Re: Does Searle's "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?

On Sep 25, 9:51 am, tvashtar <tvash...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I'm wondering if people out there can shed some light on whether or
not Searle considers consciousness to be a non-scientific process?

I presume you mean "inaccessible to science" rather than "a non-
scientific process", which might be a cracked beaker or a baptism.

I'm pretty sure that Searle thinks consciousness is accessible to
science, but with some caveats. Quoting from:

http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/searle.html

------------------------------------

"... The first basic principle grounding Searle's theory of
consciousness is that consciousness is irreducible. For Searle,
consciousness is essentially a first-person, subjective phenomenon,
and thus talk of conscious states cannot be reduced or eliminated in
favor of third-person, objective talk about neural events. Any such
attempt at reduction, Searle argues, simply misses the essential
features of conscious states -- that is, their subjective qualities.
(See also entry on aspectual shape.)"

"The second basic principle is that consciousness is as much an
ordinary biological phenomenon as is digestion. It is from this
principle that Searle derives an argument for a non-dualist, causal
approach to the problem of consciousness..."

------------------------------------

Searle's Chinese Room Argument was intended to demonstrate that syntax
alone cannot account for semantics, so mere computation is
insufficient to obtain AI. Now he's gone a step further: (quoted from
the same source)

"...More recently (1997), Searle has argued that the Chinese Room
Argument granted too much to computationalism. As he sees it now, the
argument wrongly took as unproblematic the assumption that computer
programs are syntactic or symbolic in the first place. Instead, he
argues that there is no fact intrinsic to the physics of computers
that make their operations syntactic or symbolic; rather, the
ascription of syntax or symbolic operations to a computer program is a
matter of human interpretation..."

--
Joe

.

Relevant Pages

  • Searle on sonsciousness and language
    ... Consciousness and Language ... by John R. Searle ... explanations in the social science to consciousness and intentionality, ... categories of materialism and dualism altogether. ...
    (uk.philosophy.humanism)
  • Re: TELEPORTATION Physics Study by Eric W. Davis
    ... Professor John Searle ... Mind: A Brief Introduction ... consciousness, Searle points out, is to capture the first ...
    (sci.physics)
  • Re: Does Searles "Chinese Room" argument imply that consciousness is non-scientific?
    ... not Searle considers consciousness to be a non-scientific process? ... I'm pretty sure that Searle thinks consciousness is accessible to ... "The second basic principle is that consciousness is as much an ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Gould vs. Dawkins
    ... treated to another go at consciousness by John Searle reviewing a book ... by Nicholas Humphrey titled "Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness". ... I'm sure Searle would still remain outside of it. ... The fact that brain and mind both have material infrastructure ...
    (talk.origins)