Re: Does Searle's "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?
- From: "J.A. Legris" <jalegris@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2007 05:34:52 -0700
On Sep 26, 5:23 am, tvashtar <tvash...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Sep 25, 9:12 pm, "J.A. Legris" <jaleg...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
"...More recently (1997), Searle has argued that the Chinese Room
Argument granted too much to computationalism. As he sees it now, the
argument wrongly took as unproblematic the assumption that computer
programs are syntactic or symbolic in the first place. Instead, he
argues that there is no fact intrinsic to the physics of computers
that make their operations syntactic or symbolic; rather, the
ascription of syntax or symbolic operations to a computer program is a
matter of human interpretation..."
Thank you for these quotes, the certainly shed a lot of light on
Searle's thoughts. I feel the problem is within a computer program
symbols certainly do accrue meaning, within that program. Similarly
within our own mind we attach symbolic meaning to meaningless
interactions. To take what he says and turn it on its head:
|| he argues that there is no fact intrinsic to the physics of the
brain
that make its operations syntactic or symbolic; rather, the
ascription of syntax or symbolic operations of a brain is a
matter of that brains interpretation... ||
At the base level what is meaning except an agreed protocol of values
and targets?
From:
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cfs/472_html/Intro/NYT_Intro/History/SearleChinese.html
"...What is Searle's positive view? What more besides implementing an
algorithm that is formally isomorphic to the thinking that goes on in
the human brain is required to produce a thinking thing? According to
Searle, whether something is thinking depends not only on what
computational algorithm it is running (the software) but also the
nature of the thing that is running the algorithm (the hardware). The
problem with functionalism, Searle argues, is that it abstracts away
too much from the actual physical implementation of the computational
processes involved in thinking. A program "running on" a human brain
might constitute thinking, but the same program running on a computer
made out of "beer cans strung together with wires and powered by
windmills," or by the population of a large country (such as China)
would not constitute thinking. As he puts it, some materials in which
an algorithm might be implemented have the "causal power" to produce
thinking, and others do not. He does not provide a criterion for
deciding which things do and which do not have the "causal power" to
produce thinking. That is a matter for future investigation..."
-----------------------------
I hasten to add that this notion of "causal power" is not some form of
vitalism or animism. To my mind it is the tacit acceptance that
thinking is an activity of extremely complex biochemical systems that
arose only after billions of years of tuning and tinkering and
experimenting (with their own lives!). The resulting information
embedded in the structure of every living thing reflects the
properties of the underlying materials and the ancient history of each
species. Syntax is an afterthought.
--
Joe
.
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