Re: Germany, Japan, and the PTO-did the Germans know how things were going?

On Jul 31, 7:15 pm, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
"Eunometic" <eunome...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message

news:1185799948.801358.95220@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

German-Japanese co-operation was nowhere as extensive as US British
cooperation which can be explained in part by the difficulty of the
journey (via u-boat) or possibly via neutrals and the lack of a pre-
existing or natural cultural relationship. (the japanese were on the
allied side in ww1)

See also mutually assured racism, both governments were big on
their natural superiority over everyone else.

And it was quite easy to travel from Germany to Japan and back
again until June 1941 via the USSR and until later in that year a
more difficult journey was via the Italian air line flights to Brazil
then by sea to Japan.

While the US was escorting British Merchant
shipping and repeatedly attacking u-boats for almost a year in advance
of the declaration of war the Japanese did not forwarn the Germans of
their planed attack.

Try the US declared a neutrality zone at the start of the war and
gradually extended that further east.

Calling an area extending from half way to all the way across the
atlantic a 'zone of neutrality'
has got to be one of the more egrarious and spins. Surely that is
what it was called but just
as surely it is idiotic or dishonest to insist that is what it was.

In effect it had several purposes: one to greatly assist Britain and
secondly to create the conditions for war between Germany and the USA.


Try the US became involved in escorting convoys after the US
occupation of Iceland, in July 1941. Try attacking U-boats from
September 1941.

Attacks began well before then. You seem to be willing to persist in
adhering to the mistrouths that have been disabused by competent
historians decades ago.

Roosevelt was performing something that had become almost habbitual
with US presidents in several occasions since: 'lying' to wit in order
to fulfill his ostensible strategy to get the US people to accept war
with Germany by aggravating Hitler or creating an incident.

I've Just got Wolfgang Hirschfelds diary here.
He was to Hydrophone and Enigma opperator on U-234. (the Uranium U-
boat)

On May 16th may 1941 he notes being depth charged by a US Arizona
class destroyer not far from the Shetland-Faroes Passage. That's a
long way from
the USA. He notes that the u-boat commanders were opperating under a
'fuhrerbefele'
to avoid incidents with US ships.



The usual Eunometic flexible definition of time is being employed.


Actually its not 'usual' for me at all.

It is however typical of you to use crude and primitive debating
rhetoric.

Straw man tactics, misrepresenting your opponents arguments and
posting tables of
facts that are insubstantial to the issue but are an attempt to create
the illusion of
being factual.



Try the Germans did not warn the Japanese about Barbarossa.
Try the Japanese did warn the Germans things were becoming
"very dangerous" in the Pacific which was diplomatic speak for
war was coming. Fighting could "break out at any moment".

Airflights over the pole from Germany to Japan
were technically possible (by Junkers Ju 290) but politically
officially over ruled by the Japanese who were not at war with the
Russians and did not wish to aggravate them.

Try the Italians rather than the Germans and the fact the costs
of such flights were not worth the effort. Not to mention the
problems of over pole flights.

The Italians performed them but the German technically could have
performed them
given the good performance of the Junkers Ju 290 but probably didn't
for political
considerations and Japanese sensitivities.

The rumours of Ju 290 performing these are well known and someone
would need
to be insipidly dumb not to ascertain that had they have done this
they would have taken
precautions to keep the flights secret from the Soviets, US,UK etc as
possible.



There are rumours of Ju
290 transfered to civilian markings and used for this purpose however
are something you may be interested in,

Eunometic is reporting fiction.

Having said that there was a flow of technology mainly from the
Germans to the Japanese who brought German tanks, liquid cooled
engines (hoping to create high altitude fighters) etc

The liquid cooled engine was more about covering a gap in
Japanese engine technology, not for altitude work, that meant
supercharging.

the Ki 67 Hien with its DB601 engine copy was probably the best
aircraft the japanese had for dealing with the first B-29 raids.
By this time the Germans had switched to the DB605 and DB605AS


and in the final
phases Germany shipped examples of parts of its jet and rocket
engines, Me 163 rocket fighters, proximity fuses, guidence systems,
radar calibrators etc.

The point is of course how many made it and whether there were
any proximity fuses involved. You see the shipments of these
items was a 1945 affair. Rather late.

One of the final u-boats was the
controversial U-234, another was surrendered to the Canadians but
grabbed by the US while carrying uranium as well as two Japaneses
officers who suicided rhather than surrendering (some of the Germans
on board are still missing, perhaps killed in US interrogation).

Note uboat.net says U-234 surrendered at Portsmouth New Hampshire
on 16 May 1945


It was intercepted by the USS Sutton on 14 May.

The German crew surrendered by radio to the canadians. The US
intercepted the surrender and then jammed the subs radio to prevent
this.

The surrender has its sad as well as amusing moments. The USN
boarding
party, hyped up by their own anti-german and nazi atrocity propaganda
displayed a bumbling but terrifying incompetence eminating from their
fear.
They subs autopilot was not understood by the americans and actually
twice
pointed and followed the destroyer which had the Sutton about to open
fire on the U234 and its 15 americans (2 officers and 13 ratings)
boarding party. When one
of the germans alarmed at what he could see developing shouted an
order
in english about how to disengage the auto rudder some of the
americans tied to
surrendered to the unarmed german?


And who exactly claims there are missing crew members from U-234?
And what sort of evidence exists to claim the US killed them?

Of the 10 technical experts only 9 were relocated by the u-boat crew
after the
war.

Gerhardt Falcke knew all about the Uranium cargo and never reappeared
not even since
publication of the book.




U-864 was sunk when enigma decrypts disclosed her course and she was
ambushed.

By an RN submarine.

The Japanese in fact were able to get their jet engine going when they
viewed pictures of the inards of a BMW003. (this indicates the power
of belief)

Try the Japanese decided the Ne-10 engine was not gong to produce
enough power and so decided to use the BMW003 as the basis for the
Ne-20 design. They had photographs and a cut away drawing for guides.

What's with the rhetoric?


One irony was that the Japanese under SHIGERU NAKAJIMA had developed
in 1939 a multicavity magnetron for microwave radar one year ahead of
Randall and Boot in england.
See page 5/6 here:
http://www.ieee.org/portal/cms_docs_iportals/iportals/aboutus/history...

The Japanese failed to appreciate the value of their discovery and
lacksadiscally installed it on a ship only in 1942.

Going to mention the Soviet scientists who appear to have discovered
the cavity magnetron even earlier and also published their results?

I have on previous occaisions refered to the Soviet Patent, indeed it
was I who informed
YOU of the Soviet patent (which was never built or developed) and of
German patents
by Hans Hollamann for a water cooled multicavity magnetron both from
around
1935. Upon discovering the British CV66 H2S ,magnetron the Germans
did a
patent search and found the Russian one.



Or how small the Japanese electronic industry was, even Zeros had
to fly without voice radios in 1941/42.

This was not a failure of Japanese industrial capacity as Nakajima
makes
clear. It was a failure of the Japanese Navy and indirectly the
Japanese
Army (who were apparently not involved at all) to appreciate what they
had
and its potential.

Had the Japanese valued their discovery they would have given even a
little priority
instead of waiting 3 years from 1939 to 1942 to get a pilot device
operating on a single
ship.

Building a dozen experimental radar sets for its destroyers cruisers
would not have stretched the japanese
radio industry at all.

The japanese were simply overconfident of their admitedly superlative
night vision optics (the finest of any
combatent even better than the German) and lacked the imagination to
make use of them. Technically they
were A1 and could have had the finest kit.


In 1940 German industry was told to shutdown or suspend development
programs that would not produce a field able weapons within 6 months
(various times are given) and so the magnetron development program was
mostly shutdown. (those who think this was a unique act of stupidity
should note that the same pressures were applied in Britain and almost
succeeded).

ry the German ban was nowhere as complete as being claimed and

It was enough to shutdown their microwave effort.

As per usual you make a vague sweeping statement with a patina of
authority.

A small amount of work was carried on at the PTR at a very low
level. When the Germans took stock of their own situation after the
Rotterdam GEC CV66
magnetron was examined they noted that their own capabillity.

This was the Telefunken LD9 disk triode which could produce stable
oscilations at half the power
of the British magnetron (10kW vs 16k-20kW) at 10cm and a split anode
tungsten magnetron which could
produce 0.8kW at 7cm. The problem really was that they hadn't really
tried to
use these devices as efforts were directed into existing radars the
LD9 was produced
with resonance chamber much larger and when they did they noted that
that microwaves
produced weaker reflections for the same power.

the British bans applied in the second half of 1940, thanks to the
biggest national crisis in centuries. It was lifted by the end of the
year. In effect for the Battle of Britain the British tried to concentrate
on what they could produce then, not in 1941.

Which seems to have been the situation in Germany due to the fuehrer
befehel probably in preperation for barbarossa, however for a variety
of reasons many of the programs did not recover. The official British
directives, noted by Lovell, were ignored at a lower buerocratic
level.


In December 1942 they (under General Martini) attempted
to reopen in order to dominate the high frequency field but this was
rejected. In Feb 1943 a magnetron was recovered from a H2S radar in a
Stirling bomber. Although they were able to get a copy going within
weeks a trickle of productions sets didn't start till 18 months
latter.

For whatever reason this device, which could have changed the course
of the war for both the Germans and Japanese wasn't appreciated or
shared. It probably constitutes the biggest failure after the failure
to secure their encryption systems that both nations failed in.

I like the idea possessing centimetric radar sets could have changed
the war for the axis.

The uboats would not be being surprised, there would be not Hamburg
disaster in which
the German defenses were blinded by Windows which led to the fire
bombing
of that city and 40,000 deaths in one night and 10,000 in a follow up
raid.

The cheapness of the microwave sets are such that they can be produced
in large numbers
as they don't need large antena to produce a PPI set.

One PPI sets can control multiple interceptions instead of
requiring two wurzburgs and one freya per interception. The strategy
of saturating German
defenses fails. Even with jamming and windows the narrow beam means
that chaff/window
reflections do not enter into the sides of the narrow beams.


Somehow I do not see the IJN able to match the USN in combat
power, which means Japan is doomed. Somehow I do not see
the German air defences becoming that much better, and the radars
helping to stop the Red Army or Overlord.

I did point out that the failure to secure their cyphers was the other
great, decisive technical
failure. It was as simple as issuing new rotors and withdrawing the
old ones.


Also having the design was one thing manufacturing it in quantity
was something else. A real problem for the Japanese and even
for the Germans.

Having the design in 1939 makes mass producing sets in quantity by
1941 a cinch.
More importantly it allows a vast array of experimental data to be
gathered.

Of course I suspect the IJN even told the japanese army let alone the
Germans.

The Germans were in fact quite generous with the japanese shipping all
of their best.



.

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