Re: Against Introspectionism

forbisgaryg@xxxxxxx says...

On May 10, 5:17 am, stevendaryl3...@xxxxxxxxx (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:

No, I'm saying that the introspectionist notion of
"mind" has no consequences. And yes, I wish people
would stop talking about it. *My* notion of mind has
observable consequences, and I think it *is* useful
to talk about it.

Except that you aren't talking about mind.

Yes, I am. I'm talking about what I mean by mind.

Behaviors have consequences. Talk about behaviors all you
want.

Only certain behaviors are associated with minds.
The word "mind" is useful because it singles out
a particular category of behaviors, causal
connections, etc.

Talk about the causal connection between detected
signals and the production of behavior. You don't need to use
the word "mind" or use any of the words connoting mind.

I would claim that there is no need for introspectionists
to talk about mind. They may as well substitute "myself"
for "mind", because ultimately they are only talking about
themselves.

If you can explain a particular behavior without referencing the
human mind then it would be obvious that anyone asserting a
mind was required would be proven wrong.

I think that's wrong. Mind is (for me) a certain *category* of
behavior and causal relationships. It's like calling
a certain category of weather a "tornado" or a "hurricane"
or a "thunderstorm". Yes, anything you want to say about
tornadoes can be said without using the word "tornado".
Does that prove that there are no tornadoes?

So the analog of the introspectionist would be a "tornadoist"
who has a particular tornado in mind (maybe the one that just
smashed through his town). He *knows* that that was a tornado,
because that's what the word *means* to him. But he's not sure
if other cases of swirling wind are tornadoes, or not. He believes
there is a philosophical problem of "other tornados": how can we know
whether some other weather pattern actually *is* a tornado,
as opposed to just acting like one?

You object to my using the word "mind" to refer to a broad
class of phenomenon, when you want to limit it to a much narrower
class. I'm all in favor of making distinctions *when* those
distinctions are important or interesting. But I haven't yet
heard an example of where the distinction makes a difference.

What's an example of a statement that can be made about
a *real* mind (whatever that is) for which there is no
analogous statement for a pseudo-mind (something that
merely has the right behavior and the right causal
relations)?

What seems to be the case is that for every concept associated
with *real* mentality, there is a corresponding concept associated
with pseudo-mentality. We can talk about pseudo-pain, pseudo-consciousness,
pseudo-emotions, pseudo-beliefs, etc. What is the point of distinguishing
between the concept and the corresponding pseudo-concept? What *follows*
from the distinction? Why is it any more meaningful than the tornadoist
distinguishing between real tornadoes (the ones he personally has witnessed)
and pseudo-tornadoes?

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: be
    ... It's a state of mind, really; a way of describing an action as a ... without committing yourself to its actuality. ... distinctions have disappeared. ...
    (alt.usage.english)
  • Re: be
    ... It's a state of mind, ... It is a mood or state of mind.... ... distinctions have disappeared. ... so I won't trouble you with more of ...
    (alt.usage.english)
  • Re: Free word order (Re: A general question on learning languages)
    ... > fine distinctions and nuances in a concise way. ... you start with what comes to your mind, ... A king-high straight remains a king-high straight, ...
    (sci.lang)
  • Re: The ultimate luxury ?
    ... these distinctions which are so stunningly important to ... Silver lining: It does take one's mind off of all those exceedingly ... annoying 'open questions in physics'. ...
    (sci.physics)
Loading