Re: Treasongate
- From: Josh Hill <usereplyto@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 01 Aug 2005 19:18:50 -0400
On 1 Aug 2005 12:57:08 -0700, "Selur" <selurs@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>Josh Hill wrote:
>> On 1 Aug 2005 11:36:38 -0700, "Selur" <selurs@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> >If you don't think comment concerning certain poster's posts is worthy
>> >of certain poster's posts, why didn't you just skip the preamble and
>> >start about the shuttle then?
>> >
>> >Relevant space-shuttle content:
>> >
>> >I have a bad feeling that we, as media consumers, the "general public,"
>> >are being conditioned for a likely failure. I hope not.
>> >
>> >Something about it -- unsettling.
>>
>> Is it that, or is it just that the press is expecting a failure to
>> occur in the same place it did last time? The problems that have
>> occurred are pretty routine -- which is to say that they could destroy
>> the orbiter, but the chance is fairly small (one out of every 57
>> flights before the new precautions).
>>
>> Also, I think people are catching on to the fact that the shuttle had
>> fundamental design flaws, thanks in large measure to Nixon's budget
>> cuts, which forced NASA to discard the original fully-reusable design
>> in favor of a cheaper, less reliable vehicle, and to use the shuttle
>> in tasks which were originally to have been done by a new run of
>> Saturn V's.
>>
>> Also, despite the claims of a "fixed safety culture," some (of us) see
>> more of the same in the fact that the shuttle is being flown despite
>> known flaws. Both the O-ring and foam disasters could have been
>> prevented if management, under pressure from politicians (and in the
>> case of Thiokol, the bottom line) hadn't overlooked clear warnings of
>> trouble. How does flying the shuttle with only 1/6 as much foam
>> falling off and testing out useless prototype repair kits constitute a
>> "fix" to the basic safety problems?
>>
>> The shuttle was an experimental vehicle, and should have been replaced
>> by a new generation years ago.
>>
>> --
>> Josh
>
>The original o-rings worked fine, if used properly. One of the
>conditions was not launching when temperatures were below freezing.
>They were temperature sensitive. This was a known parameter.
>
>The reaction, the costly re-engineering of a workable design, instead
>of admitting truth, that management didn't read the owner's manual
>before playing with their toy, is their legacy.
Whose legacy? NASA was aware of the temperature problem at the time of
launch: management at both NASA and Thiokol overruled their engineers.
As to the redesign, erosion had been a problem from the get-go, and
work to fix it was underway at the time of the disaster:
"Thiokol knew there was a problem with the boosters as early as 1977,
and had initiated a redesign effort in 1985. NASA Level I management
had been briefed on the problem on August 19, 1985. Almost half of the
shuttle flights had experienced O-ring erosion in the booster field
joints. Ebeling and Boisjoly had complained to Thiokol that management
was not supporting the redesign task force."
http://www.engineering.com/content/ContentDisplay?contentId=41009024
The Thiokol boosters should never have been used in the first place --
NASA considered them the lowest level of the proposal. Unfortunately,
Sen. Garn was from Utah, where Thiokol is located. So much for
engineering decisions.
--
Josh
.
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