Re: Is the Curt net a kind of decision tree?

Michael Olea wrote:
Curt Welch wrote:

And that, sorry Curt, is all I have time for at the moment.

* Sisemore The Odious, Glen, is the shining light in this newsgroup. It is
his expertise that keeps me here.

AC: If I get some time over the next couple of days, I may try to reply to
the link you posted, but I DO want to reply to this ...

I have the same problem with Glen that I have with Wolf and that I have
with Curt ... their claims overstep their arguments, and yet they are
all insistent that they are correct. Ultimately, Glen ends up arguing
that everyone should share his interests and his research projects[]



GS: No, not everyone. You're not invited Cybulski. Don't take that as an
insult, I just think that is much more valuable for you to continue thinking
about non-physical "forces" that, nonetheless, have physical effects.



AC: [](there was a recent post that really highlighted that, but I didn't
have the time to reply to it) and that if they aren't they're "wrong"
as opposed to focusing on something else.



GS: Like the non-physical universe. I think you should keep working on that
problem.

AC: Look at the article you posted. What he ends up doing is "translating"
cognitive or mentalistic terminology into what he thinks are
behaviouristic correlates: it's all about the environment and it's all
behaviour, it's the same as in a pigeon, etc, etc. To ME, doing that
loses a lot of detail that I want in order to discuss intelligence.



GS: But an important question is why you want these alleged details. Not
because the answers to that question logically defeats some of your alleged
details, but because it casts suspicion on them.



AC: First, what it does is eliminate the distinction between automatic or
instinctive responses and reasoned responses.



GS: No it doesn't. With the caveat added that your nomenclature is
needlessly vague, I can say that the distinction is rather important to
behaviorism. The distinction is between contingency-shaped and rule-governed
behavior.



AC: While it may be the case
that the underlying implementation is not different -- a claim that
behaviourism CANNOT make, since it studiously avoids the level of
detail on implementation that is required to make that claim[]



GS: Half right (which is about the best I have ever seen you do). One can
make the claim that rule-governed behavior is ultimately contingency-shaped.
That is, that "language use" is behavior that can be explained by pointing
to the contingencies that shape and maintain it, even when speaker and
listener are in the same skin. One can hardly talk about human behavior
without talking about thinking, but that doesn't mean that thinking is not
behavior.



AC: -- we
wouldn't call automatic responses themselves INTELLIGENT. Habits
especially can lead to incorrect behaviours that I consciously knew
were wrong.



GS: To the contrary, contingency-shaped behavior falls into your category of
"automatic" but such behavior is frequently called intelligent. The dog that
walks around the fence to get the food instead of jumping at the fence would
be called, by many, intelligent, or at least more intelligent than one that
doesn't. And here's something to ponder, Cybulski, what is "behind thought"?
Certainly not "more thought" right? That means, in a curious sense (showing
the paucity of your distinctions) that thought must "be automatic" because
it certainly can't be the product of thought. No? Now, a smart guy like you
might argue that nervous system behavior is, in some sense, "behind thought"
and I would have to agree. The nervous system is "behind thought" just like
it is "behind" all behavior.



AC: For example, locking my car door with the keys inside
because when I'm anywhere else I always lock the door "automatically"
(and also have the keys on me). We don't want to call such behaviours
"intelligent" because they are, generally, independent of the "big
picture" environmental details AND my internal beliefs ABOUT those
details. So if those behaviours aren't "intelligent", then simply
relating intelligent behaviours and those behaviours simply loses this
important distinction.



GS: Rule-governed, "thought-driven," behavior can also go astray. The
distinction is useless. The distinction between rule-governed behavior and
contingency-shaped behavior is important, but your distinction concerning
the particular outcome on particular occasions is worthless.

AC: This leads to the second point: I learn differently than pigeons do --
and the mechanism I use is much more flexible and faster than the
pigeon's. The pigeon learns to peck the object with the "white" text
to get food, whereas I can be taught to do the same thing merely by
being told "press the object labelled 'white" to get food".



GS: We have had this discussion before. The fact that you can do this is not
inconsistent with the definition operant behavior. The distinction between
contingency-shaped and rule-governed behavior is an important detail, but
both are operants, products of a history of exposure to contingencies and
the current environment.



AC: When we
want to change the mechanism to be the "white" object, the pigeon must
be retrained. I merely have to be told "Press the 'white' object now"
and my behaviour is changed. While one can argue that this is an
artifact of language, that does not seem credible, since it seems that
reasoning could do this as well (given sufficient non-language "clues"
to the change).



GS: Huh? OK, what is "reasoning" then? I have been discussing rule-governed
and contingency-shaped behavior, and I will let that part stand because it
is closely related to what many people "mean" by reasoning. But you want to
argue that reasoning is not connected to "language"? Then what is reasoning?



AC: This is therefore different than the pigeon's
mechanism,[]



GS: As I pointed out, the abilities that you describe are not inconsistent
with a contingency description - so from a logical, definitional standpoint,
you have demonstrated nothing and the "therefore" is completely unwarranted.



AC: []and the behaviouristic language hides that crucial
distinction that casts doubt on the idea that we just have a faster
processor for what the pigeon does (or more memory or ...).



GS: Well, neither of the things you point to are things that I would say,
but that is secondary to the fact that you have said nothing to defend the
notion that the sort of behavior that you are contrasting are not, a the
most fundamental level, different at all.


AC: Finally, even if I accepted the behaviouristic claims, the terminology
is still not useful for my particular interests.



GS: That's because you wouldn't know a reasoned argument from a dog's ass.
BTW, Shinola is, or was, a type of shoe polish.



AC: As was seen in the
first point (or should be obvious from it) I believe that internal
behaviour is CRITICAL in behaviour that can be classified as
intelligent.



GS: I don't know what you mean by "internal behavior," but I would say that
I think that to explain some aspects of human behavior one must point to
private behavior. I have already pointed out that some behavior (that does
not involve private behavior) would be called "intelligent" by lay-speakers,
and the word "intelligence" is, at least part of the time, a colloquial
term.



AC: In short, if you don't think about it, it isn't
intelligent.



GS: Ok. If that is the distinction you want to make, that's fine.



AC: But the behaviouristic terminology tries to HIDE that
critical distinction.



GS: No, it doesn't, as I have already pointed out.



AC: And so if I pursue my project about considering
what are the qualities of behaviours that INCLUDE internal behaviour, I
end up having to reintroduce mentalistic terms because that idea is set
to DELIBERATELY examine the critical components of behaviours that
include internal behaviour. So for MY project, mentalistic terminology
is useful and behaviouristic terminology is not. Yet Glen insists that
all interests and all theories are wrong if they even BORROW from
mentalistic terminology -- or, at least he does that when he's being
grumpy [grin].



GS: Mentalism is sufficient for ordinary activities but it is a hemorrhoid
on the rectum of behavioral science. It is simply animism.


AC: I suspect that you -- and Curt -- approve of Glen's ideas because they
do indeed hide these distinctions, allowing you to avoid questions that
would complicate what you are interested in looking at. Which is fine,
but doesn't mean anything about the views of others, nor does it make
the ideas RIGHT.



GS: As I have said, there are two issues concerning behavioristic
extrapolations of known facts. 1.) is the extrapolation logically
consistentand cogent? 2.) will empirical methods verify it? You want to
argue that it violates the first, but it doesn't. The second is much more
difficult to evaluate because we don't get to do the critical experiments
for ethical reasons.




.

Loading