Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review

On May 29, 9:36 am, Allan C Cybulskie <allan_c_cybuls...@xxxxxxxx>
wrote:
On May 29, 9:30 am, forbisga...@xxxxxxx wrote:



On May 29, 5:50 am, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

"Neil W Rickert" <rickert...@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote in messagenews:K1L6i.4150$u56.4002@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Allan C Cybulskie <allan_c_cybuls...@xxxxxxxx> writes:

(review not quoted)

Good review. You hit on the problem with most (maybe all) arguments
against free will. Namely, when the conclusion is applied to the
arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that
conclusion.

There seems to be something missing. Namely, how this follows from an
argument against free-will. How, for example, does saying that behavior we
tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement
mean that the arguer's behavior cannot be a product of contingencies?

I'm pretty sure Allan was addressing the incoherence of any
notion of moral culpability when one accepts that behavior
is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement.

This doesn't mean either position must be given up. It only means
that the vast majority of society will consider people antisocial
who believe the notion of moral culpability is incoherent even
though this may be due to the contingencies of reinforcement.

Actually, it's more a problem that Skinner seems to be assigning
responsiblity to "controllers" for their actions but not to the
"controlled". But surely the controllers are no more free than the
controlled.

But in principle that's not a problem. For example, lawmakers are
controlled (we hope) by the collective actions of the populace, but
individuals are controlled by law-enforcement. IIRC, Skinner was
arguing for laws and enforcement based on the observed characteristics
of behaviour instead of the assumed nature of humans. A noble cause,
but alas, the devil is in the details.

--
Joe

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement ... is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement. ... But surely the controllers are no more free than the ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... mean that the arguer's behavior cannot be a product of contingencies? ... is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement. ... responsiblity to "controllers" for their actions but not to the ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement ... is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement. ... But surely the controllers are no more free than the ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement ... is really due to the contingencies of reinforcement. ... who believe the notion of moral culpability is incoherent even ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: Beyond Freedom and Dignity: A Philosophical Review
    ... arguer it implies that the arguer has no ability to reach that ... tend to call "intentional" is really due to contingencies of reinforcement ... But surely the controllers are no more free than the ... couldn't assign responsibility to the controllers if you can't to the ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)