Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review

On May 30, 10:38 am, Wolf <ElLoboVi...@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Allan C Cybulskie wrote:
On May 29, 9:28 am, Wolf <ElLoboVi...@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
Allan C Cybulskie <allan_c_cybuls...@xxxxxxxx> writes:
(review not quoted)
Good review. You hit on the problem with most (maybe all) arguments
against free will. Namely, when the conclusion is applied to the
arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that
conclusion.
My experience is that people who argue against free will attempt to
just brush off this objection. They don't answer it. They simply
deny that it has merit.
There is no logical connection between free will and the ability to
reach conclusions. Neither implies the other, therefore denying either
doesn't deny the other.

And of course my objection denies merit to the position you espouse. Any
criticism of the logic of am argument denies merit to that argument.

Well, that's debatable. I mean, don't I have to accept a conclusion?

No.

I think you miss the point: if someone is making an argument and they
expect my behaviour to change as a result of my hearing/reading it,
don't I have to participate in "accepting the conclusion" behaviour
before that happens, in at least some interesting way? But isn't that
simply based on past history and environment?

Translate that to the person making the argument. Isn't it safe to
GENERALLY assume that THEY have "accepting the conclusion" behaviour,
and that their behaviour is determined by past history and
environment? Heck, even the "generating the argument" behaviour is
produced that way. So what does it mean that they advanced the
argument? Well, it means that they had a particular past history and
environment. If I COULD choose to accept an argument -- and didn't
have that just fall out from having a particular past history and
environment -- why should I? There's not even any reason to think
that that past history and environment were "right" in any way.

The fact that they argued that argument makes their argument mostly
meaningless if it's true. And if it's false, why care about it?


Do I never have to make a choice of any kind in reaching a
conclusion?

What do you mean by choice? What logical connection do you see between
"choice" and "free will". (IMO, you are begging the question by
implicating free will in choice.)

Well, free will and choice are intertwined in interesting ways. But
hopefully the above paragraph clears up the "choice" angle. I mean,
you could call something "choice behaviour" but it wouldn't be the
type of behaviour we'd need here.

[snipped. Mostly phrasing issues dealt with better by my first
paragraph]

Basically, if they couldn't help but be convinced of that argument --
whether or not it was true -- then there's no real benefit or warrant
added by them advancing the argument.

Well, I don't know what it means to be convinced by an argument. In my
experience, no one is convinced by an argument. Not even philosophers.
;-) The best I can do to parse that phrase is "report that the
argument's conclusion agrees with one's prejudices." (That sounds like
one of Ambrose Bierce's sayings.)

This point would work against you; arguments SEEM to change some of
our prejudices, and cause us to reject them.


But even if you are right, Skinner's view still has a specific problem
that I've outlined in the first post and hinted at twice now, so I
won't hint at it again [grin].

If you intend "free will" as issue, I don't think Skinner's view has a
specific problem, unless you assume that "free will" is some aspect of
"mind" that doesn't obey any known laws of the natural universe.

Well, it wasn't that general.


If you think the issue has to do with controllers and controlled,
Skinner did point out more than once that the pigeon feeder's behaviour
is contingent on the pigeon's behaviour, just as the pigeon's behaviour
is contingent on the feeder's behaviour. About a year ago I argued that
when we say we control the car we are ignoring that the car controls us.
That is, our behaviour while driving a car is constrained in all manner
of ways -- and had better be, if we want to avoid death. I used the
car-driver _system_ as an exemplum of the concept that control is a
bi-lateral relationship. IOW, the standard grammar/usage rules for
"control" mislead us.

Actually, this has nothing to do with this point, and in fact this
point buttresses my issue: how controlled are the controllers?
Skinner implies that they bear responsibility for how they control ...
something he does not grant to the controlled. He can't have it both
ways: either controllers cannot choose how they control or controlled
can choose (in some limited sense) how they are controlled. Going the
"free will" route is, in my opinion, the much more interesting option.


It seems to me that underlying your stance is the assumption that the
notion of "determined behaviour" cannot be reconciled with "free will."
IMO, you are somehow conflating the concepts of "predictable" and
"determined." Theologically, that's the problem of predestination.

I think you need to give some details, because that isn't related to
anything I've said in my opinion. And I accept the argument from
Augustine given below ...

Basically, it ain't about knowing, but is about what I actually do.


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