Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review

On May 29, 3:13 pm, "J.A. Legris" <jaleg...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On May 29, 9:36 am, Allan C Cybulskie <allan_c_cybuls...@xxxxxxxx>
wrote:



On May 29, 9:30 am, forbisga...@xxxxxxx wrote:

On May 29, 5:50 am, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

"Neil W Rickert" <rickert...@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote in messagenews:K1L6i.4150$u56.4002@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Allan C Cybulskie <allan_c_cybuls...@xxxxxxxx> writes:

(review not quoted)

Good review. You hit on the problem with most (maybe all) arguments
against free will. Namely, when the conclusion is applied to the
arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that
conclusion.

There seems to be something missing. Namely, how this follows from an
argument against free-will. How, for example, does saying that behavior we
tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement
mean that the arguer's behavior cannot be a product of contingencies?

I'm pretty sure Allan was addressing the incoherence of any
notion of moral culpability when one accepts that behavior
is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement.

This doesn't mean either position must be given up. It only means
that the vast majority of society will consider people antisocial
who believe the notion of moral culpability is incoherent even
though this may be due to the contingencies of reinforcement.

Actually, it's more a problem that Skinner seems to be assigning
responsiblity to "controllers" for their actions but not to the
"controlled". But surely the controllers are no more free than the
controlled.

But in principle that's not a problem.

On the contrary, in principle it's a huge problem: there is no point
in admonishing people to change things to be a certain way, set
certain values, or aim for a certain society if what they do is only
what the unique combination of their past history and environment
"force" them to do. You cannot claim that controllers are responsible
for what they do because they in some way "choose" it (the implication
in Skinner, but not stated) and then say that the controlled HAVE no
choice. You can say that the controlled SHOULDN'T, but not that they
DON'T. And if you can't say that controllers are responsible for what
they do, why tell them to do things a certain way? But then Skinner
has as little choice over what he says as anyone else ...

Basically, Skinner seems to be saying that controllers should try
controlling in certain ways to produce a better society. But if they
don't have any more control than the controlled do, then there is no
try ... there is only do.

For example, lawmakers are
controlled (we hope) by the collective actions of the populace, but
individuals are controlled by law-enforcement. IIRC, Skinner was
arguing for laws and enforcement based on the observed characteristics
of behaviour instead of the assumed nature of humans. A noble cause,
but alas, the devil is in the details.

There's a bit of an issue here with "controlled". If you mean
"determined certainly", then you have the problems I mentioned above.
If you mean "influenced" or even "influenced strongly", no one would
ever disagree with that.

For example, above you probably would be saying that individuals are
controlled by law-enforcement because they would arrest or physically
restrain people who are breaking the laws. But Skinner's view is
stronger than that; their mere presence would control the behaviour
because of the past history + environment controlling factor. In
short, it isn't REALLY after the fact that Skinner wants things to be
controlled. But that applies to the controllers as well.

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement ... is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement. ... But surely the controllers are no more free than the ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... mean that the arguer's behavior cannot be a product of contingencies? ... is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement. ... responsiblity to "controllers" for their actions but not to the ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement ... is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement. ... But surely the controllers are no more free than the ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement ... is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement. ... But surely the controllers are no more free than the ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement ... responsiblity to "controllers" for their actions but not to the ... But surely the controllers are no more free than the ... But then Skinner ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)