Re: Other JSF options

In message <m4WdnY79YbtOZDLZnZ2dnUVZ_o6dnZ2d@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Kevin Brooks <brooksvmi@xxxxxxxxxxxx> writes
"Guy Alcala" <g_alcala@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:44AF7875.9267BDD9@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
I was thinking of shipping tonnage, not hauling them on tank transporters.

In shipping terms your equipment usually "cubes out" before it "weights out"
(i.e., volume takes precdence over weight), so agian, not really a big
factor.

It gets a touch trickier than that, if only because you need more loggie assets to keep up with faster tanks (and more again when they're thirstier) which chew quickly into the available LIMs.

The single greatest daily supply requirement in a mech. division is POL,
by
far. M1s need a hell of a lot more of it than M60s, and of course all
that fuel
has to be hauled forward somehow.

Again, so what? Yeah, the M1 is more thirsty...but when your total vehicle
density is, for example, maybe five thousand vehicles in a heavy division
(just a for instance--again, my books are not here, but I'd bet if anything
that the total is a bit higher than that), and the MBT component makes up
only 200 or 250 of those, it becomes apparent that the effect of even
doubling the fuel consumption of the MBT force is not going to have a
significant impact on the total force requirement.

Except that the fuel consumption is one part of the equation - *where* the fuel is needed, is another factor. Thirsty B Echelon vehicles aren't too bad, but when your lead assets are gas-guzzlers you don't just need their extra fuel, but you need the means to get it to them (and do those fuel runs need protection? and so it goes...)

The more fuel needed forward, the more trucks
it takes to get it there, which burn even more fuel, which requires more
trucks,
which . . . We stockpiled 6 months of supplies in theater, including POL,
before
the war started. When I say we could have gotten their faster, I'm
referring to
how long it took us to move all that there (granted, much of the POL was
in the
area, but we also had to get the trucks there to haul it as we couldn't
hire
them all locally).

Guy, having helped plan division level operations, and signed off on the
OPORDS for brigade and battalion level operations, let me tell you that you
are drawing some really strange conclusions here, apparently influenced by
both your pet GAO folks and some off-kilter "conventional wisdom".

He's suggesting that fuel stockpiles don't spontaneously teleport to where they're wanted, as far as I can see, which is true.

You need
to expreience planning just one division level deliberate river crossing
operation (where every piece of rolling stock must be programmed into the
crossing timeline) to get a real appreciation for the amount of equipment
other than tanks and IFV's that a division rolls into battle with a heavy
division.

True, but not entirely relevant to fangs-out offensive operations where the tanks, armoured infantry and recce are heading off over the horizon with the rest of the division rushing to catch up.

When heavy divisions advance as they did during ODS, there is a
heck of a lot more "ash-and-trash" CS/CSS assets rolling forward than there
are MBT's-

But generally, further from what used to be called the FEBA.

-sorry, but that is just a fact. Just look at the ODS-era
division's organic assets--three DS arty battalions (and a MLRS battery with
its assorted reloads, etc.), a DIVARTY HQ and ammo resupply assets, engineer
battalion (during ODS the heavies still had only one organic engineer
battalion, but it was a rather dense unit in terms of equipment assets),
ADA battalion, MI battalion, AVN brigade (and that unit has plenty of
rolling stock, too), DISCOM and main support battalion, three forward
support battalions, an MP company, a chemical company, etc. I recently saw a
number of around sixteen hundred vehicles per *brigade* combat team, though
the ODS figure would have been a bit smaller due to that engineer situation
mentioned above.

Quite true - but how does any of the above push fuel forward faster to the frontline?

Faster thirstier tanks impose much larger demands, when you have to either keep them in diesel or limit the advance to the pace of the loggies. That there are many other units also wanting fuel doesn't change that fact.


> so I don't know that 73 easting would have been at higher rather than
> lower cost to us.

Higher, because...

IIRR,
> the accounts I've read of 73 easting indicate that few if any of our
> tanks
> got hit; we hit theirs before
> they could see or target us. The 120mm would maybe get a few kills
> where
> the 105mm would bounce, but
> that would be about it.

Uhmmm...a lot of those kill shots were made while moving at high speed
across the desert during that battle, IIRC.

My memory was mostly steady slow advance, with pauses. Been awhile since
I read
the (first person) account by IIRR the Troop or Squadron CO, so I could be
wrong
(given the way my memory's getting these days, it's likely -- Please, sir,
may I
be excused? My brain is full).

My description of "high speed" was poorly chosen, I'll admit. But the
majority of the tank engagements were fough "on the move". I hate using
Wiki, but it is all I really have easily available right now: "McMaster's
unit charged and destroyed the Iraqi tanks at 73 Easting at close range...
In 20 minutes, Eagle Troop had advanced in constant heavy contact with Iraqi
armor from 67 Easting to 74 Easting." That is seven kilometers in 20 minutes
while under fire--hardly an immobile operation, and indicitive of the speed
that they used *through* the main battle area. ISTR that Medina Ridge was
another rather mobile fight (even larger than 73 Easting IIRC).

Twenty-one kilometres an hour is achievable even in a Chieftain provided it doesn't break down en route :)

More seriously, were there any complaints about UK Challengers being too slow to keep up? (I know one factor in CR2's selection was the fuel consumption issue)

See mine about POL supply, stocks and shipping.

They are not valid, as noted earlier. Guy, you cannot really argue that a
low density item like the MBT is going to have a significant effect on the
POL supply requirements for a corps,

The tonnage of POL required, no.

The assets needed to get that relatively small quantity of extra fuel to where it is needed, and the resources needed to protect them... yes, that is *very* arguable, and one of the reasons the UK armour community went from "we want Abrams" in 1990 to "CR2 rocks!". It's a complicated story, as choosing between two excellent contenders usually is.

ISTR seeing photos of them with such at the time, but then it may have
been the
experience then which led to recognition of the need for the applique kits
(which per you was predicted by GAO). M2A2 and M2A3 certainly use the
kits.

Apparently onl a portion of the force had M2A2's during ODS, with the
remainder in the M2A1 which was not equipped with applique armor. GAO's was
bellyaching about the entire program because they wwere convinced the M2
could not survive as well as an MBT (well, no duh, right?).

The problem of making a claim like "the M2 will operate alongside the tanks" - it's then fair to point out that, as a tank-sized target on tracks with a turret, it will be engaged in like fashion to the tanks, and the consequences for the occupants should be considered.

Same issue in the UK, FWIW - Warrior is a bloody good IFV, tough and reliable and well-liked, but there are still times you get a CR2 to lead the convoy because it's got such an excess of protection and firepower. IFVs look vaguely tank-like but they shouldn't be used _as_ tanks without some careful thought about the expected threat.

And they wouldn't have gotten there before the first plane and maybe the
second
hit, regardless.

Maybe not, but it was indeed an example of the GAO getting things dead
wrong.

The GAO pointed out that NORAD was of limited utility, it was, and they were dead wrong for saying so?

Obviously I disagree, but everwhere I do
agree that's the case, you can point to similar poor work by other
entities
which, by implication, are being held up as paragons of virtue and
objectivity.
It seems you agree with me that's not the case, so why the antipathy only
towards the legislative agencies whose job it is to check the claims of
the
executive agencies?

Because they are supposed to present a complete, non-biased analysis, and
that is not what we get in many cases.

So where *can* such an analysis be reliably found? Over here in the UK, the National Audit Office and the Commons Select Committee for Defence make no claims for infallibility, but they _do_ provide valuable oversight.

If the US GAO can't be trusted, who's got a better record?

On the contrary, they've been the main advocates of that.

Then why are they insisting that a second engine has to be developed now
rather than later?

Some experience of the reality of industrial development?

Once you've read the book you'll be in a better position to confirm or
deny your
beliefs, but until then there's no point discussing it.

Once you can show me that they had the capability to manage a land operation
into Bosnia without US support I'll bite, but until then...

Well, I was going to be recalled for it... the contingency plan was that just about anyone less than five years out of uniform would be recalled, to cover for the active and up-to-date-reserves.

Would it have worked? Probably, though with a nasty insurgency to follow.

The F-15 suffered from
severe availability problems owing to the F100's shortcomings for several
years,
and Pratt's lackadaisical attitude to fixing the problems. Although the
problems weren't all within P&W's control (there was a strike at Pratt
that
caused some production delays, and the USAF's F-15 spares calculations
were
hopelessly optimistic), in the mid-late'70s the USAF had more than a few
F-15s
sitting around with empty engine bays owing to the lack of usable engines.

Yeah, it was a really lousy program, huh? Those kills by IAF Eagles in the
early eighties were a real fluke, and since the aircraft was never competed
out in the first place it is really a wonder that it has managed to rack-up
such a *surely* mediocre record...?

Hey, the L85A2 has turned into a really good rifle. Doesn't change the catastrophe of its introduction, or how awful the early production versions were (it's not good to take fifteen rifles to a range, and after forty rounds per man have only twelve still able to be made fireable).

Getting a good weapon system... eventually... is doable if you keep throwing enough money and effort at it. Getting it right early - there's the trick.

Considering the Patriot's lack of real tactical success in DS (political
success
is another matter), are you sure you want tohold it up as an example of a
good
program?

It was not successful tactically?

Nope. How many fixed-wing threats did it ever see? (Before we even ask how many it engaged).

Then, in 2003, it demonstrated the amazing feat of having worse track-extraction and target classification than the infamously bad Outfit LFA.

Can't say I know enough about the program to comment, although ISTR the
original
design was competed. OTOH, seems to me that most of the DDG-51's systems
are
recycled from other programs (the LM-2500s certainly are), so they were
pretty
low risk.

So, it's OK for some programs to merely compete designs, but the JSF program
has to follow a stage-by-stage comp through production I guess? Odd.

Well, the DDG-51 uses weapons, sensors, combat systems and propulsions thoroughly proven on other platforms.

Which of those are true for JSF?

--
Paul J. Adam
.

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