Re: Question about "the Gros Venure" as mentioned by Aubrey

nyra <nyra@xxxxxxx> wrote:

> Zeborah schrieb:
> >
> > Kai Henningsen <kaih=9lDj0n2mw-B@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > > zeborah@xxxxxxxxx (Zeborah) wrote on 03.01.06 in
> > <1h8ly0v.dmw3wp141ocnuN%zeborah@xxxxxxxxx>:
> > >
> > > > I don't think that's predestination.
> > >
> > > > v. 10-15 are perfectly reconcilable with omniscience and foreknowledge;
> > >
> > > Just a short note that there's a link between predestination and
> > > foreknowledge; as in, if your actions aren't predetermined, how can anyone
> > > know what they will be? And if they do know, how can those actions not be
> > > predetermined? Ignoring for the moment the question who, if anyone, is
> > > responsible for the predetermination.
> >
> > Generally, yes. But a being such as God who is postulated to be outside
> > time, or who time travels, can know what my actions will be, from having
> > seen those actions in my future, without anything having predetermined
> > the actions, ie without anything having determined that action *before*
> > I took it.
>
> But if the result of a decision is already known to God before it was
> taken, could the decision have gone any other way? I.e. is my decision
> free if someone can take a look in the future and perfectly know how i
> will have acted?
>
> I can't imagine an infallible foreknowledge of _the_ future unless
> this future is unalterable, i.e. pre-ordained.
> Comprehensive foreknowledge on part of God can be reconciled with free
> will (i.e. a not-preordained future) if e.g. God knows all _possible_
> futures but due to free will does not know which of those possible
> futures will become real.

In discussions about free will and determinism, it's helpful to talk
about the past, and to swap past tense for future.

So your question becomes:

"But if the result of a decision will be known to God after the
decision is taken, could the decision have gone any other way?"

Logically, AFAICT, the question has the exact same status.

As an act of my own free will, I just made myself a cup of tea. That's
free will in the past. If "free will" in the future is somehow
different, please explain how it is different. For example, if I told
you, "of my own free will, I am going to make a cup of tea" and then
came back and hit send, how does that differ?

So, IMO, the question of determinism has nothing to do with future v.
past. The answer to the two questions is the same.

And, moreover, if you argue that I had no choice, that my making a
cup of tea was inevitable, written in my brain state, you are making a
category error by confusing two different levels of description. At
the level in which there is an "I" who makes decisions, the decision
was free. Reduced to the level where neurons are firing, there is
no "I" - you can't see the wood for the trees.

But, just because someone is focused on trees does not mean the wood
doesn't exist.

Jonathan
.

Relevant Pages

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