Re: Other JSF options


"Guy Alcala" <g_alcala@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:447FFD28.10C6AC6E@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" <g_alcala@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:44793A0C.3DBD7FE0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Kevin Brooks wrote:

<snip>

I don't get it; how does it compute that the ANG would NOT want a
dedicated
A-10 replacement aircraft? I have seen nothing from the ANG side
(attributed)
that indicates such is the case.

Presumably tied into their losing the A-10s and then being
transitioned
to
UCAVs. As I read it, the idea was to have the JSFs be
purely active, with no guard component.

Huh? I can't begin to believe that. A plan saying that the ANG not
getting
F-35's? Guy, you'll have to dig up something concrete on that. From
what
I
have read of the Total Air Force plan for the future leaner force,
they
envision one-third of the fighter force residing in the Guard/Reserve,
and
another third being integrated AC/RC units (such as the 1st FW is
currently
doing with the F-22 and the VaANG). At least that is what the Guard
Association said.

I believe the idea didn't come from the service, it was floated by OSD
in
conjunction with BRAC last year.

Sorry, can't buy it. The ANG is too much an integral part of the Total
Air
Force and the F-35 program is too broad not to include ANG fielding to be
planned from the get-go.The C-17 saw early fielding to the ANG, the ANG
is

already getting its feet-wet in the F-22 program, the F-16 (which is
after
all one of the major to-be-replaced systems for the F-35) saw significant
straight-to-Guard production, IIRC, etc.

But if we're going UCAV in a big way, we may well not wind up buying all
that many manned a/c. So there may be less
need for the guard to have some. At least, that seemed to be OSD's
thought, but I don't know how far that got
(probably not very, given the politics).

Still does not compute. Say what you will about the OSD, he is not stupid.
he fully understands the political power of the Guard, not to mention the
fact that the Guard provides a large chunk of his deployed forces. This
really smacks of a major foul-up on the part of whoever reported it, because
it is just not believable. OSD has never spoken of reducing the JSF buy down
to the point where the Guard would not be included in the fielding plan.


<snip>

This is really their "we are ggonna try anything to keep the
possibility
of
more F-22 authorizations alive" gambit. As to Mosely...see below.

Certainly and it appears to have worked, at least up to the current
moment. They also managed to squeeze four more a/c (183, up from
179) in there somehow.

I thought there was some abiguity in the 179 number before--the deal
was
that if the USAF could work additional airframes out of the planned
procurement total without increasing it, fine and dandy. Which is how
the
183 number came about.

No, IIRC 179 wasn't the "this is how much we're giving you" number, I
think it was higher, maybe 270-odd well before last year's cuts. I
forget just how they were able to get the extra four a/c, and I'm not
going to look through umpteen issues of AvLleak again just to find
out;-)

ISTR that the budget nubers were based upon the ability to build 179, and
the deal was the USAF could increase that if they could get the unit-cost
down, which was how those four additional airframes made it into the
plan.
But don't quote me on that....

My memory was that the number was higher, and the airforce then began
whining because they very clearly weren't going

The number was higher-once-upon-a-time, and the 270 figure sounds about
right. But the result was that money was programmed for 179 aircraft.

to come anywhere close to their cost estimate (Gee, what else is new).
The estimate of the other organization
(forget the name) was far more accurate. Then after that, the number got
reduced even further due to budget
pressures as well as transformation. Oh, well, one or both of our
memories may be wrong.

<snip>

I'll be interested to see how it works out. They've been making
statements that not having full source code access is a deal-breaker
for them.

I am betting they are bluffing in an effort to get as much as they
can.
Persoanlly, I think we ought to treat it as a b luff, and if they
*did*
back
out, tell 'em not to let the door hit 'em in the posterior on the way
out.
They are demanding waaay too much for their rather paltry capital
contribution, and seem determined that the US taxpayer should foot the
bill
for *their* personal desires.

Given that source code access is likely going to be a major factor for
other countries, I don't think we can be cavalier about it. And
losing the British buy can only boost our costs.

That cost boost would be at most the five or six percent that we would
lose
in terms of further R&D and production funding. A lot of that would be
recouped by redistributing the UK share of the production responsibilty,
or
most of it, to businesses/nations already hungry for more work. At some
point we have to be protective of our intellectual property rights--six
friggin' percent contribution (which contribution is supposedly to be
repaid
a few times over as a result of UK work-share income) does not equal a
100%
access to intellectual property IMO. Worse, standing on a platform of
that
measily 6% contribution and *demanding* the whole pie does not cut the
mustard, either.

If it was a bluff (and I don't agree that it was) it was a successful one,
as we've agreed to give them the access
they insisted on. I expect they'll get the F136 too, because there's way
too much political backing in this country
for it.

Politicos stink. As I said before, this affair has turned me from leaning
Anglophie to Anglophobe. Though I have yet to see anything that indicates
the Brits got everything they were *demanding*; just some gobbledegook about
how they were now satisfied. The two are not necessarilly the same thing...


<snip>

I tend to agree, although I don't recall any mention of Rafale by
the
Brits.

The French initiated that branch of the discussion, and the Brits were
happy
to allude to it earlier this year (or was it at the end of last year?)
when
the defense ministers of the two nations met and the French put the
offer
on
the table. I make it to be about as likely as a navalized
Typhoon--i.e.,
zilch.

OTOH, Rafale M is at least in operational service now, and appears to
be
(caveats noted) a somewhat lower-RCS design than Typhoon. I
suspect it would be far cheaper to buy Rafale than wait 10 or more
years
to develop a CV version of Typhoon.

Which makes it, by my reckoning, at least twice as likely as the
Navalized
Typhoon....but the problem is when you are using a factor of zero (which
is
what navalized-Typhoon is really represented by), the end product is
still
zero. :-)

Moot, now.

They're trying to get together with the French on
building a fairly common carrier, which (given the history of past
UK/French common ship attempts) strikes me as unlikely to amount to
anything. OTOH, if CVF does get built it's already a UK/French
collaborative project, so maybe this will prove the exception.

The last truly successful joint program they ran of any significant
size
was
Jaguar. The funny part is that Rafael is itself the stepchild of a
*previous* failed attempt at joint development, when the French bailed
from
Eurofighter in a snit. The CVF program could be very entertaining...

You have a strange sense of what's entertaining, especially given the
overlong nature of the program to date; Main Gate seems to
continually recede into the distance;-) Not that this is unique to
European programs.

Think Nimrod IV.... or Nimrod AEW....

Or Comanche, or SBIRS-HI, or any number of other programs over here. As I
said, it's a problem hardly limited to
Europe.

You are right about Commanche. And yes, we have had our own bottomless pit
projects. But it is still a bit ironic that the Brits were trying to use the
leverage of the product of a previously failed joint program to get what
they want in another joint program.


And they always have, but that didn't stop the F110 program. Oh,
and
don't forget Massachussetts on GE's side. Given the choice,
I'll take a competitive program any day. The projected savings of
having
a single program usually seem to assume that everything goes
right, and judging by past history that's foolish. We've certainly
benefitted by the competition on the F100/F110, F119/F120, and
likely will on the F135/F136; the F136 is claimed to be important
for
the
STOVL, as it's said to provide extra thrust and/or extra
growth. Naturally, P&W denies that this is the case.

The cost for that additional engine is some 2 plus billion dollars in
the
next budget, IIRC. You were griping earlier about the addditional cost
of
the B model for the USAF, so what's the difference?

_I_ wasn't griping about it, the Air Force was,and that's one reason
why
they (and the navy) wanted to cancel the F136.

So the services think it is a bad idea and will cost more money....

Well, mainly they think it will cost money they'd rather spend on other
things, and that going with a single engine
will be cheaper. However, given that they've been wrong about the cost
and/or cost-benefit of virtually every major
non-competitive acquisition program they've been responsible for, I trust
their judgement on such matters very
little. I'm personally convinced that having the F100 and F110 in
competition every year for the F-16 kept P&W and
GE on their toes, forcing them to make improvements far quicker than would
have otherwise occurred, and that having
at least two military engine design shops is a good thing.

Unless you lack the up-front money to make it happen in the first place.
What this amounts to is the Brits leveraging an increased US deficit for
their own gain. Geeze, the more I think about this, the more I think we'd be
better off letting the UK get nice and buddy-buddy with France and wash our
hands of them...


<snip>

The Army likes the A-10
because it can count on it being dedicated first and foremost to
their
own
support needs, and that is a reason why they may apply some
leverage
in
the
B model discussion. Time will tell.

The critical issue being 'dedicated'; I doubt they care about the
type,
as
long as it can provide the necessary coverage when they
want it.

I don't think they are yet comfortable with the idea of going fully
UCAV
in
the CAS arena, and from what I have read the USAF has been careful not
to
reach to that extreme.

It will phase in gradually in any case, giving them time to get
comfortable with the idea (and work out the kinks).

But saying you are not going to field a dedicated A-10 replacement *now*
is
not "gradually" phasing it in, is it?

A-10s are going to be around for many years yet, as are all the other
manned assets used for that job, and there will
eventually be plenty of F-35s around as well. No one is suggesting that
an all-UCAv force is going to take place
over night. It may never happen, and even if it does it's likely to take
at least 20 years or more.

Which does not very well support your argument that this was all supposedly
driving a no-JSF-for-ANG angle.


<snip>

For example the V-22 website still talks about the USN
buying 48 for CSAR, a plan that AFAIR died years ago.

Not according to the budget documentation released by the Navy this
past
February for the FY 07 budget, which indicates the HV-22 is still
planned
and among its missions will be, "the strike rescue needs of the
Navy".

http://public.secnav.navy.mil/FY07.nsf/($reload)/2B7ED565758E939D8525711E0060B6B5/$FILE/RDTEN+BA05+Book.pdf

When you look at the details (Item No. 95, exhibit R-4A), you'll
find
no
mention and no funding for the HV-22, only the MV-22 and
CV-22. Nor is there any inclusion of the HV-22 in the program
timeline.
I imagine the retention of the HV-22 in the summary is just
a carry-over which no one noticed or bothered to change. Especially
since
you'll find money for the MH-60S, which is specifically
stated to be tasked with CSAR among other missions.

Not sure about that. The other side of the coin is perhaps that the
Navy
has
deferred the HV-22 to out years but still is keeping the program
alive.

<snip rest>

The "out years" in this case would have to be the teens, because the
document shows planned production up to the end of the decade with
no mention of them (and shows production tapering off then). I do have
a
fairly clear memory of the navy saying some years back (maybe
5+) that they were dropping out, some time before they committed to the
MH-60 for CSAR.

I can't see a living budget justification being five years out of date,
even
from the Navy....My Google efforts have yet to uncover any USN
announcement
of completely giving up on the Osprey being fielded as the HV-22, but I
did
find that kernel claiming it is still planned.

I know it's almost impossible to find any mention of the navy's lack of
interest on the web (although it's even more
difficult to find any mention of when the navy plans to buy any), but I
definitely read this some years back in a
reputable source quoting the responsible officials, maybe AvLeak or even a
DoD announcement. However, this article,

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/05/mh60r-seahawk-upgrade-enters-opeval/index.php

which is the best I could find online, includes the following statement:

The MH-60S will replace the US Navy's HH-60H in the combat-rescue and
special warfare support roles. If the Navy
continues to decline to invest in 48 HV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft for
search and rescue, special warfare and
fleet logistics support, the MH-60S will become the primary rotary naval
platform for those roles.

Which does not eliminate USN interest; it just indicates they have not been
willing to pony up the procurement bucks *yet*.

Brooks



Guy



.

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