Re: consciousness

On Apr 19, 8:24 am, Don Geddis <d...@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:


"Alpha" <OmegaZero2...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote on Wed, 18 Apr 2007:

To conflate the workings of the neurons with the
ideas they "represent", as an identity relationship,
is to be very mistaken.


Complex information processing devices can be described
at multiple levels of abstraction.

If your PC is currently running Microsoft Word, at the
end of the day everything that is happening is "just"
electrical signals in transistors. Much like all of
consciousness is really "just" neural signals in the
brain.


Microsoft Word is nothing but electrical signals in
transistors and so is Microsoft Paint but they are in
some way not the same thing. The problem I had with
Curt's conscious rocks was one of saying a conscious
process was the same as an unconscious process which
would have been like saying MS Word is the same as
MS Paint.




But if you're interested in discussing whether MS Word
is doing spelling checking using an American or a British
dictionary, while it is in principle possible to carry
out that discussion at a level of voltages and transistors,
that isn't useful in practice and kind of misses the point.


So of course you talk about software and text and English
"words" and "running a spelling checker". But you aren't
confused in this case that there is something going on
which is _distinct_ from voltages and transistors. It's
merely convenient to describe and discuss behavior at a
higher level of abstraction.


It's the same with consciousness. It's often convenient
to explain the behavior of other humans by using words
like "belief" or "intention" or "qualia".


And it is convenient as it is *useful* just as we use
words like MS Paint or MS Word to explain the behavior
of a machine. There is a difference between the two that
needs an explanation at some level even if they are both
nothing but electrical signals in transistors.



Your confusion is believing that the fact that these
abstractions are useful, is somehow evidence that the
actual phenomena are somehow distinct from the obvious
neural implementation.


As DH says: "Although these [brain things] are all
legitimate and important objects of neurological study,
to me this liost betrays a limited point of view.
Saying that studying the brain is limited to the study
of physical entities such as these would be like saying
that literary criticism must focus on paper and
bookbinding, ink and its chemistry, page sizes and magin
widths, typefaces and paragraph lengths and so forth."


He's absolutely correct that measuring voltages on the
wires of a PC is poor approach to figuring out why MS
Word is misspelling "color" as "colour".

But that does NOT mean that Word is somehow a different
"kind" of thing from voltages and transistors. And
nobody supposes that a novel somehow has causal power
on top of its layout of ink and paper.


And similarly, consciousness is "nothing more" than
neural activity. Even though studying neurons directly
is unlikely to teach you much useful about consciousness.


Nor is saying consciousness is "nothing but" going to
teach us much about consciousness.


He goes on to mention that it is the abstractions
(that Curt dismisses) are central. Abstractions, I
have tried to get Curt to understand, that are
*NOT* indentical with the brain things!


I'm sure Curt is aware that abstractions are important.

What he (and I) object to is your unwarranted conclusion
that they must be distinct phenomena in the universe.


That, in particular, human qualia must be something other
than ordinary neural activity.



there is a gulf that separates the truely (simply or
minimally conscious) from truely non-conscious artifacts
(like rocks).


Just like the so-call "gulf" that separates "living
things" from "non-living things", right? In that case,
non-living things are apparently missing some magic
"vitalism" stuff, right?

Have you given a name to the "stuff" that you think
non-conscious things are missing? In the old days,
people called it a soul. Perhaps you've come up
with a new word.


"Living" matter is arranged differently to non-living
matter. Atoms are in a complex state of dynamic stability
with other atoms unlike the atoms in a non-living rock.
Nothing "vitalistic" about it and nothing "rock-like"
either.

--
JC

The conscious/non-conscious gulf is no different from
the living/non-living gulf. It's a useful abstraction
of the world at a high level, just like dividing the
world into "red objects" and "non-red objects". But,
with a deep scientific understanding, we can come to
realize that none of these distinctions are based on
anything objective about the structure of the universe.


-- Don

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: consciousness
    ... described at the high levels of abstraction. ... theory be implemented by voltages and transistors" is but the merest first ... But what we _don't_ have to do is look to physics for something beyond ... gates as a low-level substrate to host the final solution. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: consciousness
    ... described at the high levels of abstraction. ... theory be implemented by voltages and transistors" is but the merest first ... gates as a low-level substrate to host the final solution. ... from voltages and transistors. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: consciousness
    ... everything that is happening is "just" electrical signals in transistors. ... described at the high levels of abstraction. ... But what we _don't_ have to do is look to physics for something beyond logic ... gates as a low-level substrate to host the final solution. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: consciousness
    ... consciousness is just brain states or brain processes. ... example appeared to highlight that "really just voltages and transistors" ... levels of abstraction, each of which is describing the exact same physical ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: R&Ms "memory illusions" and functional verbal response classes
    ... Consciousness is really a word with too many meanings. ... talk about abstraction, then things can be a bit more precise. ... experiments have demonstrated such abilities in non human animals. ... difference in abstraction abilities between humans and non human ...
    (sci.cognitive)
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