Re: Does Searle's "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?
- From: tvashtar <tvashtar@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2007 09:23:23 -0000
On Sep 25, 9:12 pm, "J.A. Legris" <jaleg...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
"...More recently (1997), Searle has argued that the Chinese Room
Argument granted too much to computationalism. As he sees it now, the
argument wrongly took as unproblematic the assumption that computer
programs are syntactic or symbolic in the first place. Instead, he
argues that there is no fact intrinsic to the physics of computers
that make their operations syntactic or symbolic; rather, the
ascription of syntax or symbolic operations to a computer program is a
matter of human interpretation..."
Thank you for these quotes, the certainly shed a lot of light on
Searle's thoughts. I feel the problem is within a computer program
symbols certainly do accrue meaning, within that program. Similarly
within our own mind we attach symbolic meaning to meaningless
interactions. To take what he says and turn it on its head:
|| he argues that there is no fact intrinsic to the physics of the
brain
that make its operations syntactic or symbolic; rather, the
ascription of syntax or symbolic operations of a brain is a
matter of that brains interpretation... ||
At the base level what is meaning except an agreed protocol of values
and targets?
.
- Follow-Ups:
- References:
- Prev by Date: Re: Does Searle's "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?
- Next by Date: Re: Does Searle's "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?
- Previous by thread: Re: Does Searle's "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?
- Next by thread: Re: Does Searle's "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|
