Re: your thoughts are needed


"casey" <jgkjcasey@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:b8e8d662-ffa4-4084-b291-cb37daa06a1c@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
On Jan 8, 1:26 am, forbisga...@xxxxxxx wrote:
On Jan 7, 12:38 am, casey <jgkjca...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I take the view that mental events *are* brain events.
One is an objective point of view and the other a
subjective point of view of the same event. An
unconscious event is one in which there is no
subjective point of view although there may still
be an objective point of view of the event.


Yes. I wish there was an objective way to tell conscious
and unconscious events apart. Weak Functionalism tells
me that if I get the functions right I will get the
behaviors right.

...

I do not deny that computers may have a conscious
existence. I deny that this is implied from the
functions implemented.


JC: Whereas I would deny that computers have a conscious
existence unless they have the internal subjective,
first person, processing required.

GS: No comment yet.

It is not clear to me that behavior is sufficient
to ascribe consciousness and yet I do it all the time.

JC: I don't think external behavior is sufficient to
ascribe consciousness for I see it as the ability
to at least have a first person point of view.

GS: But keep in mind the argument that (1.) we mostly think that others have
"subjective experiences" because they tell us about them. Indeed, if the
ability to "report" is lacking, we deny "subjective experience" even when
the behavior exhibited by the subject would otherwise constitute grounds for
claiming "subjective awarenes! I have in mind here, stuff like so-called
"blind sight." Also (2.) "the ability to at least have a first person point
of view" could be viewed as a kind of behavior. So, while it isn't "external
behavior," it is behavior nonetheless. This should not be taken to mean that
what is observed is "in the brain" except, possibly, in a very restricted
sense. IOW, most of the relevant neurophysiology that constitutes "the
ability to at least have a first person point of view" is not visible, and
most of what we are "experiencing" in the first person is unambiguously
"behavior" in the restricted sense of "animal behavior." I'll allow,
ultimately, that some kinds of subjective experience are controlled by
stimuli for which the designation "behavior" and "physiological event" are
inseperable, but I don't know this for sure. I read an interestin abstract
the other day, and what the authors' were claiming is that, even if someone
is looking directly at a particular stimulus, certain subtle responses of
the neck muscles are highly correlated with "whether or not the person is
really 'paying attention.'" In case you can't see it, the reason I bring up
"attention" is that it could be construed as a kind of behavior that is
subtle and not easily seen as "external behavior."

JC: Keep in mind those patients who awoke during
an operation, or were in a "coma" and yet aware
of what was being said but couldn't communicate
the fact.

GS: But this merely suggests that the behavior of "hav[ing] a first person
point of view" is left intact while other responses are not.

JC: From a practical point of view I think you are safe
to assign consciousness to animals according to their
behavior. However I would not be so quick to assign
it to a computer program or a mechanical quaking duck.

GS: Two points:
(1.) responding to stimuli is often the only criterion necessay to say that
an animal is "conscious." So, the statement, "I think you are safe to assign
consciousness to animals according to their behavior" strikes me as odd; it
is common practice - it is the way the "language game" works.
(2.): There is another meaning of "consciousness" that, ironically, denies
that responding to stimuli is enough to claim "conciousness." This is what
you are really after. But it is a psuedo-distinction from one point of view
in that , "the ability to at least have a first person point of view" is
referring to the control of a subtle response by stimuli. In closing I would
say that I have thought a great deal about this, and I have come to the
tentative conclusion that this is largely a sort of academic construction
(i.e., the latter definition of "consciousness"). Don't get me wrong, I
think it is an important distinction. It is pointing to the difference
between "awareness" and "self-awareness." I have spent a great deal of time
discussing the distinction over the years right here in comp.ai.philosophy.


Glen's response to your prior response are interesting
to me. I think his questions need exploring. I can't
do it because of history. Each of us has a model of
others in the newsgroup and this filters our
interpretations of what is written.

JC: I don't know if Glen has anything worthwhile to say
or not but you shouldn't let your feelings get in
the way of exploring his questions for that would
be your loss not his.

GS: Needless to say, I think I have had something important to say.



.

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