Re: Does Searle's "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?

On Sep 25, 7:41 am, tvashtar <tvash...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Sep 25, 3:18 pm, c...@xxxxxxxx (Curt Welch) wrote:

tvashtar <tvash...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I'm wondering if people out there can shed some light on whether or
not Searle considers consciousness to be a non-scientific process?

I don't consider it to be outside the reach of science because I don't
believe it's anything other than the physical operation of a physical
brain.

Well I would totally agree, I'm just interested to know how exactly
Searle's argument has become so influential (in exposure if not
acceptance) when it appears (to me at least) to moot the idea of the
brain being somewhat magic.

Notice how Curt's arguments rest on Curt's beliefs.

Do you think Empirical Science rests upon beliefs or upon empirical
evidence? Sure, there are some a priori beliefs backing the
philosophy of science but these beliefs are non-controversial.

Before discussing Searle's Chineese Room intuition pump one must
put it in context. The context is symbolic processing, in particular
Roger Schank's Conceptual Dependency. Searle got upset by by CS
students coming into his class and making unsupportable claims.
The Chineese Room intuition pump was his reply to them. There was
never a meeting of the minds.

There is a say that goes "about that which nothing can be said
say nothing." Empirical Science can say nothing about that which
is not third person observable.

Is consciousness or awareness third person observable? I don't
think so. What we observe is behavior and from behavior we
make claims about consciousness but this adds nothing to any
explaination of behavior since all that can be observed can
be equally explained without appeal to conscioiusness. When
considering two explantions one of which is (A and B) -> C
and the other is A -> C one should prefer A -> C.

That about which nothing can be said say nothing.

.

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