Re: AMD planning 45nm 12-Core 'Istanbul' Processor ?

Robert Myers wrote:
Robert Myers wrote:
I thought financial wizards knew how to estimate risk.

What risk? You dont understand squat what you talk about. There is no
general risk. So what risk? If they failed at one field doesnt mean they
fail in much simpler ones. Show me one example of impropely estimated
risk wrt to software bringing down one of those companies...

You claimed that the people you work for know how to estimate risk.
Manifestly, financial institutions have their shortcomings in the area
of risk estimation. Oh. They know how to estimate software risk
(even though it's known to be an impossibly hard problem), but they
screw up on more important kinds of risk?

Oh, they guy can't pilot a plane, how would you accept he coul'd drive a
car. ROTFL!

Do you expect anyone to
take you seriously?

Well It's you who can't be taken seriously. Your continued strawman
invention is more and more funny.


You've changed your story.

Nope.

You remind me of the NASA managers.

You reming me of high skool kids having solution to every problem of the
World. You're simply laughable.

[...]
Just don't make
claims about knowing more than you could possibly know.


Look in the mirror. You're discussing stuff you're clules about.


Unreliable in what field?

The history of risk estimation, whether in aerospace or finance, has
not been a happy one.

ROTFL!

How all those insurance companies are alive and kicking!

[...]
The difference is that most software risk is not unexpected and can be
eliminated.

Oh, you start to get it!

Unfortunately, the methods that are available are rarely used.

They are used where they are needed. Your lack of clue about software
production doesn't change the reality. But those methods still do not cover
everything.


So contrary to financial markets which as Keith described nicely are
Schroedinger Cat on Steroids, software is a good behaved beast.

Not really.

Really.

All the problems that NASA has encountered obtain.
People who *really* have to get it right (the fly by wire folks) don't
do business the way you apparently do.

You don't know squat how I do business.

Even then, everyone
understands that a plane could fall out of the sky because of a flight
control software problem.

Of course.


As painful as the shuttle disasters were, we learned things from each
one. They have resulted in changes in methodology, not drugs to
increase imaginative capacity. What will *not* happen, unfortunately,
is to recognize the behavior patterns of managers present in both
cases and to eliminate such people from critical decision-making
roles.

And you know why? The behaviour is so typical that noone could be
declared immune to that.

Everyone does it, he explained, as he grabbed for himself as much as
he could.

Whatever. You again didn't get it. And again speak off clulelessness.

When shuttle started to fly many things behaved off normal, oustide design
guidelines. Yet nothing serious happend. So NASA started to change
guidelines to things which apparently occured. As there was large group of
people involved there was not possibility of 100% agreement. And management
pushing for their own goals after many raised concerns turning into nothing
started to care less and less. This is typical human behaviour. It has
nothing to the nonsense you put above.

Sebastian Kaliszewski
--
"Never underestimate the power of human stupidity" -- L. Lang
.

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