Re: Other JSF options

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" <g_alcala@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:447FFD28.10C6AC6E@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" <g_alcala@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:44793A0C.3DBD7FE0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Kevin Brooks wrote:

<snip>

I don't get it; how does it compute that the ANG would NOT want a
dedicated
A-10 replacement aircraft? I have seen nothing from the ANG side
(attributed)
that indicates such is the case.

Presumably tied into their losing the A-10s and then being
transitioned
to
UCAVs. As I read it, the idea was to have the JSFs be
purely active, with no guard component.

Huh? I can't begin to believe that. A plan saying that the ANG not
getting
F-35's? Guy, you'll have to dig up something concrete on that. From
what
I
have read of the Total Air Force plan for the future leaner force,
they
envision one-third of the fighter force residing in the Guard/Reserve,
and
another third being integrated AC/RC units (such as the 1st FW is
currently
doing with the F-22 and the VaANG). At least that is what the Guard
Association said.

I believe the idea didn't come from the service, it was floated by OSD
in
conjunction with BRAC last year.

Sorry, can't buy it. The ANG is too much an integral part of the Total
Air
Force and the F-35 program is too broad not to include ANG fielding to be
planned from the get-go.The C-17 saw early fielding to the ANG, the ANG
is

already getting its feet-wet in the F-22 program, the F-16 (which is
after
all one of the major to-be-replaced systems for the F-35) saw significant
straight-to-Guard production, IIRC, etc.

But if we're going UCAV in a big way, we may well not wind up buying all
that many manned a/c. So there may be less
need for the guard to have some. At least, that seemed to be OSD's
thought, but I don't know how far that got
(probably not very, given the politics).

Still does not compute. Say what you will about the OSD, he is not stupid.
he fully understands the political power of the Guard, not to mention the
fact that the Guard provides a large chunk of his deployed forces. This
really smacks of a major foul-up on the part of whoever reported it, because
it is just not believable. OSD has never spoken of reducing the JSF buy down
to the point where the Guard would not be included in the fielding plan.

OSD includes far more than Rumsfeld. BRAC seems to have been largely England's (DepSecDef) baby, and he seems to have
been the guy behind the idea. If the political power of the guard were a determining factor in what they suggested they
never would have put so many guard bases and missions on the block in the first place (to the obligatory and expected
loud howls of outrage). That they didn't get all they asked for isn't surprising.

<snip>

This is really their "we are ggonna try anything to keep the
possibility
of
more F-22 authorizations alive" gambit. As to Mosely...see below.

Certainly and it appears to have worked, at least up to the current
moment. They also managed to squeeze four more a/c (183, up from
179) in there somehow.

I thought there was some abiguity in the 179 number before--the deal
was
that if the USAF could work additional airframes out of the planned
procurement total without increasing it, fine and dandy. Which is how
the
183 number came about.

No, IIRC 179 wasn't the "this is how much we're giving you" number, I
think it was higher, maybe 270-odd well before last year's cuts. I
forget just how they were able to get the extra four a/c, and I'm not
going to look through umpteen issues of AvLleak again just to find
out;-)

ISTR that the budget nubers were based upon the ability to build 179, and
the deal was the USAF could increase that if they could get the unit-cost
down, which was how those four additional airframes made it into the
plan.
But don't quote me on that....

My memory was that the number was higher, and the airforce then began
whining because they very clearly weren't going

The number was higher-once-upon-a-time, and the 270 figure sounds about
right. But the result was that money was programmed for 179 aircraft.

I finally found a DoD briefing with (Asst. SEcDef for AT&L) Aldridge which mentions the numbers (my memory wasn't
totally off):

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t02072003_t0207atl.html

Quoting:

"Q: Under the '04 budget, in the projections, what's the total number of F/A-22s envisioned for the Air Force? And do
you think that will ultimately be the number?

Aldridge: As I've mentioned before, we have a plan called "buy to budget." As you may recall, last year when we agreed
to proceed with the F-22, there was a big debate between the cost of the Air Force estimate of F-22 costs and the CAIG,
the Cost Analysis Improvement Group's estimate -- that was my independent -- of about $7 billion.

We established a program by which we would use the Air Force estimate of cost, but we would only buy the number of
airplanes the CAIG says you could buy at that cost, and that was the buy-to-budget. That number was roughly 295, but it
permitted the Air Force, if they could in fact achieve cost savings, to buy more, up to the 339 that they would have
liked to have had.

As this flight test program has proceeded, and the cost of the flight test activities have gone up, we have deliberately
moved money from the procurement account to R&D to pay for that. Therefore, the number of aircraft has to drop. So the
number now estimated to be procured at the estimate of the procurement cost is about 276. But the incentive is still
there for the Air Force, as they go out into the future, to invest in cost-savings measures, and we will permit them to
buy more aircraft within those cost limitations, if they can do that. But right now, it's around 276, which is
affordable -- and again, I'm projecting out to the year 2010 now, which is not easy to do, but that's roughly the
number."


to come anywhere close to their cost estimate (Gee, what else is new).
The estimate of the other organization
(forget the name) was far more accurate.

As mentioned in the above quote, it was the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG).

<snip>

Given that source code access is likely going to be a major factor for
other countries, I don't think we can be cavalier about it. And
losing the British buy can only boost our costs.

That cost boost would be at most the five or six percent that we would
lose
in terms of further R&D and production funding. A lot of that would be
recouped by redistributing the UK share of the production responsibilty,
or
most of it, to businesses/nations already hungry for more work. At some
point we have to be protective of our intellectual property rights--six
friggin' percent contribution (which contribution is supposedly to be
repaid
a few times over as a result of UK work-share income) does not equal a
100%
access to intellectual property IMO. Worse, standing on a platform of
that
measily 6% contribution and *demanding* the whole pie does not cut the
mustard, either.

If it was a bluff (and I don't agree that it was) it was a successful one,
as we've agreed to give them the access
they insisted on. I expect they'll get the F136 too, because there's way
too much political backing in this country
for it.

Politicos stink.

In this case, I agree with them. They aren't always wrong, even if they often do the right thing for the wrong reason.

As I said before, this affair has turned me from leaning
Anglophie to Anglophobe. Though I have yet to see anything that indicates
the Brits got everything they were *demanding*; just some gobbledegook about
how they were now satisfied. The two are not necessarilly the same thing...

Quoting the Flight International article:
-------------------------------------------------
The UK has been guaranteed ?operational sovereignty? over its F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, according to a joint statement
released by US president George Bush and UK prime minister Tony Blair after their meeting last week.

?Both governments agree that the UK will have the ability to successfully operate, upgrade, employ and maintain the
Joint Strike Fighter such that the UK retains operational sovereignty over the aircraft,? says the statement.

The UK has criticised US technology transfer restrictions and had warned it would not sign up for the JSF production and
sustainment phase unless it was guaranteed operational sovereignty ? and particularly the ability to make urgent
upgrades based on operating experience.

The US-UK statement makes clear the two sides ?are working out the details? of a technology transfer agreement that
protects sensitive technologies in the JSF, ?while remaining committed to these principles?.

A final agreement is unlikely to change the requirement for JSF prime contractor Lockheed Martin to obtain a US export
licence to transfer any technology to the UK that is required for production and in-service support of the F-35, but a
government-to-government accord should provide a guarantee that the license will be approved.

The UK and seven other international partners now involved in F-35 system developmet and demonstration are being asked
to sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in December covering the production, sustainment and follow-on development
phase of the JSF programme.
----------------------------------------------------------------

Now, just how having 'operational sovereignty' that allows them to go in and modify software to meet their needs differs
from having full access to the source code aka 'total sovereignty' is way above my head. Maybe someone with more
background can comment -- Paul, are you still following this? In any case, they got something they could live with,
which is the important thing.

<snip>

And they always have, but that didn't stop the F110 program. Oh,
and
don't forget Massachussetts on GE's side. Given the choice,
I'll take a competitive program any day. The projected savings of
having
a single program usually seem to assume that everything goes
right, and judging by past history that's foolish. We've certainly
benefitted by the competition on the F100/F110, F119/F120, and
likely will on the F135/F136; the F136 is claimed to be important
for
the
STOVL, as it's said to provide extra thrust and/or extra
growth. Naturally, P&W denies that this is the case.

The cost for that additional engine is some 2 plus billion dollars in
the
next budget, IIRC. You were griping earlier about the addditional cost
of
the B model for the USAF, so what's the difference?

_I_ wasn't griping about it, the Air Force was,and that's one reason
why
they (and the navy) wanted to cancel the F136.

So the services think it is a bad idea and will cost more money....

Well, mainly they think it will cost money they'd rather spend on other
things, and that going with a single engine
will be cheaper. However, given that they've been wrong about the cost
and/or cost-benefit of virtually every major
non-competitive acquisition program they've been responsible for, I trust
their judgement on such matters very
little. I'm personally convinced that having the F100 and F110 in
competition every year for the F-16 kept P&W and
GE on their toes, forcing them to make improvements far quicker than would
have otherwise occurred, and that having
at least two military engine design shops is a good thing.

Unless you lack the up-front money to make it happen in the first place.

As I said, it's not a case of lacking the up-front money, it's a question of wanting to spend it elsewhere.

What this amounts to is the Brits leveraging an increased US deficit for
their own gain. Geeze, the more I think about this, the more I think we'd be
better off letting the UK get nice and buddy-buddy with France and wash our
hands of them...

Since I think the F136 is a good idea whether the Brits are involved or not, it's not an issue for me. On the larger
issue, do you really think we can afford to ignore the political needs of the best (and largest) ally we have, given
that we've done our best to burn bridges with just about everyone else? I can still imagine the collective groan that
must have gone up from the state department when Rumsfeld made his "Old Europe" remark. It seems the countries he once
implied were the "New Europe" are now part of "Old Europe" again. Are we ready to see Blair replaced by Brown, and
after that who knows?

The Army likes the A-10
because it can count on it being dedicated first and foremost to
their
own
support needs, and that is a reason why they may apply some
leverage
in
the
B model discussion. Time will tell.

The critical issue being 'dedicated'; I doubt they care about the
type,
as
long as it can provide the necessary coverage when they
want it.

I don't think they are yet comfortable with the idea of going fully
UCAV
in
the CAS arena, and from what I have read the USAF has been careful not
to
reach to that extreme.

It will phase in gradually in any case, giving them time to get
comfortable with the idea (and work out the kinks).

But saying you are not going to field a dedicated A-10 replacement *now*
is
not "gradually" phasing it in, is it?

A-10s are going to be around for many years yet, as are all the other
manned assets used for that job, and there will
eventually be plenty of F-35s around as well. No one is suggesting that
an all-UCAv force is going to take place
over night. It may never happen, and even if it does it's likely to take
at least 20 years or more.

Which does not very well support your argument that this was all supposedly
driving a no-JSF-for-ANG angle.

I don't see that at all. A transition is going to take years, there will be bugs to work out, and there is always the
possiblity that it may prove unworkable, in which case decisions will be modified to suit.

<snip>

[HV-22 vs. MH-60]

The "out years" in this case would have to be the teens, because the
document shows planned production up to the end of the decade with
no mention of them (and shows production tapering off then). I do have
a
fairly clear memory of the navy saying some years back (maybe
5+) that they were dropping out, some time before they committed to the
MH-60 for CSAR.

I can't see a living budget justification being five years out of date,
even
from the Navy....My Google efforts have yet to uncover any USN
announcement
of completely giving up on the Osprey being fielded as the HV-22, but I
did
find that kernel claiming it is still planned.

I know it's almost impossible to find any mention of the navy's lack of
interest on the web (although it's even more
difficult to find any mention of when the navy plans to buy any), but I
definitely read this some years back in a
reputable source quoting the responsible officials, maybe AvLeak or even a
DoD announcement. However, this article,

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/05/mh60r-seahawk-upgrade-enters-opeval/index.php

which is the best I could find online, includes the following statement:

The MH-60S will replace the US Navy's HH-60H in the combat-rescue and
special warfare support roles. If the Navy
continues to decline to invest in 48 HV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft for
search and rescue, special warfare and
fleet logistics support, the MH-60S will become the primary rotary naval
platform for those roles.

Which does not eliminate USN interest; it just indicates they have not been
willing to pony up the procurement bucks *yet*.

Given that:

The requirement for 48 HV-22s was part of the program almost from the get-go;

There was absolutely no mention of the HV-22 in the program status report from 2001 I have;

V-22 production is scheduled to end about the end of the decade;

They have no funds programmed for the HV-22 up until then, and

They are buying another a/c for the role.

This seems pretty definite to me. Now personally, I think the V-22 is so manifestly superior in the CSAR role (other
than at extreme altitudes) to a conventional helo, that anyone choosing the latter for the role is deliberately
crippling their capability. But, as with the USAF CSAR competition, they've got a limited pot of money to buy a certain
number of assets, and theycan't buy enough V-22s to go around. What's I think's going to wind up happening is that
MV-22s and/or CV-22s are going to be called on to do the CSAR missions the helos can't do, after a few losses where we
lose people due to lack of capability. The marines will be willing, but the MV-22 lacks some equipment. The specops
side is likely to be unwilling to tie up their assets for the mission as was the case in DS, which led to crews being
captured who could have been rescued. CSAR was moved out of Specops afterwards, then back in and just recently out
again.

If we lose some people thatwecould have gotten with the osprey, maybe then Congress will raise a big to-do and
appropriate funds, and the USAF and/or USN will buy some dedicated CSAR birds. Or maybe we'll have something even
better by then. What's encouraging to me is that Israel has indicated it is seriously considering buying some for
CSAR/special ops.

Guy

.

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