunfire.
About 25% of German radar sets were fitted with the wurzlaus system
by May 1944. A rush upgrade had 10% of the 511 Wurzburg sets with
the system in August 1943. The system worked best against an average
window drop profile, with a 50% loss in bearing accuracy and loss of range.
Triggering RAF IFF sets was a more reliable way to track the bombers.
Although it
worked and evolved along the path wurzlaus, tastlaus, windlaus and k-
laus it could not be deployed fast enough. (the last version burned
through windows and carpet jamming)
This burned through appears to be yet another Eunometic exaggeration.
because too much time had been
wasted and because the bombing campaign severel disrupted radar
production.
Try the Germans did not have a really good radar research system.
In essence they adapted captured allied sets for the latest types
from mid 1943 onwards.
(Jumo 004 B)
Some engines would last 70 hours, variability was large.
Ah yes, the best figure that can be found is used, without saying
how many. Is this the time to note some of the B-29 engines lasted
over 500 hours between overhauls, versus the planned 300 hours?
Eunometic of course will now assume the 70 hours figure was
widespread. Of course think of what large variability means
of the bottom end of the lifetime figures and what that means
to things like availability and accident rates.
The engines official MTBO was 25 hours they were not thrown away but
removed and serviced,.
Actually lifetime was considered 25 hours, between overhauls
was 10 hours.
Service involved removing both engines and replacing them: this took 3
man hours. Servicing involved x-raying the turbine and replacing if
neccesary and replacing the 6 combustion chamber cans.
By the way the three hours is the Eunometic figure engine on and off
part, and a service is not an overhaul.
While mention is often made of the 10-12 hour engines less mention is
that of upt to 70 hour engines that skilled pilots could nurse or that
the reliability increased with the hollow air cooled blades.
The 70 hour figure is not much mentioned because it is really
another Eunometic wish figure, way out of the reality of the
normal results.
By the way the hollow air cooled blades was the definition of the
004B-4 version, the main production type. It arrived in December
1944, the B-1 version arrived in production in June 1944.
A bomb sight called the TSA-2 (TSA-2D) could make bombing accurate.
Just note it was never deployed in WWII apart from some tests.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
.
- References:
- Goering’s Big Bungle: the Me-262
- From: Archaeopteryx
- Re: Goering’s Big Bungle: the Me-262
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