Re: Dale Eastman v. Shyster1040

Geez, Dale, I've got a pretty good track record if you can only find one
mistake (as to TINs).

With respect to horse-whipping you, let me remind you of the following
beating I gave you back on October 27, 2005:

Re: Dale, your only Corporations have income is a loser also.
by "Shyster1040" <Shyster1040@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Oct 27, 2005 at 04:12 PM


Dale sez:""by Dale Eastman <dalereastman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Oct 27, 2005 at
07:22 PM


Sorry Mr. Macdonald,

These cases you cite, of lower court reversals of the supreme court cases
I cite are illegal.

""

Really Dale, what reversals? The Supreme Court cases you cite (or rather,
the cases you've cited and "attempted" to analyse on your too-cute
webpage) do not, in any way, shape, or form, stand for the propositions
you think they do.

Merchant's Loan & Trust v. Smietanka - concluded that earlier Supreme
Court cases had adopted a uniform definition of "income," which definition
was set forth in Eisner v. Macomber as the gain derived from capital,
labor, or from both combined, including profit from the sale or exchange
of capital assets.

Now, first point - Mrs. Macomber was, guess what, an individual (or as you
like to put it, a natural person). Thus, it must be the case that, as far
as the Eisner v. Macomber Court was concerned, the definition of "income"
was independent of the nature of the person alleged to have derived that
"income."

Second point - the very same exact 9 Justices who rendered the decision in
Merchant's Loan & Trust also rendered two decisions concerning the taxable
income of, can you guess, two individuals, Messers. Walsh and Goodrich.
That very same Court applied the same definition in Walsh v. Brewster and
Goodrich v. Edwards that it applied in Merchant's Loan & Trust, namely,
that income is the gain derived from capital, labor, or from both
combined, including profit from the sale or exchange of capital assets.
Not only that, but they did so with an explicit cross-reference to
Merchant's.

Therefore, it cannot be the case that the definition of "income" has any
dependence on the nature (corporate or natural) of the person deriving the
alleged "income."

This can be quite easily seen when one actually goes back and reads (and
understands) what was going on in Stratton's Independence (from whence the
Eisner v. Macomber Court drew its definition of "income," with the
addition of the explicit reference to capital assets).

The task of the Court in Stratton's Independence was two-fold, first to
determine if the plaintiff was a member of the class of persons subject to
the tax, and second to determine what the measure of the tax was,
primarily to determine if the sale proceeds of the mined ore were included
in that measure.

These are two analytically distinct issues, namely:

(1) Who is being taxed (and is the plaintiff among them)?

(2) What is the amount of the tax based on (and is this particular item
included in that base)?

Thus, since the class of persons subject to tax in the Corporation Tax Act
of 1909 were only corporations engaged in business in the U.S., the Court
had to first analyze whether the plaintiff was engaged in business - that
is, whether the act of mining gold from your own property was either (a)
just the conversion of your own capital from one form to another - and
hence not a business because not generating any profits, or (b) the sort
of economic activity from which persons engaged in it would expect to
obtain a gain on the capital and labor they invested in the activity - and
hence "business activity." The Court concluded that because the activity
of mining was closely analogous to manufacturing - which was undeniably a
"business" - and since people who engage in mining generally expect to
earn a profit on it (that is, to derive gain from their investment), the
Court concluded that the plaintiff was a corporation engaged in business
and thus included in the class of persons subject to the tax.

Second, leveraging off of its discussion under the first issue, the Court
noted that it had already determined that the activity of mining generally
produces, for those engaged in it, gains derived from the capital and
labor invested therein, and decided that the sale proceeds of the mined
gold was, in fact, the sort of gain that any person engaged in mining
would expect to derive. Thus, the sale proceeds were "income" in that
they were gains derived from the use of capital and labor in the business
of mining.

Notice, in determining whether or not the plaintiff was a member of the
class of persons taxed, the Court had to determine if it was engaged in
business activity, that is, whether it expected to make a profit from the
activity, or, put in other words, whether it expected to have "income"
from the activity. Thus, the identification of the class of persons
taxed, in this case, depends on whether the activity engaged in is engaged
in for purposes of generating "income" (whether or not any income is
actually derived - thus, the analysis is still distinct from the analysis
of the measure of the tax).

Finally, the issue of whether the proceeds were "income" was completely
distinct from the nature of both the activity engaged in and the person
engaging in the activity - so long as a particular item constituted "gain
derived from capital, labor, or both" - it was "income." Thus, the
analysis of the measure of the tax is completely distinct from the
analysis of whether or not the plaintiff is a member of the class of
persons taxed.

In short, the cases you "cite" to do not hold that "income" means only the
gain derived by corporations, and thus any subsequent lower court cases
are (a) not overruling anything you've cited to, and (b) are in fact
applying the cases you cite to for the right reasons.



Or, how about this one, just four days later, on October 31, 2005:

Re: Dale, your only Corporations have income is a loser also.
by "Shyster1040" <Shyster1040@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Oct 31, 2005 at 01:03 PM


First point - the question was about your (erroneous) claim that only
corporations have "income" under the Constitution; it was not about
withholding of income tax at source on wages. So, why does your "answer"
only concern itself with such withholding? Where's your "answer" in
support of your claim about only corporations having income. But on to
the main point - refuting another one of your dumb claims.

Geez, Dale. Once again, you demonstrate your pathetic inability to read
the law.

"Include" is not, repeat not, a term of exclusion - it does not exclude
otherwise valid members of the set under discussion (in this case
employees) simply by failing to list them.

Section 7701(c) - Includes and Including. - The terms "includes" and
"including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not
be
deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term
defined.

Geez Dale. Guess what - that means that whatever the term "employee"
means in common parlance, it also has that meaning for purposes of the
Code. Thus, if you are a common-law employee under the common-law as
applied under the state law of a particular state, then you are an
"employee" for purposes of the Code because the term "employee," in
common
parlance, includes persons who are common-law employees.

So, you lose. Since anyone who would be classified as a common-law
employee under their respective state law is an "employee" for purposes
of
the Code, they have "wages" for purposes of chapter 24.

Know what that means? It means that if you would qualify as a common-law
employee, then you have "wages" and are subject to mandatory withholding
of income at source. Since a common-law employee has "wages," it follows
ineluctably that they are not making "voluntary withholding agreements"
with their employers.

Thus, your "answer" is not an answer at all, but merely another example
of
you demonstrating your singular incapacity to understand any part of the
Code (or the law as a general matter).

Which brings me to a related point. Did you notice that the language of
Code section 3401(a) is limited in its scope?

It says, "for purposes of this chapter," and as you were so kind to
include in your oh-so-snazzy graphic, Code section 3401 is located in
"Chapter 24" of Subtitle C of the Code.

By contrast, the imposition of the tax on income, and the definition of
what is gross income, occurs under Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Code.
Guess what Dale, that means that, by its own terms, the definition of
"wages" in Section 3401(a) applies only to Chapter 24 of Subtitle C and
thus has no bearing on what is, or is not, "income" for purposes of
Chapter 1 of Subtitle A.




Or, this one, from a different thread, on February 14, 2005:

Re: Best information from www.paynotaxes.org
by "Shyster1040" <Shyster1040@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Feb 14, 2005 at 01:04 PM


Sorry, monkey-boy, but that ain't the way it works. Congress may impose
any tax it wishes; if the tax is classified as an impost, duty or excise,
then it must be applied with geographically uniform rates; if the tax is
a
so-called "direct tax," then, subject to the 16th Amendment, it must be
apportioned on the basis of the census.

More to the point, no court, no legislature, and no rational commentator
(you do not count, for very obvious reasons) has ever suggested that the
income tax was not a permissible tax. It has always been a permissible
tax; the only issue in the Income Tax cases was whether or not it had to
be directly apportioned. The Supreme Court said that any tax on the
income from property was a tax on the property itself and therefore a
direct tax (notice, dimbulb, they never once talked about the tax on
wages). The 16th Amendment promptly overruled the Income Tax cases, with
the result that Congress can (as it always could) enact an income tax,
and
now it is beyond cavil that such a tax is never subject to the direct
apportionment requirements.

Finally, if you would, just for once, read the damned cases you
continually regurgitate here, you would see that they dealt with the
direct/indirect issue by holding that the income tax was taken out of the
direct category (whether or not it ever was really in there was
immaterial) and placed into the category of indirect taxes, meaning that
the only limitation on it is that it must be applied with uniform rates.
Your drivel about "is it a privilege or is it a right" is meaningless
tripe. A tax on income has always been, ever since the beginning of
recorded English history, a valid tax (and a direct tax at that); it
continued to be a valid tax under the Constitution in 1789, and was only
subject to the apportionment requirement. That requirement was lifted
with the 16th Amendment. Therefore, incomes can be taxed, as they always
could, but the only restriction on the tax is that it be applied with
uniform rates.



Or, .....

Even if you don't, everyone else gets the point.

The bottom line is, Dale, I whupped your ass so good the last time you ran
away and hid for more than a year.

.

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