Re: Computer being developed modeled after human brain

Don Stockbauer <donstockbauer@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Apr 25, 9:38=A0pm, c...@xxxxxxxx (Curt Welch) wrote:
casey <jgkjca...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Apr 25, 3:23=3DA0pm, Don Stockbauer <donstockba...@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrot=
e:

It's more like information provides the means
of a system controlling other systems and
controlling itself.

Ok, but the debate was about the physical nature
of an abstraction, such as "information". Curt
will point out that the abstraction exists in some
physical form in the brain and is thus physical.

Right. =A0When we talk about an abstraction, we are in fact talking
about=
the
behavior of a human brain. =A0We don't normally bother to think of it
in those terms (and for every day use, we can totally ignore that
fact), but that is what we are actually talking about.

This is because in every day use, we regularly confuse the distinction
about what happens in the brain, and what happens outside of the brain.
=
=A0Is
red in the apple, or in the brain? =A0When I go out to buy, and eat,
red apples, it makes no difference, if the people I talk to, understand
the difference. =A0I can ask the grocer where to find the red apples,
or how =
much
the red apple cost, even if he has no clue about what red is, and where
i=
t
exists.

This, for the most part, is true about the meaning of almost every word
w=
e
use. =A0Words are used to label aspects of the universe, but the
meaning =
of
the word, is defined by our brain hardware. =A0Tghe light, or the
things =
out
in the universe that create it, exist outside the brain. But the way
the brain classifies that physical event, and respond to it by
producing the word "red" is something that happens in the brain.

The classification of physical events as "things" and "actions" is
likewi=
se
something the brain does, not something that exists "out there".

It was also about what is a physical object.
Curt seems to be saying that an apple IS what an
apple DOES, presumably, what it does physically
in the brain that is doing "apple".

The apple is what it is (a continuous flow of physical events) whether
there's a brain to be effected by those events or not. =A0When I talk
abo=
ut
applies, I normally am making a reference to the thing "out there" that
exists even when I'm not here. =A0I think you (John) tend to do just
the opposite. =A0You are more likely to making reference to what is
happening=
"in
here".

If we build a robot with a camera and audio output, and make it produce
t=
he
words "I see a red apple" when a red apple is placed in its field of
vision, what is that robot "talking about"? =A0Is it talking about the
ap=
ple,
ort the light spectrum reflected from it? Or is it talking about the
internal behavior (signals) of the hardware inside its head that is the
indication that the machine has classified those physical events as a
"re=
d
apple" events even before it started to make the speaker vibrate to
produ=
ce
the words?

In normal day to day communication, the distinction is not relevant.
=A0B=
ut
in these debates of mind and brain, the distinction becomes very
importan=
t.
The only reason that robot knows it has seen a red apple (in it's mind)
i=
s
because there is internal hardware that represents the "red apple"
event. So when it says it sees a red apple, is it talking about seeing
those internal hardware events, or seeing the apple out there?

Does the red apple abstraction exist in the computer hardware, or in
the apple out there? =A0Well, the definition of what a "red apple" is,
is def=
ined
in the robot hardware, not in the apple. =A0But regardless of where the
meaning of the words are defined, the apple the robot is talking about
still exists both "out there" and "in here" as the signals which
represen=
t
the "red apple" for the robot. =A0And when the robot is talking about
red apples, it's really talking about both unless it's gets specific
about which it's talking about - but that would require abstractions
about the perception of red apples which is a bit complex for most
robots today. :)

To say everything is an action in a brain may
be true but it is not in my opinion very useful.

I have never said everything is an action in the brain. =A0You are the
on=
e
that seems to like to think in those terms by choosing to believe when
yo=
u
talk about an apple, or when you "see" an apple, you are only seeing
your own internal brain behavior (qualia), and not the apple "out
there". =A0I tend to do just the opposite. =A0I tend to think in terms
of the apple ou=
t
there, and ignore the fact that is internal brain behavior happening
that allows me to know about the apple out there.

When I talk about red light, I'm not talking about my red brain qualia.
I'm talking about the the electromagnetic spectrum out there. =A0It's
jus=
t my
brain qualia which has classified the event out there as falling into
the "red light" classification.

"seeing red" is a brain event. =A0"Seeing" a montior as a thing,
instead =
of
an action" is a brain event. =A0but the red apple, and the monitor, are
things "out there".

The abstraction is defined by how our hardware works, but it makes
reference to things "out there".

To say that a noun is a verb may make an English
class with teacher Curt at the blackboard an
easy lesson but it will not give you the rich
vocabulary required to really understand how it
all works in detail.

JC

Yes, the question isn't whether nouns and verbs are useful (they are).
Th=
e
question is what are they? =A0Are they attributes of the universe, or
creations of the brain? =A0The answer is that the distinction between
wha=
t is
a "thing" and what is an "action", is not something that happens "out
there", but instead, happens "in here". =A0The distinction between
thing =
and
action, is exactly like the distinction between red and blue. =A0It's
an arbitrary (but useful) classification of sensory data performed by
the human brain.

Where does black turn into white? =A0Or light turn into dark? =A0Or
quiet=
into
loud? =A0The classification is something created by the brain, not by
the universe "out there". But it's a very useful classification because
it allows us to communicate to others a rough idea of the physical
effects w=
e
are talking about. Before it's useful, we have to condition everyone to
u=
se
approximately the same convention, but that happens as a normal part of
trying to communicate.

Just like a measurement system is totally arbitrary. =A0To say a stick
is=
8
cm long is a very useful communication tool. =A0We classify some
physical event into the group of 8 cm stick events, instead of
classifying it into the 9 cm group. =A0There is nothing about the
sticks, that makes the choo=
se
to divide the two groups at the 9 cm length. =A0It's an arbitrary (but
useful) convention created by the human brain. =A0The classification of
sensory events into "things" vs "actions" is the same type of
arbitrary, but useful, classification. =A0The dividing line between the
two doesn't exist "out there", it exists in how human brain hardware
works (and in ho=
w
we have been conditioned - by evolved social language convention).

Hope you two resolve this someday.

Not likely. We will just keep talking past each other until the end of
time!

At least it creates a little traffic in the group. :) It's been kinda low
lately.

--
Curt Welch http://CurtWelch.Com/
curt@xxxxxxxx http://NewsReader.Com/
.

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